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1SECTION-A
CHAPTER 1
THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSHIP
Industrial relations is still a developing discipline and 
draws on sociology, law, economics and history for concepts 
and perspectives. It also has a direct practical orientation 
in that it is becoming recognised as an important management 
function. Industrial relations systems vary from country 
to country depending on the degree to which the economy is 
planned and freedom of assosication and other workers1s 
rights are honoured.
In an article in the S.A. Journal of Economics in 1964, 
Clack warned that although the period of latency in the 
development of trade unions can be considerable, the character 
of a country1s industrial relations system deserves close 
attention during and subsequent to a period of high economic 
growth. ‘What does seem clear is that the period during which 
high-velocity economic grorth can be closely associated with 
harsh industrial relations arrangements is finite, and there 
are limits beyond which the 'surplus' for investment derived 
from these restraints on consumption cannot be taken. For 
continuing industrial growth requires the complex skills 
and maintained co-operation of workers, which can only be 
taken by fostering their 1 good faith1.'
(Clack, G., 1964, p.127)
South Africa did experience a high economic growth 
rate during the 1960 decade but Clack's warning was not 
heeded. This is not surprising and supports the fundamental 
fact that industrial relations are primarily power relations. 
It required the explosion of frustration in the demonstration 
strikes of 100 000 non-organised Black workers in 1973 to 
awaken both employers and the State to a response, in 
particular once the emergence of Black unions had to be 
acknowledged. The latency period in the development of 
worker consciousness was over.
No significant theory of industrial relations has been 
developed to predict the nature of the response by the 
State and its agencies, employers and their organisations 
and the White controlled unions, in terms of their position 
in existing industrial relations system, to the re-emerged 
thrust of Black unionism. From the relevant liaterature, 
it is possible to develop an analytical framework on the 
subject of the institutionalisation of industrial conflict. 
The concepts underlying this subject are discussed in this 
section and will be relevant in the analysis of the material 
and data obtained for this study.
1.1 The Idea of the Factory
Wootton states in dramatic but relevant terms that above 
the entrance to the factory should be written the injunction:
'Abandon all hope, ye who enter here1
It is the sociological perspective which helps explain why 
workers, when clocking in their cards, have to forego hope 
of autonomy. The factory system represents a highly 
effective means of bringing all the factors of production 
together in one area, in order to control particularly the 
interaction of worker and machine. Central to this control 
is acceptance of command or authority as the core idea 
of the factory. The worker sells his labour for a wage 
and in return accepts orders given. Instructions have to 
be given by the few to the many and disciplinary action 
ensures obedience. The worker on his own is not party to the 
decision-making process affecting his life and is placed 
in a situation of 'frustration without hope'.
(Wootton, G., 1966).
But the exercise of power inherent in the employer - 
employee relationship is by definition dependent on the 
continued acceptance by the worker - the subordinate - of its 
legitimacy as well as his willingness to co-operate with 
the command structure created. Workers can and do, as their 
definition of the situation changes, question the right 
of management to command. When this questioning occurs 
increasingly as a collective phenomenon, industrial relations 
comes into its own. A more democratic ideology as well as 
different strategies and tactics have to be developed to 
effect either acceptance or compliance with the command 
structure of the place of work. The concept of workers' 
participation in management functions has created interest 
and hope in trade union circles as it offers the possibility 
of changing the nature of this command structure.
Zuthem suggests that the nature of the organisational 
structure of the factory system can be analysed in terms of 
three levels: the implication of division of labour, expression 
of different interests by capital (management) versus labour, 
as well as their ideological considerations.
As a result of the functional division of labour, 
workers have no insight into the overall purpose 
and rationale of their specific activities. Whereas 
the manager plans, co-ordinates, interprets, directs 
and sanctions, the worker has to act. The worker 
cannot see his 'doing' as part of the totality of 
activities or understand his job and judge its 
relevance to the whole. This isolation pushes the 
worker into apathy and builds up discontent and 
hostility. This social isolation and lack of 
identification is reinforced when circumstances exist 
under which workers are easily replaceable, are 
removed from the decision-making process and confined 
to one area in the work place. The division of 
labour further creates unequal distribution of power 
between the employers and the employees. The
4managers who exercise the power further entrencn 
themselves because they have access to information 
and other mechanisms of control. The division of 
labour has built into it unequal distribution of 
earnings and status allocations. Awareness of these 
inequalities create conflicts and tensions. Job 
evaluation might achieve equity regarding job tasks skill 
differentials but cannot resolve what proportion of 
profits is available for wages and what share is 
allocated for re-investments and dividends. Job 
evaluation does not accommodate the perspective of 
workers regarding the size of wage gap between skilled 
and unskilled workers. These considerations 
lead to the second level of analysis.
The factory is also to be understood as being able to 
bring together groups with similar objectives as 
well as differing and divergent interests - the factory 
organisation is plural in nature. Management and 
workers are both concerned to see the factory continue 
operating; - the increasing phenomenon of workers 
occupying factories which were to be closed down 
suggests similar objectives can be identified. The 
differing and opposing interests emerge because of 
unequal allocation of status and rewards and when 
questions arise such as introduction of new 
technology; regulation of power relations, eg. role 
of the work place committee system; nature of 
disciplinary and grievance procedures, wage increases, 
redundancy etc.
The third level of analysis is that of the differing 
beliefs of management and the interest group it 
represents and labour. What is a 'fair wage';
5what is the nature of work; what are human needs; 
what is the source of managerial power, and under 
what circumstances can it be transformed into 
legitimate authority; what is loyalty to the company 
and why can its expression be required; what is 
the dynamic of the profit motive in creating 
investment and job opportunities, etc. It is evident 
that both employers and workers will hold different 
beliefs about such questions and develop, because of 
basic opposing interests, different frames of 
reference regarding such issues. (Zuthem, H., 1976,
pp.133-139). Such questions lead to the consideration 
of the exploitative nature of capitalism and the 
undemocratic nature of unionism.
From the above analysis, it is concluded that there is 
inherent conflict between employers and the workers. To 
facilitate the expression of this industrial conflict, pro­
tection of the divergent interests and promotion of the 
respective objectives has to occur through the establishment 
and maintenance of organisations representing these two 
opposing groups or parties. The expression of the inter­
dependence of the parties requires that a relationship 
pattern is established between the employer or employers 
organisation and the trade union, ie. the effective expression 
of the workers objectives. The form a>id content of the 
organisational expression of employers and their companies 
on the one hand and workers and their unions on the other 
hand is shaped by the values and norms of a society and 
legislation regarding freedom of association, as well as 
operation of the free enterprise systems. The expression 
of these variables dictate how the inherent industrial 
conflict is institutionalised. This institutionalisation 
occurs when managers and union leaders as spokesmen of the 
parties interact and agree on rules to regulate the 
relationship.
6The equitable institutionalisation of industrial 
conflict requires that managerial power is transformed into 
authority; that is, managerial instructions can be legitimately 
exercised but this implies that the system of control over 
worn relations moves from management by coercion to 
management by consent. This consent is achieved in varying 
degrees, when the two parties agree on the items, as well as 
range of influence which trade unions can exercise on the 
decision-making process affecting wages; working conditions, 
quality of life and ultimately the nature of the production 
process and investment policies.
1.5 Power Relations and Workers 1 Rights
If the idea of the factory is command, the system of control 
in the work place is to be understood in terms of power. 
(Dahrendorf, R., 1965). Whatever the ultimate source of 
that power management exercises. When workers become aware 
of their disadvantages and powerless position, they demand 
change thereby forcing managers to defend their position, 
and change their strategies. The notion of managerial 
prerogation is formulated to counter worker demands. Power 
is normally perceived by management as a fixed amount and any 
attempt to interfere with their decision-making function 
is seen as a threat to the control necessary to operate the 
factory effectively and efficiently. The adoption by 
management of this approach leads to open hostility when 
workers seek expression of their collective strength. The 
formulation of an Industrial relationship between management 
(representing the company) and the trade unions (representing 
the organised collectivity of union members) is presented 
to companies as a process offering the possibility of 
regulating behaviour patterns. However the implication of 
institutionalising industrial conflict is that power sharing 
in the decision-making process affecting workers is entered 
into by management with the trade union. By accepting that
7the power component in the employment relationship is 
expandable, management realises that it need not lose 
control of the situation particularly the requirements of 
order in the factory and discipline in work place intereaction; 
the right to give instruction is retained.
The acceptance by management of the process whereby 
industrial conflict is institutionalised, is facilitated if 
that society accepts the broad value of democracy as a basic 
ideology through which plurality of interests are regulated 
and human rights are constitutionally protected. That is, 
in such a society it becomes a norm that because workers 
sell their labour for a wage, they should be protected with 
basic rights in order that they can counter the power of 
management and establish a relationship based on consensus 
and not coercion. The underlying rationale is that if workers 
can, through collective expression exercise rights, the 
unilateral power adopted by management can be transformed 
into authority; that is the basic characteristic of the 
work place is not changed. Instructions still have to be 
obeyed and rules still have to be adhered to. But the 
power of the factory system is transformed into authority when 
management has to account for its decisions and employment 
practices in terms of procedures agreed to with an independent 
body, the union representing the collective wish of the workers. 
Shared responsibility becomes the goal when workers can 
exercise rights.
The universally accepted rights of workers in the free 
world are: the right to organise into a trade union in order 
to give expression to the collective strength of workers; 
the right to negotiate with the company or employers' 
associations in order through agreements to improve the 
standard of living and quality of life; and the right to 
withhold labour, to strike, if no agreement can be reached.
The unrestricted exercising of these rights Is dependent 
on that society accepting the functioning of the trade union 
as an essential part of the democratic process to which that 
society is committed.
8In the early stages of Industrialisation the question as to 
whether managerial power should be legitimised was not raised.
The operation of managerial control and coercive employment 
practices were accepted because of the essential role performed 
by companies in creating wealth, giving work and maintaining 
discipline. Vested interests emerged to ensure that managerial 
power and this status quo were not challenged. As a con­
sequence severe hostility between employers and workers occurred 
as the workers as a class became conscious of their subordinate 
and deprived position. There was at that stage little under­
standing about the variables involved in the institutionalisation 
of industrial conflict.
The establishment of the International Labour Office (ILO) 
in 1918 reflected concern with the social rather than the 
economic aspects of employment relations. The objective of the 
ILO is to establish international labour standards. These 
standards or conventions initially dealt with working con­
ditions but after World War II specific concern emerged about 
the nature of the relationship between employers and workers 
and two conventions were adopted which dealt with the rights 
of workers or freedom of association. Not only are member 
countries of the ILO required to adhere to these conventions, 
but because of the crucial nature of worker rights a standing 
committee on Freedom of Association was established to in­
vestigate reports of alleged contraventions by member States 
of these worker rights.
In the majority of free-world countries, legislation has 
been enacted to enable workers to exercise these rights and 
use their collective bargaining strengths. For example, in 
the United States of America, the National Labour Relations 
Act of 1935 identified five sets of unfair employer practices 
which were seen as constituting interference on the part of 
the employer in the exercise by workers of the right to 
organise and bargain collectively in good faith.
Employers argue that as they constitute the other party in 
the industrial relationship, they should be accorded the same 
rights as workers. Labour legislation or custom or practices 
supports the formation by employers of their associations and 
hence be in a position to counter the demands from labour and
9in certain circumstances deny workers the right to work; ie. 
to lock-out.
There is a dynamic difference between the exercise of these 
rights by employers and workers. Workers have to fight for 
these rights even when legislation provides for them. Societies 
upholding the free enterprise principle accept that employers 
promote their interest through associations or individually.
The different norms operating in society with regard to the 
exercise of rights in order to define the nature of the in­
dustrial relationship is more marked in a country such as South 
Africa where large corporations emerged before all the workers 
were in a position to exercise their rights. These corporations 
with their specialised services increasingly operate independently 
from employers’ associations and use their resources to retain 
control over the expression by workers of their rights. The 
individual company can use but does not need the employers 
association. The worker is powerless without the status of 
union member and going forward in solidarity with other 
workers through the trade union.
Individual companies have the benefits of employers' 
organisations, particularly to set minimum wages for a 
sector to eliminate unfair competition. But the degree to 
which employers' associations play a role in collective 
bargaining varies from country to country. Companies can 
and do enter into collective agreements which a trade union.
This trend is reinforced if there is an emphasis on the 
formalisation of the industrial relationship in the work place.
However, the Union remains the organisational 
expression of these workers who adopt union status. The 
power base of Union is the unionised work force. This is 
why the establishment of a branch of Union in the work place, 
particularly in large companies, is regarded as an essential 
prerequisite to retain equitable relationship between the 
two parties as it prevents control by the employer of the 
decentralised industrial relationship. (Caire, G ., 1977) .
10
The Union branch operating in a company cannot, when 
it comes to collective bargaining, become independent from 
the Union in the sense that the individual company can be 
independent from the employers' association. The 
'collectivity1 of the collective bargaining process refers 
specifically to the organisational expression of the workers 
as union members. But the nature of the employment 
situation in the factory system is such that even if a society 
endorses freedom of association, management can still try to 
'outdo the union1, not only in terms of benefits but with the 
argument that the right to associate implies the right of the 
workers to choose not to belong. This argument has a certain 
logic but overlooks the fact that unions, in an effective and 
equitable industrial relations system, provide a public 
good for the workers of that sector. However, before the 
analysis underlying that statement is made, it is pertinent to 
define the different approaches which can be adopted by an 
employer in response to a situation where workers are 
determined to exercise their rights. This will be followed 
by examination of the concepts underlying the process of the 
institutionalisation of industrial conflict.
1.3 Human Relations and Labour Relations
Management will try and resist unionisation of workers as a 
different relationship has to be entered into with an 
individual worker than with union members acting in unison 
The individual worker enters into a contract of a limited 
type with the company. Once the contract is made it is 
difficult to change the terms and in fact they are often 
not spelt out when employment commences. The individual 
worker has the limited choice to become an employee with a 
specific employer or not. But once in employment and he feels 
a specific requirement or practice is unjust or he is unhappy 
with certain of the terms, he has little alternative but to 
leave that company and seek employment elsewhere.
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The worker as a union member has a different status 
because the terms and conditions of the employment are laid 
down in the agreement entered into between the company 
and the union to which he belongs. The union member can, 
through the collective influence of his organisation, 
influence the terms of his employment and he can while in 
employment bring up his interpretation of a situation and 
his specific grievances and challenge arbitrary decisions 
of management, through procedures mutually agreed between 
the Union and the company.
The employer will resist the implications of these 
requirements. The exercise of union rights is seen as a 
threat to 'his workers1 and attempts will be made to maintain 
control by countering the benefits which union membership gives. 
The employer will try to better union wage demands, offer 
similar benefits and assure employees that 1 justice will be 
done1 through the personnel management function.
Employers can also counter the appeal of unionism amongst 
workers through improved employment practices and by 
ameliorating the impact of the division of labour. In fact, 
as Ramondt has analysed, a number of human relations 
practices such as job enrichment, autonomous work groups, 
communication systems can be instituted without structural 
introduction of a system of worker representation. The 
1democratisation without the workers' techniques introduced 
by corporations prevent, deliberately or not, expression of 
worker rights ( Ramond, W., 1 974) . The employment practices 
based on the human relations strategy keep workers1 
consciousness latent.
Clack postulates that two areas of interaction operate 
between the employers and workers, and these constitute 
components which make up the industrial relations system.
The human relations component is institutionalised through 
the personnel department and is concerned with direct 
management - individual worker interaction (Clack, G., 1964, 
p.32). The labour relations component is institutionalised
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through the trade union and is concerned with the interaction 
between managers and union leaders representating union 
members as a collectivity. Illustrative examples of activities 
carried out through these respective components are 
discussed in the Section on the industrial relations system 
of South Africa.
Implied in this equation is the principle that only in 
those situations where both human relations and labour 
relations components of the industrial relations systems are 
allowed to manifest themselves can it be said that managerial 
power is legitimised. If the labour relations component is 
kept latent, ie. the union is not recognised, then employment 
practices are still coercive or paternalistic. Only if an 
equitable relationship is established between management and 
the"union as well as linkage developed between the work place 
committee and the union, can it be concluded that managerial 
power is legitimised.
Clack's distinction is of limited value in gaining a 
perspective about industrial relations practice in Western 
countries where workers' rights are entrenched in legislation, 
and trade unions are accepted by society, but is of direct 
relevance to the South African situation because the personnel 
management function developed during the 1960 decade when 
no collective worker expression was institutionalised nor 
experienced.
1.4 Institutionalised of Industrial Conflict 
Wootton1s description and Zuthem’s analysis support the 
statement that there is inherent conflict of Interests 
between capital and labour as expressed through the different 
objectives of management and workers as unionists. It has 
also been argued that in a situation where workers can 
exercise rights it is possible for the industrial conflict 
to be institutionalised.
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The question of what is involved in this process of 
institutionalisation of conflict, ie. the nature of the 
scope and limits of the rules agreed upon is central 
to the study of industrial relations. It is necessary to 
describe the structures and processes through which in­
stitutionalisation can take place in order to be able to 
identify the prerequisites necessary for its operation. The 
following concepts deal with some of the basic features of 
the processes and structures as well as the nature of the 
parties involved, ie. companies and their management and 
trade unions and their members.
From hostility to interaction 
Coser, in reformulating Simmel's writings on conflict, points 
to the relevance of the distinction between hostility and social 
conflict. Social conflict is dependent on the two antagonistic 
parties establishing a relationship and interacting with one 
another. Through the interaction the divergent objectives 
and interests are articulated and possibility of reconciliation 
is explored. Thus the operation of social conflict leads to 
the formulation of new rules or norms of conduct of the 
parties and establishment of institutions to reinforce and 
interpret the rules or agreements„ This social conflict 
serves as an agent of socialisation for both contending 
parties. Furthermore, conflict reaffirms dormant norms and 
thus intensifies the participation between the parties. These 
characterisations of social conflict makes possible the re­
adjustment of the relationships between the parties to 
changed conditions (Coser, L.,1 964 , p.128).
In contrast, hostility does not lead to interaction with 
the opposing party. Hostility is an attitude and remains a 
predisposition to act, but if it cannot find the target object, 
ie. be transformed through a relationship, hostility becomes 
an end in itself.
14
an end in itself.
This distinct...on clarifies why institutionalisation of 
industrial conflict requires the establishment of a relationship 
but also suggests it is possible for the tension of pent-up 
hostility to be released without resolving the conflict.
Through safety-valve institutions, the disruptive effects 
of hostility are displaced but because the interaction was 
not between the subject and object, a cost to that system is 
involved. The displacement reduces the pressure for 
modification of the system to meet changing conditions in the 
short term but creates potentials for disruption in the form 
of riots and unorganised or spontaneous strikes.
Because of this possibility, it can be postulated that 
management will use the human relations component of industrial 
relations, over which it has control, to prevent the mani- 
festatlon of the labour relations component, ie. the expression 
of trade unionism. Consequent to this tactic, interaction 
through the labour relations dimensions is denied. The 
resources of the personnel department, reinforced by control 
over the work place committees and appointment of industrial 
relations officers, can be used as safety-valve mechanisms.
In this way, unrealistic conflict is created in that there 
is interaction but it is deflected on a substitute object, 
in this case the committee. By engaging in exercises to express 
unrealistic conflict the employer can effectively ignore the 
power dimension of industrial relations. Worker consciousness 
of their situation is not allowed to manifest and need not be 
related to.
The above considerations highlight the fact that 
institutionalisation of industrial conflict requires to be 
judged in terms of the expression and operation of rights 
of workers. Without worker rights, managerial power is 
not legitimised. Hence the importance when analysing 
industrial relations systems to determine whether international 
labour standards, (in particular Conventions No. 87 and 
No. 98 of the International Labour Organisation on freedom
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of association) are honoured. Such Conventions identify 
the parameters through which the interaction between management 
and trade unions should flow in order to ensure industrial 
justice,
Industrial justice and claim of rights
The socialisation process of the child in terms of the school 
system and the stress on respect for law and order is such 
that a worker who is exposed to injustices because of the 
command structure of the factory or the arbitrary action by 
management, does not automatically perceive it as such, or 
will immediately demand redress. The worker is led to 
believe that the power of management is either a God-given 
quality or, more probably, is sanctioned by society. (Zuthem,
H. , 1976, p.143) . As Selznick states, 'despite real
suffering and deprivation, the particular kind of hurt, the 
sensed injustice, is not an inevitable response (... to an 
unjust act by an employer). And even when the hurt is felt, 
the grievance is often abortive and no claim of rights is made. 
For the sense of justice, though fortified by historical 
opportunity, is inevitably tempered and restrained by the fixed 
parameters of the social order. It is the nature of that 
order, above all its commitments and competencies, that 
determines what expectations will be legitimate and even, to 
a large extent, what hopes and aspirations will arise at all'. 
(Selznick, P., 1969, p.184).
What in fact transforms a labour force from one which 
does not respond to industrial injustices to one where the 
workers in solidarity claim rights? What are the 1 historical 
opportunities' which causes workers, in solidarity, to demand 
a change in coercive employment practices and denial of rights?
The variables involved in bringing about demonstration 
or spontaneous strikes, (from awareness of relative deprivation, 
continued impact of inflation, an incident which exemplifies
16
humiliaty suffered by other workers) can all be identified 
as relevant r but what are the sufficient and what are 
necessary variables can not easily be assessed.
The distinction made by Selznick between a passive 
state of acceptance of an unjust situation to specific 
claim of rights clarifies why workers do not automatically 
become union members. The human relations strategy aims 
to perpetuate that state of passivity. .
Workers have a remarkable ability to tolerate industrial 
injustice. When through unionism the discontent is expressed 
management is surprised. The trade union does not create 
the suffering or injustice, but channels the sense of 
injustice and aims to establish procedures through which it 
can be processed.
It is possible for a company not to institutionalise 
conflict by denying freedom of association. But the human 
costs are high, both in terms of demonstration strikes and 
other forms of worker anger and discontent, as well as in 
terms of coercive employment practices and repressive 
mechanisms of informer system, security police action and 
strike breaking. But employers are not required to take such 
costs into account to justify their continued operation.
The balance sheet does not contain an item on industrial 
injustices. That is why trade unions aim through workers' 
participation to influence policy decisions.
Membership commitment - rights and, responsibilities 
The right to organise implies that the worker can add onto 
his status as a dependent employee that of trade union 
member and hence become part of an organised collective party, 
requiring management to negotiate terms of employment.
I
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In general the question of commitment to trade union 
membership is treated with ambivalence by the State and 
employers. Labour legislation or other norms usually 
requires evidence of commitment to unionism, by laying down 
criteria for representativeness and proof of paid-up 
membership, before the union can be recognised or registered 
and the right to bargain collectively can operate.
The requirement of proof of membership support is a 
challenge to union leadership to justify its claim to 
represent the collective strength of the workers. This 
principle is accepted but in its application management 
a become dogmatic as to the degree of support necessary 
before meetings are held with union leaders. The requirement 
of majority membership before the company will deal with a 
union denies that workers when they become union members 
start articulating grievances. There is the further danger 
that union organisers will create issues in order to 
gain majority support amongst the more cautious workers, who 
because of lack of understanding of the nature of managerial 
power will not openly demonstrate union membership. The 
dogmatic requirement of high union membership support by 
management influences the organisating campaigns of unions 
and moulds the nature of union-management relations thereby 
causing hostility to be introduced as a perceived necessary 
requirement. This element of hostility can prevent, in 
Simmel's terms, the subsequent expression of realistic 
conflict and hence its effective reconciliation. In a 
number of Western European countries the bona fides of 
unionism were not challenged dogmatically by management.
In Britain and the United States a method of determining the 
degree of union support amongst a labour force has been 
determined which acknowledges the fear of victimisation 
amongst workers resulting from managerial practices which 
have as their objective to keen the unions out.
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Thus in terms of the 1974 Employment Act in Britain, 
workers are asked 1 If the union were to be recognised by 
the company as the bargaining agent, would you join?'
This approach of determining union support will influence 
the nature of the relationship pattern to emerge between 
the two parties. The emphasis is not only on trade union 
membership, but on the relationship which results from it.
The employer perceives a threat in union membership 
and attempts through human relations techniques to regain 
what he regards as loss of loyalty on the part of the 
employee. The worker does not necessarily feel a contra­
diction between his union membership and commitment to 
work in a factory. But if management wants to deny, or hinder 
the emergence of the labour relations component, the 
concept at what unionism means becomes clouded.
Related to the rights to organise and bargain 
collectively are certain responsibilities as defined in the 
constitution of the Union. Rights and responsibilities 
are two sides of the same coin and central to the principles 
of compromise and peace obligation which bind the relationship 
between the two parties. However, such responsibility is 
to the policy of the union and not to the company. Union 
responsibility cannot be measured in terms of management's 
frame of reference or management's formulation of what 
behaviour of union membership entails. Such formulation 
by management constitutes interference in freedom of 
association.
The effective institutionalisation of conflict is 
assisted by socialisation of workers and employers into 
industrial relations principles; on both sides new norms 
have to be internalised regarding the rights and 
responsibilities. Trade unionism is an achieved status and 
implies consciousness of new values and adoption of new 
perspectives in the employer - employee relationship.
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This is why workers' education, independent of State and 
employer interference, is a vital ingredient in the 
development of trade unionism. Not only because the 
work place situation is in a constant state of flux due 
to new forms of managerial control facilitated by technological 
advances, but because the perspective of workers is 
broadening as the complexity of the employer - employee 
relationship becomes apparent.
The management of companies as well as the employers' 
association representatives also require to broaden their 
perspective. The collective bargaining agreement is a 
document signed by representatives on behalf of the union 
and the company or the employers' association. It is 
not sufficient for a manager to believe union recognition is a 
good idea. The company, as a corporate entity, enters 
into an agreement and hence the formulation of an industrial 
relations policy is vital. It is not sufficient for managers 
to get to know union leaders. From the perspective of the 
workers, the behaviour of management should be governed by 
laid down and written principles, as well as standards 
and guidelines of the company's industrial relations policy. 
Such a policy serves to socialise the various levels of 
management into the new industrial relations function and 
give meaning to any assurances that there will be no 
victimisation. The industrial relations function might 
be given to a specialist manager but it is an activity which 
all levels of management must exercise.
Organisational development of trade unions
Trade unionism emerges as a movement when workers and their 
leaders, aware of their disadvantaged position, cciae 
together to identify common interests. These common 
interests include improvements in wages and working conditions 
as well as mechanisms through which perceived injustices 
can be channelled. The achievement of these objectives
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requires organisational expression in order to challenge the 
unilateral control of the employer. It is the union as 
the organisational expression of workers which places 
demands before management and requires procedures to resolve 
the new identified conflict of interests and conflict of 
rights. For these conflicts to be resolved a relationship 
is required and the union has to be recognised as an independent 
party. For the relationship to be maintained, the union 
must develop a permanent organisational expression.
The history of trade unionism in the majority of 
countries shows that union recognition is never easily granted. 
The employers and their organisations either do not accept 
the need for it or deliberately fight against what they 
regard as encroachment on their prerogative and responsibility 
of decision-making. This resistance requires unions to be 
practical in their formulation of targets and postpone certain 
objectives.
Flanders postulates that, 1 trade unions are a mixture 
of movement and organisation and the relationship between them 
is the key to an understanding of the dynamics of their 
growth1. (Flanders, A., 1 964, p.22)
How is the expression of trade unionism into permanent 
organisations affected by the process of institutionalisation 
of Industrial conflict and how does it affect that process?
Can trade unions and their leaders 1 forget' the movement and 
neglect rank and file members? Does the concern with power 
which organisational expression brings about not cut off 
the vitality of the movement?
These questions are dealt with in the discussions on 
the organisational development of the trade union and the 
relevance of spontaneous industrial action to the maintenance 
of an equitable industrial relations system.
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In his analyses of the evolution of American unionism, 
Lester identified three strands in the organisational 
development of unions as they strove to gain permanent 
organisational expression. The three strands are:
Increased formalisation of union affairs bringing 
about transfer of certain functions from the local 
or plant-based union activity to the national 
headquarters. As the scope of items included in 
collective bargaining increased, the need for under­
standing of subjects such as job evaluation, 
incentive schemes, social security benefits, etc. 
required experts which only the union headquarters 
could employ or obtain. The possibility of centralised 
control was facilitated by employer recognition, 
union security arrangements and need for disciplined 
administration of the agreement. The institutionalisation 
of an effective grievance procedure further removed a 
certain influence from shop stewards and local leaders, 
in that problems were now to be handled in an orderly 
and businesslike manner.
The trend towards centralisation and requirements of 
stability in and responsibility for maintaining 
employer - union relations, led to a change in the 
status and outlook of top union leaders. Union leaders 
increasingly served on community, industrial, 
educational and governmental boards; that is they 
became part of the establishment. Because of these 
involvements any zeal they might once have had to alter 
the social order was forgotten or suppressed.
These developments were accompanied by a formalisation 
of the relationship between the management and the 
union. The attitude of the employer changed from one
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of hostility towards unionism to acceptance of the 
union as the 1 manager of discontent'. On the one 
hand the employer facilitated the growth of the union 
as a permanent organisation through including in 
recognition agreements stop-order facilities and a type 
of closed shop (the union security clause) requiring 
union membership as a condition of employment. On 
the other hand the union development brought about a 
decline in work stoppages and demonstration strikes 
because agreements on conditions of work and improved 
wages contained grievance procedures and the peace 
obligation. Through procedures a mechanism was 
created whereby problems could be logically and 
rationally processed and the peace obligation required 
union leaders and workers to restrain from industrial 
action during the currency of the agreement. This 
required the union to incorporate discipline and order 
to regulate its affairs and where necessary administer 
sanctions to control members, It therefore became 
possible for a distinction to be drawn between un­
organised or spontaneous strikes and authorised strikes 
agreed to by union members through ballot. These 
organisational factors led to potential and actual 
decline in contact between leaders and the rank and 
file members as well as decrease in militant action. 
However, the improvement in standard of living through 
the collective bargaining process and operation of 
procedures to seek redress for injustices and coercive 
employment practices, were considerable. (Lester, R ., 
1962, pp.21-37).
The relevance of Lester's analysis of the organisational 
development of trade unionism from movement, through 
recognition to centralised activity will be referred to in 
the discussion of the nature of unionism in South Africa. 
However, two observations made by Lester must be borne in 
mind.
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Lester observed a decline in the scope for innovation 
in the employer - worker relationship and items for 
inclusion in agreements. Initially the American unions 
demanded that rules and procedures for solving grievances 
as well as regular wage increases and improved fringe 
benefits be included in collective agreements. But 'as 
time passes many of the causes of the union's complaints 
are eliminated; some of its goals are at least partially 
achieved... In other words, past union conquests may have 
curtailed the possibility for future pioneering - at least 
by means of collective bargaining1. (Lester, R., p ,56)
Related to this observation is Lester's application of 
his broad theory to the development of trade unions in othe 
countries. He refers to the ageing of British unions and 
the vigorous maturity of Swedish unions.
The Swedish example suggests that the process of 
centralisation need not lead to loss of rank and file 
involvement. Membership is involved in the stages of the 
collective bargaining process and the extensive educational
programmes have not only ensured close contact between 
leaders and members, but created acceptance of new 
organisational mechanisms and relationships. Furthermore, 
decline in internal democracy did not occur, as it did in 
Britain. In Sweden the vitality of the union movement was 
maintained, in contrast to unionism, because of the strong 
socialist tradition and concept of working class solidarity 
The Swedish national federations of employers and unions 
established joint machinery to deal with basic matters 
affecting labour market policies. The matters dealt with 
were: protection against unfair dismissal; establishment 
of joint safety committees; vocational guidance councils? 
joint time-and-motion study boards; joint boards to study 
women's questions etc.
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Lester observes that these dev_ „opments ensured that the 
stagnating tendencies in the process of 'union maturation' 
could be countered.
Although Lester, writing in 1958, does not use the 
term 'workers' participation', this concept is implied in 
the innovative characteristics of the Swedish labour 
movement, in particular if subsequent developments are 
assessed. In 1966 the agreement on works councils between 
the Swedish national federations of employers and unions was 
revised to require that these works councils function as a 
medium of consultation and information on matters such as: 
production techniques, economic matters and questions of 
shut down, cut backs in employment, etc. Many of such issues 
are regarded as residual rights of American management which 
unions do not influence.
The concern of the labour movement in Europe with workers1 
participation, particularly since the 1960's, suggests 
that Lester's orthodox description of the development of 
the trade union requires to be amplified. In fact, the 
concept of 1 maturity' of the union is too finite in its 
description. The European experience suggests the process 
of experimentation regarding more specific forms of influence 
on managerial decisions through systems of workers' 
participation is continuing.
Using Lester's analysis, Webster identifies three 
stages in the growth of trade unionism (Webster, E ., 1975), 
namely:
(1) Unstructured conflict or hostility between
employers and workers as the labour movement 
finds expression through worker protests.
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Management feels threatened by this increased 
evidence of worker consciousness and will 
question its legitimacy.
(ii) Realisation by employers that the recognised
union may be efficient in 'managing' discontent. 
The employer in order to assist the organisational 
expression of the labour movement, grants the 
union recognition for collective bargaining and 
giving certain facilities such as the stop order 
and possibly the closed shop. The signing of 
agreements through collective bargaining would be 
accompanied by a decline in militancy amongst the 
workers.
(iii) In the third or centralised stage the union moves 
closer to the national power structure and 
further away from grass roots activities, hence 
problems of internal democracy emerge. The 
unions begin to operate within certain agreed 
'rules of the game1, and become integrated in the 
socio-economic system.
The signing of a recognition agreement marks the entry 
into the second stage of organisational development.
Employers will only sign a recognition agreement if they
are persuaded that the union has the power (in terms of 
representative membership strength) to warrant giving up 
perceived managerial prerogatives. The recognition agreement
either leads immediately to a collective bargaining situation 
or records the intent to do so; ie. conflict of interests 
is acknowledged. The other crucial clauses of a recognition 
agreement, beside items such as access, stop order and paid 
educational leave for industrial relations training, deal 
with disciplinary and grievance procedures whereby conflict 
of rights disputes can be resolved.
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The statement by Flanders that the relationship between 
a workers' movement and organisational expression of the 
trade union is the key to the understanding of the dynamics 
of union growth, has to be recalled in particular in 
considering the implication of the third stage.
The centralised involvement of the union leaders can 
lead to apathy amongst the members, particularly if certain 
economic improvements in their situations are achieved.
It can also lead to re-emergence of militancy if membership 
believes there is collusion r ^ tween leaders and the 
establishment, and union ide are forgotten. The centralised 
stage can also lead to invol ament in the political process 
and the emergence of pressure groups.
In certain Northern European countries this phase in 
union development occurred during the 1950 decade, and 
coincided with provisions, either through legislation or 
arising out of agreements between union federations and the 
employer federation, for the establishment of workers' 
councils whose members were elected from all the workers, 
irrespective of union membership. The trade unions, having 
neglected factory based activities, saw the necessity for 
countering the control which the employer could exercise over 
workers' councils, by establishing a strong union presence 
in the work place (Douwes Dekker, L ., 1974).
The ideal of industrial democracy was achieved by the unions through 
the works council, which in terms of legislative provisions 
had powers of co-dutermination for certain areas of 
management functioning, as well as representation on Boards 
of Directors to influence company policy.
During the post World War II period the trade unions 
concentrated on workers' education to ensure works council 
representatives and worker representatives on Boards of 
Directors could cope with the new responsibilities. Workers' 
participation can be used to describe this fourth phase in 
the development of trade unions and industrial relations
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patterns. The challenges and innovations required by the 
institutionalisation of workers' participation overcame 
the stagnation Lester observed in the operation of American 
unions. The American unions have no tradition of socialism 
not only because that ideology was suppressed in the early 
part of the century, but because of the individualistic 
ethos of American society (Bok, D ., 1971).
Conflict of interests and conflict of rights
The institutionalisation of industrial conflict in Western 
European countries suggests that its most effective 
expression takes place when different structures and 
processes are agreed upon between companies and trade unions, 
to process two distinct types of conflict. Conflict of 
interests arise because of the scarce or limited resources 
and status position through which work, as an activity, is 
rewarded. But even if agreement is reached at a particular 
moment in time on those interest issues, conflict of 
rights can arise because of different interpretations not 
only regarding the clauses of such agreements, but labour 
legislation requirements and common law obligations.
Through the collective bargaining process, conflict of 
interest regarding the distribution of wealth, improvements 
in conditions of work, social security benefits, i-. '.reduction 
of new technology, work allocation, etc. are reconciled and 
the terms written down in agreements. By definition this 
reconciliation is not permanent. Agreements are only entered 
into for one or more years and then the union, in -terms of a 
mandate from its members, formulates demands for improvement 
in the terms of the agreement.
During the period an agreement is in operation, the 
question of interpretation and intent of the various clauses 
regulating the terms and conditions of employment will arise. That 
is, when the agreement temporarily resolves Conflict of interests,
I
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conflict of rights becomes an issue. Conflict of rights disputes 
arise primarily because of the different interpretations by workers 
of a clause in an agreement or a requirement in law. The 
manner in which disciplinary action is taken can also lead 
to conflict of rights disputes. In a society where coercive 
measures are still prevalent, infringement of common law 
rights, such as assault become a conflict of rights issue.
These conflicts of rights disputes require different 
procedures to be processed than those used for conflict of 
interests. That is, negotiation of such issues should not 
become part of the bargaining process but be handled through 
mutually agreed upon grievance and disciplinary procedures, 
mediation committees, and if necessary arbitration institutions 
such as the Industrial Court.
In most countries collective bargaining has traditionally 
taken place between unions and employers' associations for a 
particular industry, and either nationwide or for a particular 
region. In America in particular collective bargaining also 
takes place between the work place union branch or local 
and that company. Grievance procedures are initiated by a 
particular worker or group of workers and takes place inside 
the factory or place of work.
The acceptance as well as usage of a written and signed 
grievance procedure between a company and trade union 
indicates a willingness on the part of management to move 
from a position of control through coercive methods to a 
position where it is accepted that management - employee 
relations should be regulated by some form of consent.
The procedure is a set of rules which allow for a grievance 
to be processed through stated levels of the management 
hierarchy but in terms of specified time limits. Its 
acceptance indicates that both management and trade unions 
want principles of rationality and fairness to operate in 
their interaction and want to eliminate arbitrary action.
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This is why any disciplinary action taken by management 
must also be subject to appeal. Disciplinary action should 
not be ad hoc. A written disciplinary code is required 
which lists the undesirable activities for which management 
can take punitive action against workers to ensure order and 
control necessary for the effective functioning of the 
production processes or service offered. The severity of 
the misbehaviour of the worker determines whether he is 
either given a warning, the details of which are recorded, 
or instantly dismissed. The procedural aspect of appeal 
against such proposed action is different to that of the code. 
The appeal procedure is imperative to engage the fairness and 
relevance of the discipline imposed and protest workers against 
victimisation. This process of appeal night be a different 
procedure or become part of the grievance procedure.
The nature of a grievance procedure, the manner in which 
it is used, and the determination shown by both management 
and trade union representatives to maintain it, can, as 
Singleton points out, be taken as an index of the power 
relation between these two parties (Singleton, N ., 1975).
An equitable grievance procedure constitutes a challenge 
to managerial power. Its effective operation and usage by 
both parties legitimises that power by transforming it into 
authority. If a grievance cannot be satisfactorily resolved 
after it has moved to the highest level of management, with 
the aggrieved worker being assisted by the union 
representative, the possibility of referral to an independent 
mutually agreed mediator or arbitrator is essential. The 
final decision on a matter of dispute cannot lie with top 
management as this would restore managerial power. The 
signing by management and the union of a procedure does not 
automatically prevent manipulation by management. Its 
effective operation is dependent on a reasonable power 
power balance between management and the union representatives. 
The operation of procedure is part of the labour relations 
activity which by definition must exclude the involvement
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of the personnel department, except for its administrative 
function and advice to line management.
Two observations are relevant to this section on the 
procedural mechanisms of conflict reconciliation. Built-in 
to both procedures is the principle of compromise, although 
its working is more obvious and evident in the collective 
bargaining process than in the grievance handling process.
In any system of interaction (but particularly in power 
relations), compromise is inevitable. However, little is 
known of the variables involved in this social phenomenon, 
particularly where organisational expression also becomes a 
factor of consideration.
The second point to note is that the formulation of the 
grievance procedure rests on the assumption that management 
has the right of interpretation of the agreement or the law. 
Because management exercises this priority right of inter­
pretation by virtue of its authority to co-ordinate and 
assign work, the worker who disagrees with management1s 
interpretation has to Initiate the grievance procedure.
It is significant that in Sweden the worker and his trade 
union now have the priority right of interpretation insofar 
as the point of issue concerns 'a provision on the subject 
of joint regulation rights or the duties of an individual 
worker, eg. in the event of a dispute concerning overtime or 
a worker1s obligation to perform certain tasks. In pay 
disputes the priority rights of Interpretation are retained 
by the employer but are limited in that the employee's 
interpretation of the pay settlement will become operative 
unless the employer Immediately initiates negotiations and, 
if no agreement can be reached, files proceedings with the 
Labour Court within 10 days of the conclusion of the 
negotiation1' . (Ministry of Labour, Sweden, 1 977 , p.10).
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The principles of compromise and industrial peace
Specific principles operate to facilitate the process 
whereby employers and trade unions reach agreement. Agreement 
is reached because adherence to the clauses is only required 
for the given period. The agreement does not do away with or 
resolve the conflicting interest but reconciles them until 
bargaining commences again.
Agreement is made possible because of acceptance by 
both parties of the principle of compromise. Both parties 
have to change their initial target demands in order to reach 
settlement; this is where the bargaining comes in. The 
union and its members accept that the initial demands cannot 
be reached, and the employers or their association know they 
have to give more than was initially stated. The degree of 
the compromises made by the respective parties is dependent 
on their power or perceived power both in terms of organisational 
strength and negotiating skills.
It is the representatives of the trade union and the 
employers' associations who work out the possible compromises 
to the conflicting claims. But the representatives cannot 
sign the agreement without approval from their constituents. 
Particularly the union representatives, because the union's 
affairs are dictated by the membership, ie. from below, have 
to act in terms of the mandate they received from either their 
branches or general shop stewards’ meetings. What are the 
stages involved in the collective bargaining process to 
accommodate this principle of compromise and also to ensure 
that the elected representatives remain accountable to their 
respective constituents?
The collective bargaining process is activated when the 
trade union takes the initiative. Through a mandate received 
from membership the elected executive committee is in a 
position to formulate specific proposals for increase in wages, 
improved working conditions^ social security funds, etc.
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The employers' association also requires to consult its 
constituents to determine their response to these demands.
The stage is now set for the negotiating teams of both 
parties to meet and commence actual negotiations. The process 
of defining the essential priorities in the demands and 
co inter proposals, as well as identifying the areas of 'give 
and take' is carried out behind closed doors.
This process of negotiation between the negotiating teams 
or representatives of the two parties can take a number of 
months. After this period the representatives will have 
identified areas of agreement and where compromises have to 
be made. But the representatives should not commit their 
parties. Hence a further stage requires to be instituted 
otherwise the dynamic of the collectivity of collective 
bargaining is denied.
The representatives of both parties report back and
indicate to their members the nature of the compromise 
reached and ask for acceptance of the proposed terms.
This 'selling process' within the respective organisations 
constitutes a vital stage. The negotiators from the employers' 
association can act more independently from affiliated 
companies than the trade union negotiators can from the ur ion 
members. An 'internal1 bargain within the organisation 
takes place. The union negotiating team in particular must 
ensure effective report back to membership at branches or 
through shop stewards. Without this process union leaders 
can be accused of oligarchical practices, Minor or major 
adjustments to the proposed agreement are proposed at report 
back, meetings and referred back to the negotiating teams who 
will, again, behind closed doors, identify areas of agreement 
on those outstanding issues.
The agreement which carries the approval and hence 
commitment of both parties, can then be signed by the 
representatives. The potential disorder in employer - worker 
relations has been institutionalised for a specific period
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of time (Douwes Dekker, L ., 1976).
This description of the collective bargaining process 
reinforces the emphasis placed on membership rights and 
reponsibility. A worker without the status of trade 
unionism cannot give commitment and adhere to an agreement. 
Furthermore, without the intra-organisational process of 
report back, it- is easy for the representatives of the 
parties to establish either a relationship pattern of collusion 
or co-option. A more detailed discussion of the sub-processes 
of collective bargaining as applied in the analysis of proposals 
by South African companies regarding industrial relations systems 
is given in the following section.
The employer, who has had to move from a position of 
unilateral expression of power to sharing decisions in certain 
areas with the union, requires in exchange some security, 
that the industrial conflict has been institutionalised.
The employer needs assurance that during the currency of 
the agreement his labour cost will be as reflected in the 
terms of the laid down rates in the agreement. Hence some 
form of peace obligation is normally written into an agreement; 
the clauses of the agreement must have the commitment from the 
union members not to raise conflict of interest issues,
The peace obligation requires that during the duration of the 
agreement, no union organised strikes will occur in terms 
of issues contained in that agreement. A similar requirement 
is placed on the employers regarding the lock-out tactics.
The Importance of the peace obligation, as the core component 
of institutionalisation of conflict, is evident from 
legislative requirements in the majority of countries regarding 
its inclusion in agreements.
The peace obligation on its own would leave the workers 
defenceless during the currency of an agreement. On its own 
the increase in wages and improvement in working conditions 
achieved during collective bargaining do not ensure the 
legitimisation of power into authority; the worker is still
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exposed to the command structure and his status of union 
member is not recognised - the problem of control and by 
whom in the work situation is not resolved. The 
institutionalisation of the grievance procedure based on the 
recognition of the trade union as well as the reality of 
conflict of rights arising out of the interpretation of the 
agreement, provides a mechanism of protection and counter 
influence. However, this influence is specific and isolated 
and only requires management to account for its actions and 
decisions after they have been carried out.
Because of too great an emphasis on the principle of 
compromise and too great a demand regarding the peace 
obligation, trade unions as organisations are accused of no 
longer serving the interests of the workers.
In his analysis of the American trade union movement 
after World War II, that is, subsequent to the period of 
rapid trade union growth considerably facilitated by 
guarantee of freedom of association and protection against 
unfair labour practices of bhe Wagner Act of 1935, Wright 
Mills concludes that the trade union creates social 
stability in the employment situation and aptly describes 
tue union leader as a 'manager of discontent'.
The reconciliation of conflict of interests and conflict 
of rights require the union leaders to hold the peace on 
those issues Included in the scope of the agreements until 
all formal procedures and the relevant steps have been 
followed*
The grievance procedure requires that the worker defines 
his sense of injustice into 'issues within a narrow focus 
which shape the parameters for potential solution, fundamental 
question of principle are typically suppressed and comprise 
is thus facilitated1 (Hyman, R., 1 974, p.64). Hyman argues 
that there is a validity in Mills' analysis of the trade 
union as a source of social stability because of three factors
35
(1) the achievements of trade unions regarding wages, 
working conditions and social security benefits 
have 'blurred workers' discontent' or even 
eradicated certain causes of discontent;
(ii) as trade unions 'mature' in terms of development 
as organisations, they have become moderate 
and their centralised involvement in tripartite 
bodies with employers and government agencies has
made use of the strike weapon less necessary;
(ill) the organisational needs of the union result
in increasing emphasis on maintaining a relationship 
with the employer in order to perpetuate tne 
Collective bargaining agreement and to ensure 
the security of the union as an organisation.
Active workers and union leaders are aware of these 
pitfalls arising out of the expression of industrial 
conflict into these institutionalised forms. The 
experience arising out of Involvement in the collective 
bargaining process revealed powerlessness in two areas.
Firstly, lack of information made it difficult if not 
impossible to counter arguments by employers regarding 
productivity, need for technological advances, financial 
investment consideration etc. Secondly, collective bargaining 
did not influence crucial policy decisions taken by boards 
of directors or similar bodies for specific companies.
In other words, the Influence on managerial decisions 
which collective agreements impose, although specific, 
is limited. Hence the increasing emphasis, particularly 
in Western European countries, on workers' participation 
in management. The American labour movement is however 
critical of this Ideology.
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The sub-processes of collective bargaining 
Walton and McKersie identify four interrelated and inter­
dependent activities or sub-processes in their analysis 
of collective bargaining. These sub-processes logically 
combine the requirements described in the proceeding section.
The necessity for collective bargaining between management 
and labour arises because of limited resources and scarce 
status allocation. The process of distributive bargaining 
settles this conflict of interest between the two parties.
But the interdependence of capital and labour suggest that 
there are complementary concerns which can, through 
problem solving, be identified and resolved through the 
process of integrative bargaining. Underlying these two 
sub-processes are activities that influence the attitudes of 
the two parties, in particular those of their respective 
representatives, towards each other. Attitudinal structuring 
which takes place between the repres .ntatives of the two 
parties is this third sub-process. Finally, before an 
agreement is signed by the representatives a fourth sub­
process of activities has to occur, namely, the parties must 
agree. Consensus must be achieved within each of the two 
parties and not just by their respective representatives, ie. 
intra-organisational bargaining has to take place.
The acceptance of distributive bargaining as a sub-process 
of negotiations is essential, for it acknowledges that there 
are Issues between the two parties which cannot be resolved 
because their objectives, resulting from different interests, 
are in conflict. it is a matter of distributing or dividing 
limited resources with fixed values.
However, the two parties need to maintain their relationship 
in order to ensure continuity and hence look towards 
settlement as a compromise. One of the challenges of bargaining 
for each party is to define those limits which would destroy 
the relationship if the other party overstepped them.
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For management there is a limit to issues such as 
granting wage increases or agreeing to union involvement 
in management decisions, ie. beyond such limits there 
would be little purpose in continuing the relationship.
For union leaders there is a floor to wage increases 
beneath which their loss of credibility with members 
could not be contained. For union members there is a limit 
regarding improvements in fair wages, wage differentials, 
job and social security measures below which the constraints 
and sanction of membership make institutionalised bargaining 
futile. But besides these resistance points both parties 
also have targets which reflect what they hope to achieve. 
Negotiations become effective when the respective target 
and resistance points reveal a range within which settlement 
of the agreement is possible. This is how the principle 
of compromise is . instituted. The other sub-processes play 
a crucial role in assisting tne representatives of the parties 
to identify that range of settlement.
The consideration of distributive bargaining raises 
the question of whether all objectives between the two parties
are issues of conflict? There are matters that can be
resolved to the benefit of both parties, or at least where
the gain of one party is not an equal loss for or does not
represent an euqal sacrifice by, the other party. Such 
matters are considered as problems to be solved and this 
process constitutes integrative bargaining.
An agenda item f * a negotiating meeting between the 
parties involving economic values does not include integrative 
possibilities. The integrative potential in the joint decision­
making process is realised when both parties look for 
common-pattern areas and alternative solutions of mutual 
benefit to each other.
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Although in actual fact many items on the agenda of 
labour negotiations are mixed, ie. are issues as well as 
problems, it is possible to identify those matters which 
have an integrative potential. Problems are matters 
involving rights and obligations of parties. The considerable 
breakthrough in labour relations achieved in the steel 
industry in America stems from a finding of a study committee 
tha'-, ' the joint study approach is least effective when 
applied to wages, very useful on fringes, and' has its 
greatest promise on 1 job security1 issues . The examples 
quoted are closed shop and membership maintenance, preserving 
jobs, seniority rights, etc., for which in return management 
can introduce technological changes and retain flexibility 
in manpower allocation.
Representatives of labour and management have a 
relationship which hopefully both want to foster. It is 
particularly in the face-to-face negotiating process that 
maintenance as well as restructuring of the attitudes of the 
participants towards each other takes place. If representatives 
on both sides accept the need for realising the integrative 
potential of their relationship, it is essential that 
they understand the impact of attitudes such as friendliness, 
trust, and respect on their attempts to influence each other. 
However, in numerous instances either management or labour 
representatives believe they must maintain hostility and 
the desirability of more constructive attitudes is denied.
The five relationship patters which can be established are:
(i) open hostility based on refusal or inability 
to interact. The company is determined to 
refuse to deal with the union and vice versa;
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(ii) containment-aggression based on 'grudging 
acceptance' by the parties of each other.
Management is determined to contain the scope
and influence of the union while the union leadership
denies the role or prerogative of management.
Hot only do the parties regard each other with 
suspicion, but each tries to gain the workers' 
allegiance;
(iii) accommodation based on limited trust which
allows for some satisfaction of requirements;
(iv) co-operation based on willingness by the parties 
to negotiate beyond wages and working conditions 
and examine issues such as productivity, job 
security and technological advance. There is 
respect for each other - ie. both for the 
organisations and their individual officials. The 
union accepts managerial success as being of concern 
to labour and management accepts that it is in its 
interest for there to be a stable and effective 
union?
(v) collusion based on furthering the aims of
representatives of the parties which violate the 
interest of their own members as well as either 
shareholders or the public or some combination 
of these.
What is crucial to industrial relations in South Africa 
is the likely pattern that will develop between companies 
and Black trade unions. The personalities of the key people 
involved, as well as the goals of the parties are determining 
factors. There is a danger that the parties might get locked
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into a relationship which neither party finds conducive in 
the future but which will be difficult to break when that time 
comes.
The value of Walton and McKersie's analysis is -that 
it has abstracted the process of intra-organisational 
bargaining as an essential activity of collective bargaining. 
Agreement is not reached when the representatives of the 
two parties have reconciled their differences through compromising 
on original demands and drawn up the clauses for a contract. 
Consensus within the parties is required for the terms of 
settlement to be acceptable and adhered to for a specific 
period of time. And this can only achieved through intra- 
organisational bargaining. After all, the negotiating team 
was given a mandate, the demands were presented in terms of 
members' expectations. Hence before an agreement can be 
signed a report back must take place and members must approve 
it. Through this report back the peace obligation is 
instituted. This process commits the parties and not just 
their representatives, to the terms of the agreement for 
the specified period, Furthermore, in any organisation there 
are different opinions as to the strategy and patterns of 
the union-management relationship. Internal tensions and 
conflict must be resolved to ensure consensus through this 
sub-process.
The right to strike 
As Blanpaln states collective bargaining without the right 
to strike is collective begging. The strike is a
temporary stoppage of work by a group of employees in order 
through that collective and concerted action to enforce a 
demand or express a grievance. When a strike occurs the 
workers challenge the structure of control to which they 
have to submit themselves and give notice to both the
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management and society at large that they are denying the 
legitimacy of the existing social order in the work place.
The right to withhold labour is complementary to the 
other two rights, namely to organise into unions and to 
bargain collectively. The International Labour Organisation 
has not yet incorporated the strike right into a Convention 
but the Freedom of Association Committee has, in its findings 
regarding those Conventions endorsing the other two rights, 
stressed that the right to strike by workers and their 
organisations is recognised as a legitimate means of defending 
their occupational interests. Strikes are a social 
phenomenon, not evidence of pathological behaviour. Strike 
action is a logical expression by a group of employees to the 
injustice of a given situation as perceived by them. Strikes 
are to be understood as a trial of strength even where both 
part'es test each others power to influence each other. As 
Simmel observes:
1 Since power can often be appraised only in 
its actual exercise, accommodation may frequently 
be reached (between the parties) only after the 
contenders have measured their respective strength 
in conflict'.
(Coser, L., 1965)
When a deadlock in negotiations (conflict of interests) 
can not be mediated a ballot is conducted amongst union 
members. If the majority of the workers vote accordingly 
an official strike can be held. The industrial relationship 
is temporarily broken. The trial of strength period or 
power struggle can take time to be tested. The union members 
on strike will use the picket as a peaceful demonstration 
of their declared dispute with the employer. The purpose 
of this standing outside the factory gates with placards is 
to morally persuade non-union and union members not to 
break the strike by reporting for work, and also to advise 
the public of the issues involved. Because of the highly
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motive nature of this industrial action, care has to be taken 
by the authorities, management and the union not to let 
tension convert into violence. The tensions are real in 
that they strike is a denial of the legitimacy of managerial 
authority. The drastic reversal of the normal situation 
is a demand that new norms are established in terms of 
which the relationship is to be regulated in the future.
But not all strikes are official. Particularly in the 
early stages of the institutionalisation of industrial 
conflict or when this process has not resulted in effective 
structures, spontaneous walk-outs will occur. These 
demonstration strikes are usually confined to a factory and 
relate in general to conflict of rights issues. However, 
in countries where institutionalisation of industrial 
conflict has not occurred such spontaneous actions readily 
spread to other work places.
Both management and the State, as well as commentators, 
will enhance their assessment of industrial relations if 
it is understood that the institutionalisation of industrial 
conflict cannot at all times ensure industrial peace.
The distinction drawn by Flanders between movement amongst 
the workers as a collectivity and the trade union as 
organisational expression of that movement is crucial in 
understanding collective action. Effective institutionalisation 
can be a channel through which the workers' movement expresses 
its sense of industrial injustice. But the possibility 
is always to be there for the movement to step outside of 
the organisational constraints and procedures.
The recognition granted by the employer to the independent 
union and acceptance of the role of the union leaders implied 
in the institutionalisation of conflict, carries with it 
responsibilities and duties. The union must undertake to 
honour and as a party to the Industrial relationship regulate 
job requirements and performance, eg. the requirements 
of job evaluation.
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But the acceptance of the peace obligation by the union 
cannot require that the union guarantee protest free labour 
relations. The union's undertaking to management is that if 
a spontaneous industrial action, demonstration stoppage, or 
strike occurs, it will immediately confer with membership and 
bring into action the dispute procedure regarding resolution 
of conflict of rights. The process of institutionalisation 
has its limits and the development of permanency of the union 
as organisation builds in the problem of oligarchy in 
leadership. Hence the spontaneous protest by union members 
either against management or against union leadership, is an 
essential social act, but it requires speedy and immediate 
action by union leadership to identify the nature of the 
issue and seek settlement of the dispute.
From this perspective the term 'wild-cat strike1 to 
describe worker action which has no formal or official 
sanction by leaders or through strike ballot, is inappropriate 
Unofficial strike action on the part of workers and union 
members can be rational, particularly when leadership is not 
aware, or has not wanted to be aware, of the definition of 
the situation as perceived by workers. The designation of 
such action as a spontaneous strike acknowledges the 
legitimacy of that action, If the trade union is to remain 
dynamic as an organisational expression, it must at all times 
remain in contact with the movement amongst workers.
Mediation and arbitration 
In the above discussion, it is assumed the employers1 
association or an individual company and the trade union
conclude the process of collective bargaining by signing a 
mutually acceptable agreement. What brought the parties 
around the bargaining table was the necessity to compromise 
on divergent objectives, formalise the relationship and 
counter the threat of industrial action with the requirement 
that an agreement would bring, for its duration, acceptance 
that no strikes or lock-outs would be resorted to. But
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during the negotiations the possibility of a deadlock is an
over present reality. By declaring a deadlock either party indicate
there is no utility in continuing the industrial relationship.
For the employer party the union demands can be of such a 
magnitude that the continued operation of the enterprise is 
no longer feasible. For the trade Union the final offer 
from the employer party can be so far below the needs and 
expectations of membership that to accept it will result in 
loss of credibility of the union,
Dispute procedures regarding the steps to be followed 
if a deadlock is declared are an essential part of the
institutionalisation of conflict. Either the legislation 
provides for the procedure to be followed and/or both parties 
themselves consider beforehand what should be done in such 
an event. Such procedures include mediation, voluntary, 
arbitration or compulsory arbitration.
Dispute procedures are not grievance procedures, the 
latter facilitate the reconciliation of individual problems 
and the former are used for conflicts of a collective nature.
Often it is the inability of parties to resolve a conflict 
of interest which leads to a deadlock, but in the early stages 
of the institutionalisation of industrial conflict any issue 
can lead to collective action. The most appropriate time 
for the parties to consider what steps to follow before the 
strike or lock-out is resorted to, is before collective 
bargaining commences. The dispute procedure agreed to then 
will reflect the parties concern not to destroy the relationship, 
but through mediation to re-establish it.
The intensity of the bargaining process and the heat of 
personality clashes can lead to a situation where the 
representatives misunderstand the nature of offers made or 
do not explore the possibility of different combinations of 
a package deal of the items on the negotiating agenda. The 
mediator as independent third party, examines the nature of 
the dispute, identifies how far the parties have gone to meet
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each other, points out where hostility has clouded the 
debate, and suggests alternative directions for resolving 
a deadlock issue.
The role of the mediator is not to deny that there is a 
dispute, but to Identify the non-rational issues or un­
realistic elements which led to the deadlock. The mediator 
enables the parties to deal with the more realistic aspects 
of their conflicting claims. His role is to re-establish 
the relationship. (Coser, I*., p.59)
Industrial peace is dependent on a number of conditions, 
one of which is that the two parties do not adopt too 
legalistic an approach to industrial relations. This condition 
is achieved through mediation as the purpose of the mediator 
is not onl/ to assist the parties find a mutually acceptable 
settlement, but to restore the relationship. A legalistic 
approach might have given a solution which is 'correct' from the 
perspective of rules but which does not remove the 
antagonism between the parties. (Hoffman E., 1973). The mediator 
assists (functions to arise) the two parties to find a compromise.
But the deadlock c^n centre around more fundamental 
disagreements, eg. the amount of wage Increase or the 
justification for dismissal. Neither party feels it can 
re-open negotiation on the matter or look for a compromise.
In such a situation the legal strike action can be taken or 
arbitration resorted to.
The arbitrator has a different responsibility in that 
he has to arrive at a specific award for decision on the matter 
under dispute which the parties must accept. His appointment 
as arbitrator is either by mutual consent from the parties 
who agree to abide by his decision, ie. voluntary arbitration, 
or by the ministerial decrease in terms of the legislation, 
ie. compulsory arbitration.
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The role of the arbitrator is quasi-judicial. He 
obtains acceptance of the procedures and phases involved in 
conducting the investigation and determining of the award.
These procedures include: obtaining of information and 
witnesses; arrangement and conduct of hearings; problems 
of proof of evidence and preparation for the content of 
the award.
Why is voluntary arbitration more desirable than 
compulsory arbitration? The institutionalisation of 
conflict rests on the acceptance by both parties of the 
principle that to exercise the right to strike - or lock-out - 
is undesirable because of its disruptive effect on their 
relationship and the economy. But at the same time a show 
of strength by one party is sometimes necessary to convince 
the other party of the power dimension in industrial relations. 
However, both parties agree that in a situation of deadlock, 
alternative peaceful settlement procedures are considered 
before the strike is resorted to. Hence arbitration can be 
a procedural arrangement both parties agree to before they 
commence negotiation, ie. as part of the recognition process. 
Voluntary arbitration as well as mediation recognises the 
self-govtrnment character of the industrial relationship 
between the two parties. In voluntary arbitration both 
parties not only agree on the person but agree to abide by his 
award. In fact the requirement of voluntary arbitration 
in an industrial relations system constitutes an excellent 
means of putting the autonomy of labour and management to 
the proof.
Governments regard compulsory arbitration as more 
desirable as this mechanism of ending a dispute can 
immediately stop the disruptive effects of strikes and lock­
outs whether planned wr already occurring. But the requirement 
of compulsory arbitration is an interference in the process 
of Institutionalisation and does not grant the parties the 
responsibility of exercising self-government.
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Governments of developing countries will argue that trade 
union demands can be egotistical in that trade unions 
promote high consumption patterns by a small proportion of 
the labour force, (ie. the wage earners and usually those 
in manufacturing industry and civil servants) at the expense 
of other economically active and underemployed workers. In 
terms of appeals to consider the 'public interest'.
Government spokesmen require that union leaders exhort their 
members to work more productively. But the requirement of 
this productionist function is contrary to the basic purpose 
of trade unionism. In Kenya during the 1970 decade the trade 
unions did not heed Government appeals. They continued to 
press for an increase in standard of living and decalred 
disputes in cases of dismissals which union members perceived 
as unfair. As a result, the Government increasingly adopted 
more stringent measures regarding the right to strike in 
terms of amendments to the Trade Disputes Act (Sandbrooke, A., 
1975).
If an industrial relations system has incorporated in 
its structures and processes the difference between conflict 
of interest and conflict of rights, different settlement 
procedures will operate. Conflict of interests, or economic 
disputes, because they are 'compromisable', lend themselves 
best to mediation and, if necessary, arbitration. A 
conflict of rights dispute is usually based on an alleged 
violation of existing rights, or unfair treatment by the 
management and there are more or less definite and accepted 
standards laid down in collective agreements, employment 
contracts, work place rules, laws or norms, etc. As the 
main issue, rests on the interpretation and the manner of 
application of these standards, its settlement requires 
ascertainment and appreciation of the facts. Hence rights 
disputes can best be resolved through voluntary agreed upon 
grievance procedures or by referral to judicial labour courts. 
The operation of different settlement procedures ensures that 
grievance handling is removed from the area of power conflict
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of interest disputes and can be settled through authoritative 
determination of the respective rights and obligations of 
the parties (ILO, Grievance Arbitration, 1 972 , p.5).
Grievance procedures and disciplinary procedures require" to 
be agreed upon by the two parties to ensure that their 
respective representatives utilise the laid down step and 
adhere to the time limits.
.involving the union members in irade union 
decisions
The permanent organisational expression of trade unions 
establishes a position of influence for the elected leadership 
whirh, because of inherent problems of bureaucratisation, can 
remove rank and file members from the union activities and 
policies. What democratic checks should be placed on the 
union administrative functions as well as decision-making 
process?
The intra-organisational sub-process of collective 
bargaining in the form of membership involvement in both the 
formulation of the initial proposals which the executive 
used to state the union demands for a new agreement as 
well as acceptance of the terms of the final compromise 
agreement, is an essential activity union members must be 
involved in.
The intra-organisational sub-pricess of bargaining is 
a useful descriptive concept to draw attention to the 
necessity for the union leader to retain credibility within 
the union with members. The union leader has to perform 
dual roles with opposing objectives. On the one hand union 
leaders must retain the relationship with the employer to 
ensure the needs of members can be serviced. On the other 
hand the union leader is accountaole to membership. If the
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trust in this link is broken, then the membership will move 
out of the constraints of organisational responsibility.
This leads either to a stage of apathy or anomie with the 
danger of nomlessness or anarchy; or to election of new 
leadership.
The constitutions of unions lay down the level in 
the union structure which must be involved in the intra- 
organisational bargaining sub-process. In some countries 
a tradition has been established whereby the leaders 
have the sole responsibility to decide on the level of 
compromise to agree to during negotiations. Other countries 
have the tradition that shop stewards, as the elected 
work place leaders, or the meeting of the area branch have 
to approve the terms of p proposed agreement.
It is only in the latter situation that effective 
institutionalisation can be said to occur. The peace 
obligation is not imposed, but accepted by the workers 
because their consent is obtained and adherence to the terms 
of the agreement, for its duration, can be expected.
The effective institutionalisation of intra-organisational 
consensus is necessary if the dictum by Flanders that the 
workers movement and the organisational expression of the 
union have to be harmonised, is borne in mind. The literature 
suggests that ideally the union branch in the place of work 
is the most effective basic structure of the union particularly 
with the advent of companies employing a large labour force.
The union branch constitutes the membership of the union in 
that place of work and the elected leadership. When there 
is a general meeting of both, the union branch comes into being. 
Hence facilities are essential for its expression. If the 
union constitution as well as the practice only emphasises 
the shop stewards, there is a danger that leadership has too 
great a say without accountability to membership on crucial 
issues.
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Union a c t iv ity  in the place o f work is  also essential to ensure tha t the 
company works council does not become an organ o f management. In Western 
Europe various approaches have been adopted to ensure tha t the works 
council is  not misused.
Trade unions in the metal sector in  the Netherlands became aware, in 
the la te  1950's,of the iso la tio n  o f union members because they had 
become established in the centra lised c o lle c tive  bargaining stage o f 
union development. Study conferences were held on the structure and 
function o f the trade union and how to make the member in the place of 
work aware o f his s itu a tio n .
Investiga tion showed tha t a gap existed between f u l1 time leaders 
and union members and tha t too great an emphasis was placed on 
centra lised c o lle c tive  bargaining as the major trade union a c t iv ity .
These study conferences led to the formulation o f the idea o f trade 
union a c t iv ity  in the work place. In formulating the idea and giv ing 
i t  expression, emphasis was placed on establishing sound communication 
and in te rac tion  between trade union members and the union o ff ic e  adm inistration 
and the Executive Committee. This trade union a c t iv ity  was not seen as a 
mechanism o f making representation to the employer as is  the function 
o f the shop steward. The example o f the B r it is h  system o f shop stewards 
was nor fo llowed. The unions supported the works' council system as the 
structure fo r  formulating demands but required that i t  be given more 
powers, something brought about through le g is la tiv e  amendment in  1971.
The idea o f the Union in  the work place was formulated to perform a 
watchdog function over th is  works council and serve as a 1 ink between 
union members and the union o ff ic e .
In the Netherlands the cxicept o f trade union a c t iv ity  in work place was
developed during the i 0 ' r  decade and in 1974 the Social and Economic
Council, a t r ip a r t i t e  .. was asked to determine i t s  relevance. In
subsequent recommendat, j  the Social and Economic Council gave
support fo r  the concept and the need fo r  f a c i l i t ie s  to be granted
by the company fo r i t s  e ffe c tive  expression. However, the Council bellieVed/. . .
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that full details regarding trade union activity in the 
work place should be the subject of negotiation between 
the two parties. That is, it should not be incorporated 
in legislation. The Social and Economic Council did 
observe that the works council had responsibility of 
representing all the workers in the company whereas the 
trade union commission could only function for its members.
By 1 97’7 - 67 collective bargaining agrements, covering 
just half the labour forces covered by the 186 agreements 
in operation gave recognition to this industrial relations 
structure in the work place. In terms of the national 
accord between employer federations and trade union 
federations the active leaders involved in the plant-based 
union activity were to be protected against victimisation.
This protection was provided for in 50 out of the 67 agreements 
mentioned.
In 34 of the 67 agreements some provisions regarding 
the relation of trade union activity in the work place to 
the works council was laid down. This basically dealt 
with the supportive role of the union commission for the 
works council (Loon bureau, 1978).
This development gave a more specific operational 
definition of the right to organise as laid down in 
ILO Convention No. 87 on freedom of association and 
facilitates membership involvement in union affairs and 
decisions.
The defender of change 
The institutionalisation of conflict is dependent on the 
company granting recognition to the trade union. The 
winning of recognition is a demand for acceptance of 
fundamental change in the management to worker relationships.
The worker must be treated with respect as a union member 
with rights, and not only as a subordinate who always obeys 
orders. But this implies a fundamental change in 
orientation and hence the process of union recognition 
is perceived as a threat and management will understandably 
devise strategies to counter this encroachment.
It is evident from the description of the organisational 
development of the trade union that t!* is evolution is 
influenced by the relationship pattern entered into by 
management. What is management's input?
Basically management must be expected to resist the 
demand for change; it. is not in its immediate interests that 
existing norms and structures of control are altered. When 
the need for change is accepted, management will consider 
it not in terms of the specific demands made, particularly 
if formulated in terms of workers' rights, but in terms of 
alternative measures over which control can be exercised.
The manager will want to identify the variables involved 
and will want to ensure that consensus can be achieved, 
with those involved in the change, regarding the direction 
taken. Obviously the employer, through his management 
representatives has a stake in the direction of change and 
will try and achieve commitment to that direction seen 
as appropriate. It cannot be assumed, irrespective of 
the justice of workers' rights, that employer resistance 
to change ie negative or dominant. The employer faced with 
a demand for innovation in his control over the factory 
system and the norms operating in it, will resist. The 
employer will perceive that the demand for change does not 
reflect the wishes of those subordinate to him and will see 
it as an outside influence.
Klein in fact postulates that opposition to change is 
a necessary or desirable characteristic and that perceived 
'irrationality' in resistance to change is most likely to
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be an attempt to maintain integrity of the existing system, 
a concern which cannot be ignored. It is evident that a 
demand for change in the basic relationship between company 
and workers will be seen as a threat to the status or life 
situation of the manager. In an analysis, such as attempted 
in this dissertation, on changing labour policies of employers, 
consideration must be given to the dynamics of resistance to 
change. Klein states;
'a necessary pre-requisite of successful 
change involves the mobilisation of 
forces against it'.
(Klein, D., p.502)
The resistance and apparent intransigence of management 
to change cannot be dismissed as irrational. The crux of 
the matter is to identify what is being defended. Consideration 
of this question will assist in understanding the dynamics 
of resistance and how long or under what conditions it will 
persist.
Certainly trade unions, particularly once they are 
established, also become involved in the dynamics of resistance 
to change, particularly if the employer requires changes in 
the production process as a result of technological 
innovations which affect job relations, introduces programmes 
to improve productivity and introduces different training 
programmes to reduce the time it takes to train, in 
particular, artisans.
Workers' education 
The effective institutionalisation of conflict through the 
organisational relationship implies the socialisation 
of workers into awareness of their rights and concommitant 
obligations and responsibilities, as well as socialisation of 
managers into perspective which understands the need for 
shared decisions and power sharing in order to achieve
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legitimised authority. The structural position of managers 
and workers in the command hierarchy of the factory 
and the control mechanisms which flow out of it, has 
created the belief amongst managers that they can decide 
for, and decide best, for,workers. Similarly, workers have 
adopted a passive attitude to their position of 'frustration 
without hope'. The accumulation of grievances in that 
state, when triggered off, results in hostility. Hence 
managers require a broader perspective regarding the 
expression cf workers' rights and collective power, and 
workers require new hope regarding their dignity and 
relevance as people. Both parties require to be assisted 
in understanding the nature of the relationship which 
institutionalisation in terms of some balance of power implies. 
If the relationship is not to fall between collusion and 
co-optation then education of both management and union 
leaders is essential. This industrial relations education 
is more than industrial relations training. By implication 
the education must incorporate, even if not explicitly 
stated, a view of society in terms of the nature of the 
creation as well as the distribution of wealth and power.
Hence the relevance of the question as to who is responsible 
for workers' education. In evidence to the Wiehahn Commission 
of Inquiry into Labour Legislation, the Urban Training 
Project, the workers' educational organisations established 
in 1971 stated, inter alia, that workers' education assists 
wo :kers:
'to open their eyes to the real situation in which 
they find themselves at work?
to discover how this situation is affecting them­
selves, their fellow workers, their families, 
and the whole of society;
to discover their dignity as human beings ,*
to learn their common law and statutory rights 
and how to exercise them;
to discover where their strength lies and how 
it is possible for the situation in which they 
find themselves to be changed, and that this
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change will come about by a change in themselves 
and their attitude towards each other and the 
orderly use of their strength;
to discover the form of labour movement necessary 
to bring about the change, how this must be their 
movement and how it must be controlled by them 
in a responsible manner'.
Hence the recommendation that 1 trade union education should 
be developed, controlled and financed only by trade unions 
or the organisations approved by them'. (U.T.P., 1 977, p.8)
1.5 Workers' Participation in Management
The above analysis of the variables and concepts involved in 
the institutionalisation of industrial confli t, identifies 
workers' participation in management as the crucial 
component of the fourth phase in the organisational development 
of the trade union and essential to prevent the stagnation 
of the union. It is therefor appropriate to include an 
overview of this concept. The word management is loosely 
defined to include both policy decisions by boards of 
directors and their daily execution by managers.
Workers' participation rejected in America 
In a careful and comprehensive article D . Bok analysed 
the factors which have given American labour laws and 
union movement its peculiar and distinctive character.
Why is it, as the following comparative percentages of 
unionisation,show that the American worker is less interested 
in unionisation than his counterpart in Western Europe?
In fact since 1976 unionisation in those countries has 
increased while it has deteriorated further in the United
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States of America. The respective percentages are:
USA 22%; Netherlands 40%; Germany 42%; Belgium 20%; and 
Sweden 85% (I.X.R., 1 977) .
Bok observes that for over a century experts have 
noted the absence of 1 solidarity1 or 'class consciousness' 
among working people in that country. The violence 
of the American labour relations in the 1920's 'was directed 
almost entirely toward individual., employers and not against 
the political and economic system itself' (Bok, D ., 1971, 
p.1401). American society, with the emphasis on classlessness, 
individual initiative and opportunity as well as access to 
political activity through the ballot, did not require 
or promote socialist ideologies as was the case in Europe. 
Employers also displayed a reluctance to subordinate their 
individual autonomy to employers 1 organisations. Individual 
employers showed a strong inclination to act independently 
in working out their own labour and personnel policies. 
Employers' organisations were, not seen as necessary in 
order to offer protection against strong unions.
The individualism of employers and determined opposition 
to unionism forced the trade unions to build strong grass 
root support on a factory-by-factory basis in order to 
obtain recognition, The 1936 Wagner Act actively promoted 
the process by which the union achieves individual employer 
recognition in order to be able to bargain collectively.
But no labour legislation has been enacted or has been 
demanded by American unions to give trade unions or worker 
representatives influence on company policy matters or 
management functions other than, those indirect items in 
collective bargaining agreements.
As a further consequence, trade union activity became 
decentralised and bargaining relationships operate on a 
factory instead of industry-wide basis. Hence the local 
of the American trade union has an importance unequaled 
to that of branches of unions in Europe.
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The legislative emphasis on fair labour practice, 
combined with national values of individualism contributed 
to the ideological development of the American labour 
movement, in particular the objective that the collective 
bargaining process is the only and sole mechanism through 
which influence must be brought to bear on the employer.
Any form of workers' participation in management was, 
and still is, not only perceived as an encroachment on 
management rights, but as a threat to the independence 
and identity of the union (Zuthem, B -i 1976, p.157).
The importance of the local or branch of the American 
union, its financial strength, the use of pickets and 
strikes to gain recognition and the reliance on collective 
bargaining as a powerful but indirect influence on management 
decisions, made the local union leader influential and 
prominent. To hold union office was increasingly seen as a 
business and not as a calling.
The American unions therefore emphasised initiative, 
organisations and self control and eshewed class politics. 
These characteristics explain why only a small percentage 
of workers are organised in the United States as compared 
with European countries.
Furthermore, 1 these national traits have produced a 
system of labour law that is unequally hard on the weak, 
the uneducated, the unorganised, and the unlucky... all 
social insurance programs exclude domestic servants, 
farm workers, and the other unorganised groups. Virtually 
all such programs which do operation pay lower benefits 
(relative to wages) than in other industrial democracies'
(Bok, p.1460). In 1963, America only spent 6,5% of its 
national income on social insurances as opposed to 16,1% 
in Germany.
This brief analysis of aspects of the American system 
is included as the registered White controlled trade 
unions in South Africa have developed a similar approach 
to the craft union orientation of their American counter­
parts , although, collective bargaining is conducted with 
employers organisations on a centralised level. However, 
the emphasis by the State and employers in South Africa 
since 1973 on the operation of legal plant-based committees 
orientated the emerging Black union movement of the 1970 
decade to take into account the purpose and operation of 
such bodies in their organising campaigns.
Worker's participation accepted in Europe 
In Germany and other Northern European countries some form 
workers' participation was the aim of the labour movement 
from its inception and as the unions.developed it 
increasingly became a demand in programmes for social 
reform (Furstenberg, F ., 19-69) . It was argued that if a 
citizen can participate in democratic government, he should 
also be able to influence the decision-making process 
which regulates his working life.
Participation in this context is defined as a process 
which requires that two parties be able to influence each 
other mutually when establishing plans, lines of action 
and decisions (Asplund,^1971, p.5) . However, given the 
fact of the power of the employer in the work place no 
participation in management decisions will result 
unless workers can exercise certain rights preferably protected 
by legislation.
Markham identifies eight basic legal rights which 
workers in Germany enjoy and which ensure that management 
will enter into some form of participation. These rights 
are classified according to the degree of Influence which 
they can exert on management decisions and are graded so that 
the one level of intensity always includes the previous one.
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The right to information which means that workers 
should be in a position to know and understand 
the work situation. Whereas access to information 
on the one hand exercises no influence on decisions 
there is an indirect influence in that follow-up by 
the workers is possible. Also, management regards 
the very giving of information as a form of 
restriction over its actions.
The right to hearing operates when management is 
required to listen and take into account the 
opinions and attitudes of employees. Workers can 
complain and the manager must be willing to let his 
opinion and intentions be influenced, but he still 
decides.
The right to propose or initiate is of greater 
influence because specific suggestions can be made 
by the workers. But management is still free to 
accept or reject these suggestions.
The right to consultation requires that management 
must hear the views of workers before any decision 
is put in operation. Management still has the final 
say as to what will be done but direct involvement in 
decisions by workers or their representatives occurs 
through discussion..
The right of participation operates if representatives 
of the workers have the right to make concrete 
contributions at all stages of the decision-making 
process, from preparation to the execution of the 
decision.
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When worker representatives can amend a decision 
already taken by management or even reverse it, 
t-he right to object (veto) is operative. This 
implies xn fact, that management cannot take a 
decision but must enter negotiations on the disputed 
i tem,
Management's power of decisions is effectively and 
directly influenced if the right to agreement is in 
operation. If the worker representatives withhold 
agreement no action regarding the matter can be taken.
ir. a situation where the right of co-determination 
operates, workers, through their representatives, 
nave complete equality with management in decision- 
making. This covers every stage from initial 
definition of aims, right through to preparation, 
the decision itself, its execution, and the 
monitoring of the situation resulting from the 
introduction of the new measure (Markham, H. , 1974) .
These eights do not necessarily operate in regard to all 
lLents i-nd issues decided upon by management. In a number of 
countries workers have the right of co-determination on 
social issues such as welfare aspects, holiday roster, 
safety and health measures, internal wage structure, hou.es 
of work, etc., but have the right only to information and 
possibly right to hearing, on economic issues such as new 
investment in plant and machinery, financial matters, etc.
(Shregie, J ., 1974) It is possible to draw up a list of 
i terns falling within the area of decisions which affect 
workers' interests, and placing against each item the 
degree of influence which workers can exercise in terms 
nf participation In tho prncegsa and oxocution of the 
mati.er (Douwcs Dekkvr, L , , I!'74) .
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The institutionalisation of conflict through a 
system of legally enforced rights of influence is an important 
phase in freeing the worker from a situation where, like 
the other factors of production, he is an object of 
economic actions. But a process of mutual influence 
requires a specific structure through which the rights 
can bp articulated. In the majority of Western European 
countries, either through legislation or through agreements 
reached between trade union federations and employer 
organisationsinfluence is exerted through:
(a) works councils wifchir. ti.-i. e sv-'r/-; ar.d
(b) a system of worker decked
» on the Supervisory Beards nr Boarde of Direccors.
Referring back again to the contrast between industrial 
relations systems in America and Western Europe, it is 
apparent that the American union leader can through 
collective bargaining influence matters such as bonus r vto,?, 
hours of work, leave arrangements, etc., which fall 
specifically under the right of co-determination. Where 
then is the difference? The different emphases ir. 
legislation have shaped the nature .'f the interaction 
between the two parties.
The 1 93 5 American legislation forced the. two parties 
to come together but did not interfere with the nature and 
content of the collective bargaining process. In Western 
Europe the legislative emphasis after 1950 aimed to facilitate 
worker representatives (generally union members) to 
influence management decision in the place of work and 
company policy while not interfering with the collective 
bargaining process. The implication of the Western 
European model is to change the nature and control 
function of management.
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These different forms of institutionalisation of conflict 
become more apparent if the structures through which workers' 
participation occurs are described.
Works councils and supervisory boards - the 
German system
The German Works Council Act states categorically that the 
plant-based works councils shall not affect the functioning 
of the trade union (and employers' association) in their 
task of protecting the interests of their members through 
collective bargaining. Further, the complementary co­
existence of the trade union and the works council is 
provided for by requiring that the employer and the works 
council work together in a spirit of mutual trust but within 
the relevant collective agreement. Over 7 000 agreements 
covering wages and working conditions are in operation.
What safeguards have been introduced to ensure the employer 
does not use the council as a competitive body against the 
union? The requirement of the council and the employer 
working together in a spirit of mutual trust is made 
possible because the council representatives are elected from 
all the workers and not only the trade union members. This 
implies the works council cannot be equated to a shop steward 
committee which, as the union elected representative body 
in the place of work, does not look after non-union members.
To effect a balance between employers' power and worker 
rights, the legislation grants the union the right to draw 
up a list of candidates for the tri-annual council elections. 
Union officials have access to the factory and can be, and 
are,invited to meetings of the works council. The union 
members are as aware of the importance of having a union 
influence in the works councils, as are non-members. On 
average nearly 90% of works councillors are union members 
although only 42% of workers are union members. Although 
in specific companies, union membership can be higher, these
\
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statistics demonstrate that those workers who have chosen 
not to belong to the union, are aware that it is to their 
advantage to have union leaders serve as works councillors.
The works council cannot enter into a collective 
agreement nor call a strike. The basic principles of freedom 
of association are protected by the rights of unionism. Only 
the trade union is the independent party capable of pro­
tecting worker interests
The works council, all of whose representatives are 
elected by the total labour force, has co-determination rights 
in social matters which include:
all work regulations, including hours of work and 
overtime, of the enterprise
wage and salary payment arrangements
holiday arrangements
safety regulations and health measures 
allocation of company housing, if relevant
- 'questions relating to the internal wage structure, 
particularly under the aspect of change in work 
techniques, re-organisation and piece rate system'.
The works councils have the right to be informed and 
consulted on matters concerning re-arrangement of work 
places, restructuring of plants andplanned changes in the 
technology.
'The works council has the right to be informed on all 
matters relating to personnel planning and the training 
needs arising from it, and the right to submit relevant
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suggestions for the execution of such plans'. (Bendix, D,, p.42) 
Furthermore, the employer must inform and motivate every 
dismissal to the council,
In all enterprises with more than 100 employees, an 
economic affairs committee is established which has the 
right to be informed on developments concerning finance, 
production, marketing and organisation.
Details regarding the provisions of the .-. its for worker 
representatives on Supervisory Boards are not included, here.
In terms of Co-determination Act of 1976 parity co-determination 
has been extended to public companies with more than 2 000 
employees. Previously co-determination was only for coal 
and steel industries. The purpose of this representation 
is to grant workers through their elected representatives 
co-determination in the policy formation process of companies.
The rights of works councils and their scope of influence 
places them in a position where personnel department 
activities are subordinate to their approval or dependent 
on their co-operation. Provided these rights are operative 
and the facilitative measures to ensure a linkage between 
committees and trade unions are working, the works council 
can become part of the labour relations expression of industrial 
relations.
Furstenberg states that from an organisational point 
of view the works council is an appendage to the structure 
of the company and that if part of its task is to enable 
workers' participation in management, its effectiveness is 
dependent on the successful functioning of that management.
The facilities granted to the works council and its 
representatives operate to reinforce the functioning of that 
body as an extension of the company, but not management.
On "the one hand the power of the works council resides in 
the legislation and not in the workers as they cannot 
become a member of that body. On the other hand, the 
activities of the works council are to take place during
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working houses; representatives are paid for time spent on 
attending to works council affairs (one or more are full­
time council representatives); the company bears the cost of 
training the Council representatives and is also 
responsible for other administrative expenses. Although 
employers can train councillors, the greater majority are 
trained at the workers' educational colleges of the unions.
In terms of the legislative provisions and facilities 
as well as the actual operation, a linkage exists between the 
works council and the union (L. Douwes Dekker, 1976). This 
linkage can help to counter the influence and power of 
management over that body (management is after all still 
entrusted with control of the company). But union leaders 
know from experience that the mangement can control the works 
council and that it may operate against the interests of 
union members.
To counter the control and even influence, German 
trade unions have 1vertrauensleuten1 or elected confidence 
people in each place of work. The employer is not asked to 
deal with or give recognition to the 'vertrauensleuten'.
Their task is to report what happens in the factory to the 
union office and particularly to act as watchdogs on the 
operation of and decisions taken by, the works council.
This mechanism acts as a check against manipulation by 
management of the works council.
The concept of worker elected representatives on Boards 
of Directors or Supervisory Boards has attracted considerable 
debate. It is argued on the one hand that unions cannot 
enter into 'an unholy alliance' of joint control of industry 
whereas on the other hand it is argued that there should be 
complete sharing of policy decisions between representatives 
of capital owners and the works of a company, particularly 
on Boards of Directors, Asplund's survey does show that the 
union movements in the majority of Western European countries 
believe the issues involved in representation on Boards of
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Directors require to be understood and that further 
experimentation should be undertaken. It is argued that the 
system of co-determination in Germany and Israel has 
demonstrated that it does not conflict with trade union 
goals (Asplund, C., 1972).
Functional and structural democracisation
The demand by the trade unions to be recognised and accepted 
as an independent party with opposing interests to the 
employer, the objective of European unions to influence all 
levels of managerial activities and company policies and 
the implication that management has to legitimise its power 
by transforming it into authority, is basically one of 
democratisation of the factory system of employment.
This process of democratisation can be introduced for two 
differing reasons, namely, either to improve efficiency or 
to close the power gap between the superordinates and the 
subordinations. Lammers points out that the functional 
concept of participation stresses the benefit of this 
process to the organisation in terms of improving its 
effectiveness and efficiency by increasing the influence, 
but not necessarily the power, of the lower level or sub­
ordinate members on the decision making process of those 
in charge. The functional approach to democratisation 
of the work place assist management as the improvement in 
efficiency justifies the recognition of that union, and 
assist the union as real improvements in wages and working 
conditions are obtained.
The second or structural concept of democratisation is 
concerned about power equalisation between all employees or 
members of that organisation. The purpose of the structural 
democratic process is ultimately to achieve a situation 
where hierarchies of organisation are eliminated and where 
self-management is introduced, ie. where those who do carry
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authority are made to account for or be responsible to the 
people at all times and are interchangeable with them.
The Yugoslavian concept of self-management is an example. Those
proponents who conceive of the process of democratisation
only in structural terms do so from an ideological perspective. 
(hammers, G,, 1974) Functional democracy operates primarily 
through works council system and is augmented by election of 
worker representatives on Boards of Directors, It is assumed 
that conflict of interests are reconciled through collective 
bargaining.
hammers states that the question as to whether a process
of democratisation will achieve either the structural or
functional objectives, requires that both the intention of 
those who propagage or initiate the process and the outcome 
or consequences of that process are examined and investigated. 
Therefore, even if a group of people or a movement claims 
to bring about structural democratic change, the outcome 
might only be one of achieving functional democratic change 
in the sense that, at most, the subordinates are able to 
exercise greater influence on the superordinates but that 
the ideal of equal sharing of power as well as involvement 
in functional activities between all levels of the hierarchy 
and hence elimination of the hierarchy, is not achieved.
The careful analysis of historical as well as research 
literature by hammers led him to conclude that the 
institutionalisation of democratisation cannot simultaneously 
maximise both the functional benefits of participation and 
at the same time equalise power difference between levels 
of the work place hierarchy. Although the ideal of structural 
democracy has greater appeal, hammers points out in an 
earlier paper that in fact, functional democratic processes 
can pave the way for structural changed provided, in the 
society at large, there is also evidence of greater democratic 
participation (hammers ,^,1 971) . It is increasingly realised 
that a revolution does not automatically guarantee,after the 
event, a greater structural democratisation of that 
country or more involvement of the people in the decision-
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making process of the organisations which govern their lives.
The distinction between functional and structural 
democracy is of value when evaluating and assessing the 
implication of the processes whereby industrial conflict is 
institutionalised. It is suggested that the term 'workers' 
participation in management1 be used to describe those 
structures and processes which achieve greater functional 
democratisation of the factory system. This term, "workers' 
participation', is preferable to using concepts such as 
' industrial democracy1 because as Lammer.' states in a situation 
where society at large has not yet incorporated effective 
democratic processes, it is highly unlikely that any attempt 
towards structural democratic changes of the factory 
system will, in fact, lead to the hopeful consequences. By 
focussing on the term 'workers' participation in management' 
two other important variables are highlighted, namely the 
issue of the propensity to participate of the parties as 
well as the fact that the management function, crucial 
to the operation of the factory system of production, is not 
excluded.
From his analysis of historical as well as research 
literature, hammers formulated a number of propositions.
These propositions include the following and demonstrate 
the relevance of the distinction between functional and 
structural democracy.
(a) Under the condition of relatively large 
differences in expert power amongst members of 
a system, an increase in participation will 
usually not lead to democratisation, but rather 
to a power gain for the more powerful members of 
that system.
(b) Formal provisions for democratisation will lead 
to participation only if the less powerful 
members of the system in question also participate
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in other societal organisations and activities.
(c) The less chance there is for power equalisation 
to occur in the structural sense, the better 
chance there is for the democratisation process 
to yield positive results for the efficiency and/ 
or effectiveness of an organisation.
(d) Power equalisation tends towards simplification
of structure and hinders organisational efficiency 
and/or effectiveness.
(e) Empirical evidence does not support the proposition 
that promoting efficiency and/or effectiveness 
would generally tighten up the hierarchical nature 
of organisations.
Prom these propositions hammers concludes that participation 
(functional democracy) and the power equalisation of the self 
management model (structural democracy) cannot be maximised 
simultaneously but only be optimised. The optimal solution 
in the process of democratisation would be to alternate 
efforts at power equalisation and efforts to increase 
functional democracy.
These propositions and the conclusion hold implications 
for the institutionalisation of industrial conflict. In a 
situation of large expert and other power differences between 
management and labour and a low propensity to participate on 
the part of the workers, as well as their lack of participation 
in other societal democratic processes, the possibility of 
structural democracy being achieved is highly unlikely.
This situation applies or applied to the majority of countries 
at the time when trade unions attempted to gain legitimate 
recognition as organisations. This is the situation which 
prevails in South Africa at the time that this study was 
undertaken. Institutionalisation of conflict through 
functional democracy is therefore the only form through
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which some progress can be made. It is important to note 
that functional democracy requires the independent operation 
of trade unions. That isp both the human and the labour 
relations components of the industrial relations system have 
to be activated if functional democratisation is to be 
achieved.
1.6 Suppression of Industrial Conflict
The distinction between the two components of the industrial 
relations system, namely human and labour relations, suggests 
that alternative processes of institutionalisation of 
industrial conflict can be introduced by management besides 
forming a relationship with the trade union as the collective 
expression of the workers. When the human relations component 
alone is in operation, either because the labour relations 
component is not allowed to manifest itself, or because the 
workers have not shown an inclination or ability to challenge 
managerial power, it is appropriate to talk of the suppression 
of industrial conflict as opposed to the institutionalisation 
of industrial conflict.
The concept of suppression of industrial conflict is 
relevant to understand the claim that freedom of association 
implies the right not to belong. When a union enters the 
second stage of development and has majority membership, 
it provides a public good to the labour force. Hence at 
that stage managerial t~ctics to prevent organisational 
development of the union or to actively seek deregistration 
of a union recognition certificate for a place of work is 
to counter democratic development of that society.
In the United States of America a concerted strategy 
of 'managing without unions' emerged during the 1970 
decade. This form of suppression of industrial conflict
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has not, as yet, been strongly challenged as the American 
worker has political rights as well as scope for involvement 
in other organisational pressure group activities. But even 
this approach is dependent on the operation of unions in other 
factories or industrial sectors as uheir achievement in terms 
of wages and social security benefits constitute a 1 bench mark1 
which the "management without unions' companies must improve 
upon.
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The strategy of^industrial conflict must be condemned.
The concept of unfair labour practices is relevant in 
defining operationally such suppression. Actions by employers 
which prevent the express of worker rights constitute unfair 
labour practices. In terms of American legislation such acts 
are illegal. Subsequently certain actions by unions were 
also included in the definition of unfair labour practices.
1.7 The Industrial Relations System - The Rule-Making 
Process
The foregoing formulation of institutionalisation of conflict 
is based on certain specific value0. These values derive 
from the concept or belief in freedom of association of 
workers and the concommitant rights which should be reflected 
in the norms of society and hence be allowed expression in 
organisational forms and activities.
Hence, the concern with identifying whether a society 
upholds such values, and if not whether that society is 
prepared to allow an Interested party to initiate a process 
whereby these values will become reflected in its broader 
norms >*-nd acceptable behaviour patterns. To determine 
whether this process is taking place requires assessment 
of the emergence of a common ideology between employers 
and their associations and trade unions and their members, 
as well as the agency of the State, regarding industrial 
relations practices.
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It is in this respect that the amplification by Wood 
et al of the concept 'industrial relations system' as a 
theoretical object, is of relevance. The prime property 
of an industrial relations system is that of a rule- 
making system. The emphasis in therefore not on the rules 
produced, but on the rule-making process at different 
levels and within a contextual environment. This con­
ceptual framework suggests that in any analysis of 
industrial relations in a country or economic sector, the 
emphasis should be on 'rule making (that is, how relies are 
set) or rule makers (that is, who makes them)1, (Wood, et al, 
1975). This approach does not deny the relevance of 
contextual factors such as technology and market factors.
But the determination of structural factors is not seen 
as central to the industrial relations system analysis. The 
core concept of I.R.S. is the rule making process, the 
application and enforcement of rures and their link with 
behaviour of the main actors representing the three parties.
The approach to institutionalisation of conflict and 
the underlying values implied in the above formulation, 
suggest that certain rule-making processes can be identified 
which do not bring about a just and equitable Industrial 
relations system.
To be specific, using Dunlop's terminology, the works 
council of the company cannot be defined as an actor and 
hence the rule-making entered into between works council 
and management (unless with the backing of a trade union) 
does not constitute institutionalisation of conflict.
Using Simmel1s terminology, the works council is used 
by management as a safety-valve mechanism to deflect coming 
to terms with conflict. As a result hostility is created 
and management must resort to coercive practices, or 
rely on their exercise in the wider society, to maintain 
1 industrial peace1. The power of the collectivity of 
workers is not institutionalised and hence no influence on 
managerial decision is achieved through that council system.
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The works council is a legal body which does not extend 
membership rights and responsibilities.
As mentioned previously, when trade unions enter the 
recognition phase of union development they provide union 
and non-union members in the bargaining unit with a public 
good, ie. the interests and rights of all workers are 
protected and promoted. Olson's theory on the logic of 
collective action explains why compulsory membership of 
large organisations is not an infringement of individual 
rights. The union provides a public good to all workers 
which they can enjoy and benefit from, irrespective 
whether they are union members. Hence to ensure they bear 
the cost through which the public good is made available, 
enforced membership and hence payment of subscription is 
consistent with the principle of paying taxes for Government 
public goods (Olsen, M., 1965).
The majority of the workers by virtue of union 
membership voluntarily accept the peace obligation. The 
minority of non-union membership can therefore be required 
to accept the extension of agreements over them.
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SECTION B
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA
CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL BEGINNINGS AND CONSEQUENCES
As the title of this dissertation suggests employers only 
started to pay attention in the 1970 decade to the 
industrial relations function of management. Yet the economy, 
as will be discussed, had already moved into the 'drive for 
maturity phase' of economic development and could have 
entered the final phase of 1 high mass consumption’ if it 
has not been for the duality in its growth in terms of 
racial and regional factors. How could a country, offering 
the highest rates for investment, achieve a situation where 
no serious attention needed to be given to institutionalisation 
of industrial conflict.
It is the purpose of this chaptnr to present an 
overview of some of the historic;.’ processes and other 
contectual factors which create ' such an effective system 
of control that no united labour movement emerged in 
response to the industrial revolution, and unionism was 
kept latent amongst the Black working people.
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CHAPTER 2
COERCIVE EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
The passing of the Master and Servants Ordinance in the Cape 
Colony in 1841 set a policy of coercive employment practices 
which Black workers still suffered under in the 1970 decade.
If the servant did not work as the master required, he could 
and was criminally charged for actions such as refusing to 
work overtime, leaving employment before expire of contract, 
etc. With the discovery of diamong mines in 1862 and gold 
mines 20 years later, the need for a regular supply of 
labour was essential. Through the Glen Grey Act, Black 
workers were forced to leave the land which was often 
confiscated and through the 'poll tax' workers were forced 
into the economy to earn wages.
In order to control the movement of labour on the 
diamond fields, Blacks were required to carry passes, issued 
by the employer, to be allowed to enter and leave the diggings. 
In order to further minimise the illegal diamond trade and to 
overcome the acute problem of housing, the mining companies 
accepted responsibility for accommodation. For Whites who 
had families, houses were built but the Black workers arrived 
without their families and the employer provided barrack- 
room type accommodation, ie. compounds. The idea of closed 
compounds arose naturally out of the concern to prevent the 
workers from having contact with the outside world, ie. the 
workers were confined to the mining company's area and even 
the purchase of goods could only be done from company stores.
In order to control theft of diamonds, a^l employees,
Black and White, on leaving the mines were required to strip 
and be searched. The White overseers and mechanics, who 
were union members, found this stripping 'offensive' and 
resorted to strike action. This had the desired result and 
they were no longer searched. This differential treatment re­
enforced the idea that White workers were priviledged and 
belonged to a superior class to the Black workers.
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The discriminatory employment conditions and practices 
between Whites and Blacks were further entrenched when gold 
was discovered in 1886. That is, the Black was classified 
as a servant, forced to earn wages through taxation, 
accommodated in compounds, denied access to skilled work, 
could only work and move about if he had a pass, and was 
paid a poverty wage. The compound was designed for single 
males, whether the worker was married or not, and also reduced 
labour cost in that the employer assumed no responsibility 
for the family. The rural reserve was regarded to be self- 
sufficient for its inhabitants, hence wages could be kept 
below the subsistence level.
Moroney's description of the compound during the first 
decade of this century highlights the coercive nature of the system. 
The high incidence of desertion and absenteeism, a clear 
indication of worker protest, brought about control measures 
which were justified in terms of the requirement of 
efficiency. Coercive measures were introduced to decrease 
the number of 'loafers' from 33.7 per thousand in 1899 to 5.4 per 
thousand in 1903? The compound police becamse a law into 
themselves. Special permission had to be obtained to leave 
the compound and the police could meet out their own 
punishment. Detention rooms were used as an essential means 
of 'controlling rioutous and quarrelsome natives'. In other 
words, common law rights were non-existent and workers dared 
not complain, while striking was illegal in terms of the 
Master and Servants Law. One Commission of Inquiry which had 
evidence of 'wholesale flogging of the most brutal kind' 
found that workers denied under oath that they had any 
complaints. The unhygienic and damp conditions overcrowded 
compound rooms, accommodating between 20 and 50 workers, as 
well as deficient diet, caused a death rate of pneumonia 
and meningitis which was 15 times higher than death caused 
by accidents (Moroney, S., 1978). The life style of the 
Black workers was so effectively constraint, compared to 
Whites, to ensure that they did not become too aware of the 
lack of collective bargaining rights.
77
2.1 The Systems of Control
Trade unionism was brought to South African when branches 
of British craft unions were opened from 1880 onwards.
These craft unions, based on selective principles of 
occupation and skill, were initially formed exclusively for 
trades such as carpenters, builders, engineers, printers 
and engine drivers. But the principle of craft unionism 
was not transformed into industrial unionism for all 
workers, but bastardised by racialism. How did that come 
about, and what control measures successfully divided the 
workers from different races for the next hundred years?
In his analysis of the structural constraints faced 
by the gold mining industry between 1910 and 1026, Johnstone 
identifies the forces which shaped the duality of South 
Africa's industrial relations system. The gold mining 
industry, forced by necessity to minimising costs and 
maximising output, had to reduce the costs of labour. This 
was achieved through the development of the 'exploitation 
colour bar1 to coerce Black labour and the 1 job colour 
bar1 to appease White labour. The Black workers, politically 
unfree, anchored in the rural areas and with no skills to 
use as a bargaining lever, were forced to accept control 
mechanisms and working conditions shaped by the compound 
system of accommodation for single men, the contract system, 
which denied job security, and the pass system, which 
controlled labour mobility from the rural areas. This 
1 exploitation colour bar1 not only denied freedom of 
association but prevented even the manifestation of a worker 
movement to strive for recognition of worker rights. 
(Johnstone, F., 1972).
But the 1 exploitation colour bar', brough about through 
close collaboration between mine owners and the State, 
could not be imposed on White labour. The White workers 
used their political relevance and their right to trade 
unionism and skills to bargain for priveleged status 
and a fairer distribution of wealth. The Mines and Works 
Act of 1911 laid down that certificates of competency in
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skilled occupations were to be granted only to White workers. 
This development brought in the other instrument of control: 
f the racial job colour bar'. But would it be maintained and 
how was it sustained?
The idea that Whites could not be employed in labouring 
jobs at low wages became increasingly part of the values 
and thinking of that time. In 1902 the Chamber of Mines 
accepted that Chinese labour be recruited, as White labour 
could not be imported 'at wages which could not admit of 
their living at a standards of comfort to which they had been 
accustomed in Europe1. Hence the formulation of the concept 
of 1 civilised labour wage for Whites' when the poor Whites 
problem was identified. (Doxey, G., 1961)
The ever-present pressure to reduce cost in the gold 
mines, brought about attempts to replace White workers, in 
semi skilled positions,with Blacks. In 1921 gold mine 
owners acted on the recommendations of the Low Grade Mines 
Commission and the status quo agreement, which prevented 
Blacks from being employed in semi-skilled positions, was 
altered so that Blacks be permitted to do work previously 
done by Whites. In January 1922, White miners learned that 
their wages were to be reduced. These threats to job 
security and real wages led to strong protest from the unions 
but to no avail. The ensuing strike of 22 000 White workers 
led to a riot, Martial war was declared. The outcome was 
that 240 persons were killed and 591 injured while 18 
'ringleaders1 were sentenced to death.
These events, stemming from the nature of the capitalist 
system of production, forced White workers to rely on the 
job colour bar as the only negotiable item over which they 
had control. This reliance on job entry in terms of 
skill and race excluded from the perspective of White unions 
the industrial injustices imposed on Black workers by the 
exploitation colour bar, in fact White workers were lulled
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into believing that the job colour bar, which bred and 
reinforced racialism, was their only salvation. The 
exclusive nature of craft trade unionism was transformed 
by racialism and was maintained by the belief of White 
superiority.
The intermingling of exclusive rights and race is 
apparent from the approach adopted by the craft unions.
For example, the Winding Engine Drivers Associations - 
and rightly so because of the safety issue, but also to 
protect elite status - aimed at getting legislation passed 
that only a person with a certificate be allowed to take 
charge of engines and boilers. They subsequently required 
that only White men be allowed to receive such certificates.
The Mines and Works Act of 1911 permitted the promulgation 
of regulations governing the issue of certificates of 
competency. With these regulations came the stipulation 
that certificates of competency were not granted to Black 
workers. Although this job colour bar was declared ultra 
vires in 1923, the 1925 session of Parliament passed an 
amendment to debar Blacks from 32 occupations and hence from 
job advancement. The event marked the beginning of 
legislation 'ostensibly for community interest (in this 
case safety) but in reality for the benefit of the 
privileged (White) groups'. (Doxey, G ., 1961).
The self-interest mechanism of pragmatic unionism 
became locked into the belief that the objectives of unionism 
would be achieved through legislative measures instead of 
being the result of direct power confrontation of conflict 
of interests with gold mine owners and,subsequently,the 
entrepreneurs of manufacturing industry. Such direct 
confrontation, had it occurred, would probably have brought 
the realisation that Black miners should be brought into 
the union movement . The reliance on State protection and 
the bargaining mechanism of the job colour bar, did bring 
about an increase in the living standards of White workers, 
but further reduced any pressure to understand the situation
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of the Black workers. The cost of maintaining this dependency, 
and the consequence of a divided working class, prevented 
the emergence of broad principles of socialism - initially 
only expressed in the corrupted form of 'White Workers in 
the World Unite1 - as well as the development of workers' 
education as a pre-requisite to the understanding of workers' 
rights and demands for workers' participation in management 
decisions.
The above brief description illustrates how the two 
racial instruments of control over labour utilisation and 
labour rights emerged. In the following pages it will be 
seen how they became entrenched in the legislative framework 
and the 1 South African way of life1.
2.2 Racialism in Labour Legislation
The analysis by Lever of the 1924 Industrial Conciliation 
Act and other legislation shows how the labour laws reinforced 
the two colour bars. • The following laws were enacted:
The Railways Regulations Act of 1908 removed the 
right to strike from White railway workers and 
established the principle of compulsory arbitration 
to resolve disputes. This kept railway workers 
and their unions separate from the labour movement 
in terms of strategies and objectives.
The Industrial Disputes Act of 1909 established 
two precedents. Black workers were excluded from 
the scope of the Act which severely handicapped the 
emergence of unionism amongst Black workers and 
established the pattern of collusion between 
employers and White organised labour to prevent 
Black trade unions becoming established, Secondly,
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the Act required that the White trade unions and 
employers use the principle of compromise in their 
negotiations for changes in working conditions by 
threatening compulsory arbitration in the event 
of a deadlock and effectively preventing the use 
of the organised strike or lock-out.
The Native Labour Regulations Act of 1911 rationalised 
the operation of the contract labour system for 
Black workers. The legislation reinforced the 
1 exploitation colour bar1 because a breach in the 
contract by Black workers carried criminal sanctions. 
The command system of coercion was approved by the 
law and employers did not have to legitimise their 
power over Black workers. The separate and unequal 
status of Black workers was institutionalised. As 
Lever observed South African politicians had now 
laid the ground work for two discrete systems of 
industrial relations; one for Whites, Coloureds and 
Indians and the other for Blacks. (Lever, J ., 1976,
p. 10).
The Riotous Assemblies Act of 1914 which gave the 
Government power to deal with strikes and to 
prohibit public meetings which, in its opinion, 
might endanger the public peace.
The basic features of these and other laws became 
incorporated in the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, 
the enactment of which was a direct consequence of the 1922 
White mine workers strike and resulting riots. The Act 
took over from the structural forces, which had prevented 
the emergence of one working class and weakened the White 
trade unions because of their dependence on laws. The 
following features of the Act are of relevance to this 
comment on the historical factors which shaped South Africa's 
industrial relations system;
\J
1
•j\
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The Act excluded contract Black workers from the 
definition of employee. This exclusion meant that 
the new principle of the Act, namely that trade 
unions be registered, could not be used by Black 
trade unions.
The Act provided for the establishment of industrial 
councils which bodies consist of equal number of 
registered trade union and employers organisation 
representatives. The industrial council, as an 
organisational structure established and jointly 
controlled by registered employer organisations 
and trade unions, offered a meeting place where 
negotiations for wages and working conditions could 
take place and control over the application and 
administration of agreements cnuld be exercised.
The industrial council mechanism recognised the 
difference between conflict of interest and conflict 
of rights but required that their reconcilation be 
achieved on the centralised level of that industry.
The Act provided for the publication by the 
Department of Labour of the agreements arrived at by 
the White unions and employers associations. The 
agreement, therefore, became legally binding on 
union members and employers, The Minister of 
Labour could extend the terms of agreement to non- 
parties , le. employers who had not joined the 
employers association or workers who had not 
joined, the trade union.
The Act reinforced the peace obligation by outlawing 
strikes and lock outs during the currency of the 
agreement.
In 1928, the Act was amended to give the Minister 
of Labour the power to include Black workers when 
extending an agreement to non-parties. 'This
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measure was aimed at p '-venting employers from 
substituting Whites ai-.j "oioureds occupying lower 
paid jobs, by Blacks whose rates of pay were not 
laid down'. (Lever, J ., 1 976 , p.25)
The Act stressed the crucial role of employers 
organisations in the rule making process of 
industrial relations.
In 1925, the Wage Act was enacted to supplement the 
Industrial Conciliation Act by providing for the establishment 
of a Wage Board which would be instructed to investigate 
wages and working conditions in a sector where no industrial 
council had been formed. As a result of the investigation, 
proposals would be drawn up for a determination.
Although the Industrial Conciliation Act gave legitimacy 
to the trade union organisations of White and/or Coloured 
and Indian workers by allowing for their registration, this 
did not lead to automatic recognition by employers. Industrial 
unions in particular had to fight for recognition.
Lewis records that the Garment Workers Union only 
achieved recognition from companies during 1934 after the 
major strikes of 1931 and 1932 on the issue of attempts by 
employers to reduce wages. The industrial council was 
established in 1935 only after repeated requests from the 
union. But as lewis records, 1 once an agreement had been 
signed, the union scrupulously honoured its commitment.
The stability which resulted was of obvious benefit to the 
employer’. (Lewis, J., 1977, p.80)
The National Union of Distributive Workers faced an 
equally turbulent history of opposition from employers. 
Employers in the distribution trade did not adhere to the 
Wage Board Determination. In 1942, the Union was thwarted in 
its attempts to organise sufficient workers to apply for the
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establishment of an industrial council. Only after a strike 
had occurred did O.K. Bazaars agree to the closed shop 
and the right of the union to form shop floor committees.
In 1943, the union had to declare a dispute owing to 
delay in the publication of a new Wage Board determination. 
Relations between the Union and O.K. Bazaars deteriorated 
and the agreement of the previous year was suspended because 
of the alleged constant unpleasant interference by the Union 
and the shop committees (Herd, N ., 1974, p.108). These two 
events led to another strike and successful picket against 
the O.K. Bazaars chain of shops. The strike led to a 
victory for the union. Although the demand for a closed 
shop had to be forfeited, recognition was obtained and 
improvements in wages and conditions of work achieved.
2.3 Attack on Unionism and Resulting Problems
The legislation primarily assisted the members of the craft 
trade unions and protected their interests. However, it 
was Vie semi-skilled White worker who continued to feel 
insecure as he had no skill to ensure a place in the 
labour market. This fear of the semi-skilled White worker 
that he would be replaced by the Black worker was used by 
the 'Purified1 Nationalist party for political purposes.
In order to protect and promote the interests of the 
Afrikaner people, including their disadvantageous economic 
position, organisations were established xn all spheres of 
societal activity during the 1930's. Amongst these 
organisations was the 1Blankewerkers beskermingsbond1 or 
Reform League to combat the activities in trade unionism 
of 'Jews, Communists and kaffer-boetles'. (Horrel, M.,
1961, p. 13).
Even at that stage the emerging Nationalist Party 
issued a statement that collective bargaining should be
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abolished because it was not in the interests of the 
people or 'het volk'. The refusal by the Nationalist 
Party to accept trade unionism as an integral part of 
democratic society which is implied in the operation of 
the free enterprise system, reinforced the belief that 
trade unions were communist organisations. This belief, 
subsequently reinforced by legislative measures, proved to 
become a fundamental barrier to the emergence of unionism 
amongst Black workers. Because of the 1930 depression years 
Afrikaners had to leave the land and enter employment.
In 19 36, the Reform League launched attacks on leaders 
of registered and, in particular, industrial unions with 
large Afrikaner membership . Two unions in particular were 
singled out for attack, ,y the Mine Workers Union and the
Garment Workers Union. In the mining industry the
extended campaign is made difficult by the closed shop 
arrangements betw. ,i gold mine owners and the existing union. 
Alleged maladministration of union funds and dissatisfaction 
with pay brought rank and file discontent, but success only 
came when the Reform League had its representatives elected 
on the Executive Committee in 1948. No success was achieved 
with the Garment Workers Union although blatant racialism 
and anti-semitism were used in the organising campaigns. 
During the war years, Coloured workers were employed in 
clothing factories and specific attempts were made to 
incite White workers against them. It is a credit to the 
loyalty of the members, mainly Afrikaner women, to the union 
leaders as well as adherence to the principle of industrial 
unionism, that the use of facist prejudice did not succeed. 
The vehemence of the attack and unscrupulous methods used 
is evident from the defamation cases which the garment 
and building unions won against the publishing company of 
the Reform League and which forced it into liquidation.
The attempts to secure Afrikaner control over unions 
was unsuccessful although considerable and lasting damage 
to the unity of the labour movement was achieved. The
"T,
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Nationalist Party was determined, however, when it came to 
power, to eliminate trade unionism through legislative 
measures. O'Meara refers to the 'violence' of the 
Nationalist Party response after its 1948 election victory 
towards economic as well as political action amongst the 
Black people. The repressive and racially discriminatory 
legislation took the following forms:
The Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 whose 
broad definition of communism included any scheme 
which aimed at political, industrial, social or 
economic change by the promotion of disturbances 
or disorder. The unsuccessful attempt to unseat 
the General Secretary of the Garment Workers Union 
of South Africa by the Reform League could now be 
rectified. Solly Sachs was the first person to be 
banned in terms of the Act.
The racially discriminatory amendments to the 
Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 which provided 
that:
no new mixed (Whited and Coloured) trade unions 
could be registered;
existing mixed unions break up into separate 
racial branches;
the Executive Committee of mixed unions which 
remained in existence was to consist of White 
members, thereby preventing the emergence of 
Coloured leadership.
specified types of work could be reserved for 
persons of a defined racial group. In practice 
this meant job reservation for Whites„ Twenty- 
four out of the twenty-six job reservation
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determinations protected jobs for White workers,
A subsequent amendment to the Act prohibited the holding 
of racially mixed shop steward meetings and mixed 
congresses or conferences of branches of the same 
union.
The Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 
1953 provided for the establishment of works 
committees of Black persons in places of work and 
prohibited strikes by Black workers.
It also provied that White Department of Labour 
officials speak on behalf of Black workers at 
Industrial Council meetings and Wage Board hearings.
Black unions were not banned but the Minister of 
Labour believed they would die a natural death as a result 
of the operation of these committees. The Act redefined 
the term 1 employee1 in the Industrial Conciliation Act to 
exclude all Black workers?-previously Black women, who were 
not pass bearers, were able to be members of registered 
unions.
Little was achieved by this separate legal machinery.
The provisions for committees was completely unsuccessful.
By 1961 only 16 were registered and by 1972 only 25 
were said to exist. But during the 1960 decade more than 
100 non-statutory committees had been established by 
employers on which management representatives served, 
something the works committee provisions of the Act did not 
allow. The legislation was enacted to prevent not promote 
a system of workers representation.
Horrell states that Black workers perceived neither 
the committees nor the officials responsible for the 
administering of the Act as operating in their interests.
1
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Department officials were called in when disputes occurred 
and their arrival usually coincided with that of the police. 
Work stoppages or strikes normally involved dismissal of 
alleged agitators and often prosecutions. For the 
period 1955 to 1960, 3 147 Black workers were prosecuted 
for alleged strike action involving 416 strikes. Department 
of Labour officials were seen to be involved only in punitive 
measures.
The Department of Labour claimed that it negotiated 
wage increases for Black workers as its officials were 
present at industrial council negotiations and Wage Board 
hearings. The fact that the wage gap between Black and 
White workers increased during the period 1960 to 1974 and 
that subsequent to the 1973 strikes the Wage Board was 
instructed to improve its performance, adequately deny the 
validity of this claim. Certainly the Black workers did 
not hear of any demands made on their behalf and did not 
perceive these activities as adequate or as representing 
their interests (Horrel, M., 1961) .
During World War II the Department had been more 
sympathetic to Black unions and hence the 1959 ruling that 
Black union leaders be excluded from industrial council 
meetings was a retrogressive step. At best the Department 
of Labour was perceived to act in a highly paternalistic 
manner, but more probably its policies and activities were 
regarded as blocking the expression of worker rights and 
perceived as part of the coercive and repressive system 
imposed on the Black people. The job colour bar was 
firmly entrenched; unionism amongst Black workers faced 
such considerable obstacles that it could net emerge.
The policy of promoting division in the organised 
union movement was successful. It is relevant to an 
understanding of the lack of concern by employers about 
unionism and their ability to manage without an effective
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industrial relations policy, to describe the course of 
events experienced by the co-ordinated trade union movement.
In the early 19 30 decade the 139 registered trade 
unions renewedthe objective of establishing a single co­
ordinating body. Little progress was made because of 
allegations against certain union secretaries regarding 
their links with the Communist Party. The inability of 
South Africa to understand communism is reflected also 
in these allegations as in fact these secretaries were 
expelled in 1930 because they were regarded as expressing 
right wing attitudes in their policies and practices.
(Horrel, M., 1969, p.12)
Two co-ordinating bodies were formed, the Cape 
Federation and the Trades and Labour Council (TLC). The
differences between the two were based on personality 
clashes and regional problems rather than ideological 
considerations.
The Reform League regarded the TLC as a threat because 
of the unity it fostered amongst the unions and the 
support given by the Labour Party. Plans were made not 
only to bring about the dissaffiliation of the Mine 
Workers Union but to create a right wing co-ordinating 
body (O'Meara, D ., 197 4). Had it not been for this 
determined onslaught of the Reform League, the evidence 
suggest that the organised trade union movement could have 
overcome the problem of racialism. The TLC allowed trade 
unions of all racial groups to affiliate. The Department 
of Labour was also sympathetic to Black unions during World 
War II and the Federated Chamber of Industries passed a 
resolution in 1945 supporting the move towards the recognition 
of Black trade unions. In the light of this favourable 
climate the Executive Committee of the TLC adopted a 
recommendation _’,n 1 945 that Black unions should be registered 
and their representatives be allowed to present their cases
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at meetings of the industrial councils. (tlorrel, M. , 1961, 
p.16). The 1 948 Botha Commission into Industrial 
Legislation subsequently concluded that certain Black unions 
were operating effectively and their leaders were making 
responsible recommendations. It is to be noted 
that in 1942 a co-ordinating body for the multitude 
of small Black unions was formed. This Council for Non- 
European Trade Unions did not make much progress and over the 
eixsuing years the majority of the claimed 119 unions went 
out of existence.
But the TLC recommendations were strongly opposed by 
leaders from unions in iron and steel, railways and 
provincial councils who demanded the exclusion of Black 
workers from the labour movement. In 1947 five of these 
unions broke away to form a separate co-ordinating council. 
This body became the organisational expression of the 
racialism which the job colour bar had brought into being.
The first principle formulated by this body was to only 
accept affiliation from unions where non-Whites had no 
voting power - thereby also maintaining Coloured and Indian 
union members in subordinate positions besides excluding 
Black unions. As a result other registered unions sought 
affiliation to it. This policy of seeking worker protection 
in racism became sufficient of an alternative to weaken the 
other co-ordinating body and created a situation where a 
large number of unions preferred to remain outside any co­
ordinating body. This right wing racialistic body gave 
support to the discriminatory labour laws of the Nationalist 
Government when it came into power. As O'Meara argues 
however precarious the bonds, the depoliticisation of 
class interests of the Afrikaner White workers and their 
mobilisation into the culture of the Afrikanerdom, had been 
achieved. (O'Meara, D ., 1975, p.31).
The facillations in the policies of the co-ordinating 
bodies during the next two decades demonstrated that the 
majority of leadership of the registered trade unions could
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not come to grips with the basic issue for the labour movement, 
namely the forging . of a united trade union organisation 
to express the common interests of the working class 
irrespective of race. In fact the issue for trade union 
leaders and their members became primarily the degree of 
racialism and how openly it should be expressed. Black 
workers were perceived as a threat rather than a source 
of strength. As a result formulation of concepts of 
socialism or social democracy or workers particiaption in 
management decisions were not considered as necessary 
concerns of a co-ordinating body. Control over labour 
market forces was understood in terms of exercising the 
principle of racial exclusiveness carried over from craft 
trade unionism. The determination - and success - of certain 
industrial unions such as the Garment Workers Union of S.A. 
to eradicate racialism placed them outside the main stream 
of White - and at times Coloured - worker sentiment and 
union policy influence. The wedge driven into the united 
expression of working class solidarity by the protection 
of the job colour bar, which blinded workers against the 
exploitation colour bar, could not be dislodged.
What was the reaction of the other registered trade 
unions to the assault on trade unionism by the Nationalist 
Party proposed legislation? The leaders of the unions did 
perceive the threat to collective bargaining principles„ 
Attempts to establish a co-ordinating body to function as 
a pressure group were made already before the legislation 
was proposed. But the question of union rights for Black 
workers remained the stumbling block. The Government 
correctly perceived the extent of the White worker fears 
and took no note of a deputation of leaders from registered 
unions representing 221 000 members. A number of Unity 
conferences were held from 1953 to 1955, but they failed 
to find the hoped for solidarity and the following wide 
ranging alignment of union co-ordinating bodies emerged:
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The S.A. Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) which 
offered equal rights to Black and registered trade 
unions and represented some 30 000 workers, mainly 
Blacks, Coloureds and Indians, but also some 
Whites.
The S.A. Trade Union Council (subsequently Trade 
Union Council of S.A. - TUCSA) which attracted 
affiliation from registered in particular raided 
(ie. Coloured, Indian and White) unions and 
represented some 150 000 workers primarily in 
manufacturing industry.
The S.A. Federation of Trade Unions, not that much 
different in fact to TUCSA and representing some 
50 000 workers.
The S.A. Co-ordinating Council of Trade Unions 
representing at that stage only 13 000 workers, 
which did not accept affiliations from any union 
in which Non-Whites had voting power.
The Federal Consultative Council of S.A. Railways 
and Harbours Staff Association which had remained 
an independent body primarily because it was 
controlled by separate legislation. A number of its 
unions would increasingly become affiliated to 
either the Federation or the Co-ordinating Council.
The numerous other registered unions who had 
decided not to align themselves with any of these 
positions. This category of uncommitted unions was 
to increase as the co-ordinating bodies lost them 
as a result of the confused policy debates.
(Horrel, M., 1961).
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As will be discussed in the next chapter, three 
co-ordinating bodies emerged. However, it is evident that 
the pre-occupation with the issue of race prevented the 
union movement as expressed through the registered trade 
unions from defining other objectives. While the union 
movement in Western-Europe paid increasing attention to 
some form of worker's participation, South African trade 
unions found themselves unable or unwilling to defend 
even basic principles of freedom of association.
2.4 Repressive Legislation
As will be discussed the Black trade unions have tried since 
1920 to break into the second phase of the organisational 
development of unions. The basic reason for this failure 
is to be found in the legislation which not only denied 
freedom of association but allowed for drastic action 
against persons involved in assisting those unions. South 
Africa's low strike record is due to these repressive 
measures. The industrial peace was bought at the price 
of industrial justice. Professor Kachelhoffer in his 
analysis of labour legislation as it affects Black workers 
states that the objective was state security and separate 
development; thus the structures and processes contained 
in the laws were not based on industrial relations 
principles (Kachelhoffar, G ., 1977). As revealed in the 
Parliamentary debate on the 1954 Native Labour (Settlement 
of Disputes) Act, and reinforced during the 1973 debate on 
Bantu Labour Relations Regulations Act, the respective 
Ministers of Labour believed committees would deprive 
Black trade unions of 'their life's blood'. Furthermore, 
the provisions of the Suppression of Communism Act have 
been used since they were first imposed on the garment 
worker leader, Solly Sachs in 1951, to ban persons directly 
associated with trade unions or trade union workers' 
educational organisations. By 1956, seventy-five trade 
unionists had been banned and by 1964 fifty members of
94
South African Congress of Trade Unions had been banned; 
similarly in 1974 four and in 1976 twenty-one trade 
unionists were banned.
The purpose of Section II of the Riotous Assemblies 
Act of 1956, says Mathews, is 'to prevent employees from 
using their position as workers to secure an improvement 
in their conditions. If they take any action that is 
likely to be effective they run the risk of drastic criminal 
punishment*. It is apparent from the policy underlying 
these actions that the risk involved for workers deciding 
to become union members has been extremely high. (Mathews, 
A., 1974).
In terms of the legislation, strikes are defined as 
riots. Police intervened in 61 strikes during 1974 for the 
following reasons:
illegal strikes - 16;
public violence - 3;
other reasons - intimidation of persons in relation
to their employment;
refusal to obey lawful command from the employer;
malicious injury to property;
breach of contract by persons employed by public
utility services, arson, etc.
(Horrel, M., 1975).
Workers involved in peaceful picketing in support of 
legitimate strike action have also been charged.
These and other legislative provisions ensured that
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the continued operation of the job colour bar was not 
challenged. Trade unionism was not allowed to spread 
to Black workers.
2.5 Migrant Labour System
The legislative provisions to ensure the continued operation 
of the exploitation colour bar are primarily enacted in the 
Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act and the Black Labour 
Act. The basic provisions of both acts were contained 
in legislation passed in the beginning of the century but 
were moulded more specifically by the Nationalist Party in 
order to serve the policy of apartheid or separate 
development. In terms of this policy, the Blacks who make 
up 71% of the population would be confined to 14% of the 
land and be required to express their political rights in 
those territories. Before 1948 it was accepted that the 
Blacks resided permanently in the industrialised areas.
The Nationalist Party set the objective under Verwoerd 
that Blacks would start going back to the "homelands' 
by 1978.
In terms of the Black Labour Act, labour bureaux are 
established to control and direct the movement of Black 
persons from South Africa or foreign countries to those 
areas in South Africa where they are required by the 
economy. Employers have to enter into contracts with 
those workers and are responsible for their accommodation, 
medical facilities and food. The Act prohibits squatting 
to prevent Blacks defined as illegals from putting up 
shelters in the areas where they are seeking work. The 
Act contains penal sanctions for striking, desertion, 
negligence in work performance, etc., which, as Doxey 
notes, hampered and prevented the emergence of trade 
unionism amongst them.
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In terms of the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 
every Black person is required to carry a pass whose stamp 
shows whether he or she is allowed to be in a so-called 
'White area', if not, criminal charges would be laid.
The Act also governs the establishment and administration 
of urban townships where Blacks were forced to reside.
The Black population, in line with that policy of 
separate development is divided into 9 ethnic groups each 
of which is to have its own 'independent' homeland. But 
the more crucial and consequential division is between:
those Black workers who cannot get a contract 
of employment and thereby are confined to the 
economically underdeveloped homelands; and
those Black workers who can sell their labour 
in the 'White' areas, either because they live 
there or have entered into a one year contract.
Those who face unemployment and starvation in the 
economically underdeveloped 'homelands' numbered in 1970 
1 450 500 workers or 30 per cent of the total Black 
economically active population. These workers cannot 
enter the 'White' area for longer than 72 hours. If 
they do they are criminally charged. In 1970, 793 000 
Black persons were charged for thi? offence and other 
'irregularities' in terms of the. pass laws* The number of 
people charged decreased to 227 000 in 1976, because aid 
centres had been set up which dealt with 195 000 cases.
Of these 95 000 were sent for trial and charged? 45 000 
were sent back to the homelands? 33 000 were helped with 
their documents and 20 000 were placed in employment 
(Horrel, M., 1977).
97
In 1970, 3,6 million Black workers had been allowed to 
sell their labour in the 'White1 or prescribed areas. But 
these, relatively fortunate, persons are divided, in terms 
of Section 10 of the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation 
Act, into the following four categories:
10(1}(a) persons whc were born in the prescribed or
'White1 areas;
10(1)(b) persons who have worked for 1 employer for
10 years or more than one employer for 15
years;
10(1)(c) persons who are dependents (wives and
children) of (a) and (b);
10(1)(d) persons who can only work in the prescribed
areas if they have a contract of employment 
which has to be renewed each year.
(1.5 million in 1970) .
Up to 1968 this system of classifying persons permitted 
a slow process of urbanisation of the Black population, ie. 
after the 10 or 15 years requirement,the Section 10(1) (d) 
worker could apply for Section (10)(1)(b) status. This 
meant he became a permanent resident and no longer a migrant 
and could bring his family to that urban area, provided 
there v \ housing► But this process of urbanisation was 
halted in 1968 and the contract or migrant worker (in 
terms of the 1970 census, 1.5 million) are doomed to 
perpetually live in two worlds, ie. never being allowed 
to make a home nor bring his family to the area where for 
11 months every year he sells his labour.
The consequences of this influx control system and 
the policy of regarding Black persons as non-citizens in 
the White areas are severe. Because of this policy:
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50% of the Black workers in the urban areas are 
forced to live like migrants and are accommodated 
in compounds thereby destroying family life;
the provision of high school facilities in the 
urban Black townships was stopped;
the building of houses in Black urban townships 
was stopped thereby creating a serious shortage 
and forcing people to live 6 to 8 in a room;
the unemployed workers were 'exported* to the 'homelands* 
and settled in camps with no means of employment;
the poverty of the homelands caused malnutrition;
Blacks who could not work, ie. the aged and the 
disabled were deported to the homelands.
The pernicious aspect of the migrant system is the 
false impression it creates in the attitude of the Whites, 
namely, that there is no problem. The social consequences 
of unemployment and starvation are kept out of sight in 
the homelands. The term 'exploitation' to describe the 
instrument applied in this State controlled labour 
utilisation system is accurate.
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2.6 Interpretations and Characteristics of the 
South African Economy
Thomas suggests that an understanding of the complexities 
of the South African economy is gained from the diverse 
interpretations of its history. The four historical 
analyses identify the following characteristics:
In terms of the Rostowian approach, the 'Take­
off into Sustained Growth' phase in which economic 
growth in all ^ajor sectors attained some 
momentum, occurred during 1933-1945. The impetus 
of the sectoral diversification during World 
War II freed the economy from foreign competition 
and accelerated the process rf industrialisation. 
The 'Drive to Maturity' phase with its balanced 
development from agriculture to mining to industry- 
based economic structures could have flowed into 
the final phase of 'High Mass Consumption' in terms 
of the White population by 1970. However, during 
that period the built in dualism of the society 
became apparent. The optimists still hope that 
the final phase will bo reached by 1990.
- The dualistic interpretation of the economy is 
helpful because of its emphasis on South Africa's 
extremely unequal racial and regional development 
pattern. On the one hand, historical factors 
contributing to the original dualism are high­
lighted such as 'the differences in the development 
level of the early White settlors and the 
indigenous population, the gradual institution of 
migrant labour, the Glen Grey policy of labour 
recruitment of the mid nineteenth century, influx 
control and restrictions on land ownership (the 
1915 and 1936 Land Acts) etc. - ana, on the other 
hand, later developments causing a widening of
1
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this division, which resulted in the sharp 
differences in socio-economic levels of development 
between rural Africans and the Homelands as 
opposed to the metropolitan areas'. (Thomas, W.,
1979, p.12) However, the question remains: 
how can 'the duality be overcome1.
In contrast to the dualistic perspective, the 
radical or neo-marxist interpretation emphasises 
the racially restrictive statutory and conventional 
norms deliberately imposed by the White class on 
the Black peasants. These restrictions range from 
no voting rights, no land ownership in so-called 
White areas, control over indenturing of apprentices, 
control over business rights in terms of the Group 
Areas legislation, to obstacles in the way of 
vertical and geographic mobility, etc. The 
policy of separate development which means creating 
satellite states economically dependent on South 
Africa, is perceived as a logical outcome of 
internal neo-imperialism. The Rostowian and 
dualistic interpretations with their implied 
evolutionary changes and strategy of removing 
obstacles are rejected in favour of a solution of 
revolutionary restructuring and abolition of the 
capitalist system.
The actual or believed impact of the radical 
interpretation amongst the Black population has 
led to a popularisation amongst business leaders 
of the free-enterprise interpretation. This 
latter approach, in reviewing state policy over 
the past century, points out that Government 
intervention and market-curtailing policies has 
'crept' into areas such as: marketing of 
agricultural products, capital formation, regional 
development, land ownership, import patterns,
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labour utilisation, etc. Hence the emphasis on 
decontrolling those economic areas as they 
seriously hamper growth and reduce living standards.
These four approaches all express similar concern 
about the gross inequalities between the racial groups. 
Certain newspapers and organisations such as the Institute 
of Race Relations continuously drew attention to these 
inequalities in the past, but it was only after the 1973 
strikes demonstrating against poverty, wages and coercive 
employment problems, as well as the 1976 uprising against 
Bantu education that they were more generally debated.
These inequalities, due to racial discrimination are 
reflected in the following statistical tables.
Table 1 shows past population growth and future 
projections (Thomas, W., 1979, p.8). The statistics 
include the population of the independent Homelands of 
Transkei, Bophutatswana and Venda. But even if 
their populations are deducted, the proportionate ratios 
of the various race groups does not change drastically.
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TABLE 1
POPULATION GROWTH IN SOUTH AFRICA: PAST, PRESENT AND 
PROJECTED ('000)
Black White Coloured Asian Total
% % % %
1 911 4 01 9 67,3 1 276 21 ,4 525 8,8 152 2,6 5 973
1 936 6 596 68,8 2 003 20,9 796 8,0 220 2,3 9 588
1951 8 560 67,6 2 642 20,9 1 103 8,7 367 2,9 12 671
1 970 15 340 70,4 3 773 17,3 2 051 9,4 630 2,9 21 794
1975 18 1 36 71,2 4 240 16,6 2 368 9,3 727 2,9 25 471
1 990 26 900 73,5 5 300 14,5 3 441 9,4 950 2,6 36 591
2000 34 500 75,2 5 971 13,0 4 293 9,4 1 103 2,4 45 867
Table 2 presents the growth of the labour force since 
1960 and future projections in terms of the potential 
members of each race groups (Ibid., p .11). The imperative 
need for economic development is demonstrated by this 
growth of almost 300 000 workers per annum.
TABLE 2
LABOUR FORCE 1960-75 AND PROJECTIONS ('000)
Black White Coloured Asian Total
1960 4 297 1 146 551 125 6 119
1975 6 986 1 757 807 221 9 771
1 980 7 416 1 827 939 246 10 428
2000 12 420 2 388 1 503 364 16 675
In Table 3 the economically active population by race 
is broken down in terms of participation in major sectors. 
(Ibid., p.17) It is to be noted that although agriculture 
employees one-and-a-half times the number of economically 
active workers compared with manufacturing industry, that
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sector only contributes 7,5% to the gross domestic product 
compared with 32,2% by manufacturing industry.
TABLE 3
ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION ('000)
1946 1960 1970
Blacks Others Blacks Others Blacks Others
Agriculture 1 268 279 1 438 250 2 014 225
Mining
Manufactur­
441 57 548 67 605 71
ing, etc. 
Commerce, 
finance,
245 279 495 465 808 712
etc. 
Other
71 178 189 329 349 557
sectors 
Unemployed 
and un­
743 427 892 562 1 205 708
specified 137 96 328 156 624 108
TOTAL 2 905 1 316 3 890 1 830 5 605 2 381
Tables 4 and 5 contain information on the occupational 
classification of the various race groups (R.S.A., 1 979, p.7). 
These tables are expressed in percentages and must be seen 
in relation to the total number for each race group. Table 
4 shows that Blacks have moved into professional, technical 
and related jobs, if one compares the period between 1951 
and 1970. Howevet, the following observation by Nattrass 
places this development in perspective. 'In 1972 for 
example 90% of the Blacks in the professional and technical 
grades comprise school teachers and nurses. The equivalent 
percentage for Coloureds was 80% whilst that of Asiatics 
was 62% and for Whites 35%. Similarly, in the clerical 
occupations one finds a bunching of Blacks, Asians and 
Indians in the lower clerical positions, whilst Whites
1 05
dominated in the higher grade occupations such as those 
of bookkeeper, bank clerk, internal auditor and 
administration and committee clerk'. (Nattrass, J „, 1979)
Table 5 also shows that Whites dominate the top 
four occupations especially the category managerial/ 
executive. The analysis made by Nattrass for changes in 
the racial composition of major occupations for the period 
1971 to 1977 shows that Blacks have increased their relative 
position in primarily the category clerical, from 7.1% 
to 16.3%; and sales from 16.9% to 21.5%; and production 
workers from 67.0% to 70.4%.
TABLE 4
OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION, ON A PERCENTAGE BASIS OF THE 
ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION 1951, AND 1970
Main occupational Whites Coloureds
Asians Blacks
group 1951 1970 1951 1970 1951 1970 1951 1970
Professional, tech­
nical and related 
workers 9,7 15,4 2,0 3,6 2,8 5,6 0,9 1,6
Administrative and 
managerial workers 8,0 5,3 0,4 0,1 10,7 1 ,2 0,2 0,1
Clerical workers 20,2 26,7 1,3 5,0 3,2 14,1 0,4 1 ,7
Sales workers 6,5 10,3 1 ,6 3,3 12,4 16,6 0,4 1 ,4
Service workers 4,8 6,8 22,9 17,8 11 ,1 8,7 20,6 17,8
Farm, forestry and 
fisheries workers 14,6 6,4 24,0 16,9 13,4 3,8 40,2 40,3
Mining, production 
and transport 
workers and labourers 33,6 26,1 41,5 44,6 34,6 41,4 34,4 30,6
Not classifiable 2,6 3,0 6,3 8,7 11,3 8,6 2,9 6,5
TOTAL 100 100 100 1 00 1 00 100 100 1 00
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TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE OF WHITES, COLOUREDS, ASIANS AND BLACKS IN EACH 
OCCUPATION 1970
Occupation Whites Coloureds Asians Blacks
Professional, technical 
and related workers 64,5 7,1 2,8 25,6
Administrative and 
managerial workers 
Clerical workers 71,9 6,5 4,6 17,0
Sales workers 54,1 8,1 10,5 27,3
Service workers 8,2 10,1 1,2 80,5
Farm, forestry and 
fisheries workers 3,8 4,8 0,3 91,1
Mining, production and 
transport vorkers and 
labourers 15,5 12,6 3,0 68,9
Statistics for the Educational level of the labour
force by race are given an Table 6, Just on 40% of the 
1.9 million male Black workers in urban areas have no 
educational qualification, while 80% had an educational 
qualification of only 7 years at school (van der Merwe, 
P., 1980). The position for female and rural workers 
reveal a similar but less qualified pattern.
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TABLE 6
THE EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THE MALE LABOUR FORCE IN THE 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1970
(Percentage of Totals)
Qualification
obtained Whites Coloureds Asians
Blacks 
Urban Rural
Male 
None 
Std 3
1,1
3,3
24,7
43,3
6,7
34,7
39,9
16,8
65,4
15,3
Std 3 - 5 25,3 13,6
Std 6 - 7 25,4 22,4 36,0 13,0 4,1
Std 8 - 9 29,7 6,5 13,8 4,0 1 ,o
Std 10 25,1 1 ,7 5,4 0,7 0,2
Diploma
degree
and/or
15,4 1,4 3,4 0,3 0,4
TOTAL 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
The explanation for the low educational qualification of 
the Black 1abour force lies in the gross discriminatory 
spending by the State on the educational facilities for each 
racial group. The estimated per capital expenditure during 
1976 to 1977 on school pupils of the various racial groups 
was:
White R654
Coloured R158
Indian R220
Black R 49
There was one teat her for every 20 White pupils but 
only one teacher for every 50 Black pupils in 1977 
(Gordon, L., 1979, p.323).
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Comparative information on the racial distribution 
of the national and personal income is given in Table 7. 
Whereas the Black people constitute 70% of the population 
and the Whites 17%, the percentages when it comes to 
income are reversed. The Blacks only command a total 
personal income of 20% while the Whites receive 7%
(Thomas ,W,y1 979, p.16).
TABLE 7
RACIAL PERCENTAGE SHARE IN AGGREGATE INCOME
Year White Coloured Asian Black
Personal income 1970 72,0 6,0 2,0 20,0
Remuneration of 
employers 1 970 63,3 6,6 2,3 27,8
Claimed household 
income 1973 69,5 5,9 2,3 22,3
In a study on racial income distribution in South Africa
McGrath shows that for the period 1946/47 to 1970 the
inequality between Whites and Blacks widened. The disparity
in racial income distribution increased in particular 
since 1960 . From 1946/47 to 1960 the disparity moved from 
10,6 to 11,9 but for the 1960 - 1970 decade it moved to 
15.0 (McGrath, M., 1977).
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TABLE 8
RACIAL INCOME PER CAPITA
Income per capita (R) %higc^to^Other^ 
1946/47 1960 1970 1946/47 1960 1970
White 41 3 843 1 594 -
Coloured 66 133 265 6,3 6,3 6,0
Asian 97 1 47 312 4,3 5,7 5,1
Black 3 9 71 106 10,6 1 1 ,9 15,0
The duality of the South African economy is shown up 
in Table 9. The international comparative figures for 1973 
of the per capita gross domestic products for various 
countries and also for the various groups in South Africa 
shows that White South Africans compared to the people in 
France and Black South Africans compared to the people of 
Ivory Coast. The urban Blacks living in Soweto have a 
higher per capita income than those Blacks living in the 
Homelands (Thomas, W., 1979, p.6).
TABLE 9
THE 1973 PER CAPITA GDP EXPRESSED IN US DOLLARS
United States 6 200 South Africa: Soweto
Blacks 486
France 4 540 Zambia 430
South Africa: Whites 4 449 South Africa: All
Africans 409
Japan 3 630 Ivory Coast 380
Soviet Union 2 030 Senegal 280
South Africa: Asians 1 054 South Africa: Homelands 262
Coloureds 897 Nigeria 210
Brazil 760 Tanzania 1 30
Turkey 600
The above statistics dealt with the period up to 1970 
or 1973. Subsequent to the shock-effeet of the demonstration 
strikes of 197 3 and the World-Wide publicity on poverty
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wages, a change has occurred.
Table 10 shows that the wage gap is narrowing, although in 
money terms the gap is widening because of the low base of 
Black wages in 1970. As Thomas observes 'The general trend 
can also be illustrated by other data: for example in the 
non-agricultural sectors real wages of Whites and Blacks 
have increased at average annual rates of 2,47 and 6,46 
per cent respectively during the period 1969/70-1976. In 
fact, White real wages have only increased at the average 
rate of 0,52 per cent since 1971/72. Thus there is little 
doubt that the racial wage gap is narrowing, even though the 
process is far too complex - being determined by factors as 
diverse as the profitability of respective sectors, the 
capital: labour relationship and substitutability of labour, 
the educational and training level of Africans, upward 
mobi ■+-y of Africans in each sector, their bargaining power 
(ie„ tneir position in the trade union system) and the 
ability of the fiscus to rapidly change wage scales of 
African public-sector employees etc. - for this adjustment 
to take place within a few years'. (Ibid., p.19)
TABLE 10
AVERAGE WAGES FOR WHITE AND BLACK WORKERS
Sector
Average annual 
wage 
R
Relationship 
Black White
1 970 1 976 1 970 1976
Mining WB
4 255
215
8
1
516
070 1:19,79 1 : 7,96
Manufacturing industry WB
3 347
572
6
1
746
465 1: 5,85 1:4,60
Construction WB
3 441
521
6
1
650
357 1: 6,60 1:4,90
Retail trade WB
1 684
485
2 973
939 1: 3,47 1:3,16
Central Government WB
2 71 8 
512
5
1
1 1 1 
479 1: 5,31 1:3,46
Local authorities WB
2 934
460
6
1
232
097 1: 6,37 1:5,68
Post office WB
2 585 
61 8
4
1
817
280 1 : 4,18 1:3,76
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The dual and discriminatory system severely influenced 
the productivity performance of the South African economy.
The exploitation colour bar affected the sound use of 
labour in particular training of the workers. The 
apprenticeship system drew primarily from the White group 
and to a certain extent from the Indian and Coloured group . 
For the period 1975 tc 1978,1"! 318 apprenticeship contracts 
were entered into of whom 80% were Whites, 15% Coloureds 
and 5% Indians. This discrimination is partly due to the 
disparity in educational expenditure in the educational 
system whereby fewer Coloureds and Indians reach Std. 8, and 
partly due to the fact that White registered unions do not 
allow workers from other race groups to be apprenticed.
Black youth have been apprenticed for the building trade 
in terms of the Black Building Workers Act, but they can 
only practice their trade,once qualified, in the homelands 
or Black townships (Halse, F., 1980, p.4).
South Africa's productivity performance compares 
particularly poorly even with countries such as Spain.
Table 11 compares the gross domestic product per employed 
person and per capita for the year 1 975 (Upton, L., 1 978, p.31) 
It is evident that considerable improvements can and must 
be made but this would require elimination of the job 
colour bar and the exploitation colour bar.
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TABLE 11
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 1975 (US $)
Per employed per- p^r capita
sons
United States 1 7 200 6 600
Germany 16 730 6 200
France 1 6 710 5 660
Israel 9 600 3 060
Japan 9 320 4 1 30
Italy 9 190 2 710
United Kingdom 9 170 3 370
Spain 6 890 2 100
South Africa 2 781 1 054
Thomas concludes from the historical analysis and the 
above statistical information that South Africa should 
be regarded as a semi-developed country with a mixed 
economic system in that both features of the conventional 
private-enterprise system and socialism are found side by 
side. This assessment is supported by the following examples:
the Government employees about 40% of working-age 
White males in the public sector which covers the 
direct government, provincial and local authorities 
as well as enterprises such as the Railways and 
Harbours administration, the post office? and 
Government financed public corporations such as 
Electricity Commission (Escom); Iron and Steel 
Works (Iscor) and oil from coal projects (Sasol)?
the homeland areas for the Black ethnic groups 
can not adequately supply their own agricultural 
needs and have to generate income through the 
migrant labour system;
113
the market mechanism still constitutes the major 
regulatory instrument, although in regard to 
agricultural products the Control Boards influence 
prices and location of industry is influenced by 
Government policy (Ibid., p.24).
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CHAPTER 3
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM
IN THE 1970 DECADE
Chapter three deals with the characteristics of the 
industrial relations system in the 1970 decade. The first 
part describes the considerable division in the organised 
union movement as a consequence of the 1956 amendments to 
the Industrial Conciliation Act and assists in understanding 
the description of the registered union movement„ This 
is followed by a description of employers association.
The part on wage regulating instruments records the output 
of the interaction between these two parties to the industrial 
relations system.
Because the research engaged in for this dissertation 
focussed on the formation of industrial relations policy of 
employers, a section on the development of the personnel 
management function is included. As discussed in the first 
chapter, two approaches can be adopted towards industrial 
relations. The human relations approach in regard to the 
workplace relationship is based on the premis that the 
personnel management function is sufficient whereas the 
labour relations approach accepts that besides the direct 
management to individual worker interaction, it is 
necessary to formalise a relationship between management and 
the collective expression of the labour force. This is 
why the chapter also includes a part on the re-emergence of 
Black unions in the first half of the 1970 decade.
3.1 Division in the Organised Union Movement 
As is evident from the description in Chapter 2, neither 
a sense of common beliefs and interest nor awareness of 
common opponent developed amongst the workers of the 
different racial groups, as industrialisation spread from
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the mining industry to the various manufacturing sectors.
In fact as Williams concludes in analysing the different 
approaches to trade unionism, as reflected in the diverse 
range of co-ordinating bodies, they are not simply divisions 
in an otherwise united working class. 'In many ways, these 
are simply of the working class and not within the working 
class'. (Williams, K ., 1979, p.82)
It is therefore pertinent to briefly relate how the 
organised union movement responded to the attack on trade 
unionism by the further entrenchment of racialism on the 
legislation in the 1950 decade.
Three co-ordinating bodies emerged subsequent to the 
1956 Industrial Conciliation Act: ~ the South African 
Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) which initially had as 
founder members four registered (mixed) trade unions and 
eight Black trade unions from the manufacturing sector; the 
Trade Union Council of S.A. (TUCSA) which initially excluded 
Black unions from affiliation, and catered primarily for 
unions in manufacturing, commerce and transport sectors; 
and the right wing S.A. Confederation of Labour (SACOLA) 
which had support only from White trade unions, whose 
membership was primarily employed by the government and 
semi-government agencies, in particular the Railways, 
municipalities and in the mines, as well as the state- 
controlled steel works.
The South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) 
opposed in principle the 1956 Industrial Conciliation 
Act. As a result its activities were seen as politically 
motivated rather than economically directed by authorities 
and employers and its leaders incurred the constant attention 
and action of State security. SACTU argued that Black 
workers were both economically exploited as well as 
politically oppressed and hence its alliance with the 
African National Congress was essential. As a result,
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broad-based strategies such as the 1£1-a-day' and 'stay-at-home' 
demonstrations were adopted, (Horrel, M., 1961, p. 80)
SACTU leadership probably miscalculated the problems 
in obtaining mass support and mistakenly, assumed that from 
mass action programmes^effective organisations would emerge. 
Feit, in analysing SACTU activities lists a number of factors 
to explain why the objective of establishing viable unions 
and yet retaining political involvement failed: involvement 
in strike action (nurses, match manufacturing workers; blind 
workers) which led to little more than publicity; no funds to 
organise workers; leaders involved in too many projects, eg. 
rents issues; power for women; organising the unemployed; 
problems of inexperienced full-time staff; lack of co­
ordinated action from regions in national campaigns, ie. 
no organisational follow-up besides issue of placards, leaflets 
and badges in campaigns; use of exaggerated reports and 
claims of success which later proved questionable. Fjiedman 
adds the strong indictment that SACTU unions were not grass 
root organisations which developed out of a sense of relative 
depirvation amongst the workers and response to their 
situation. They grew from outside the working class and hence 
there was no worker-inspired strategy (see L. Douwes-Dekker,
1977 (b), p.8).
SACTU initially drew its majority membership from the 
Black unions. It was not able to attract many registered 
trade unions. Neither was it able to win over the Black 
garment unions to its cause and the distributive unions who 
were expected to show support did not affiliate because 
SACTU was regarded as too political.
By 1961 SACTU claimed 46 affiliated unions with combined 
memberships of 53 350 (500 Whites, 12 400 Coloureds, 1 650 
Indians and 38 000 Blacks).
But besides organisational weaknesses SACTU1s downfall 
was a direct result of action against it by State security.
As a consequence of the ’stay-at-home' demonstrations a number
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of SACTU members were convicted on a charge of inciting 
others to strike. During the state of emergency in I960, 
meetings called by SACTU were banned. During 1963, 35 
SACTU officials were detained. By 1964, more than 50 
prominent members had been served with banning orders.
By 1965, SACTU existed in name only. When the 
leadership was forced into exile, the organisation continued 
operating overseas with the help of the African National 
Congress. Although SACTU gained the sympathetic hearing 
from national trade union centres in Europe, its claim 
to represent the Black workers was increasingly questioned 
when leaders of the re-emerged Black union movement in 
the 1970's made contact with overseas union organisations, 
and when these Black unions affiliated to the International 
Trade Secretariats. SACTU gained support from African and 
Asian countries and was active in the move to have South 
Africa suspended from the International Labour Organisation 
because of that country's 1 declared policy of racial 
discrimination'. South Africa withdrew from the ILO in 
1965 before this suspension could be put into effect.
The rivalry between the African National Congress and 
Pan African Congress - which believed in the need for the 
Blacks to build up their own bargaining power without the 
Whites assistance from persons - led to the establishment of 
the Federation of Free African Trade Unions (FOFATUSA). 
FOFATUSA, which had 18 400 Black members, became an 
alternative co-ordinating body of Black unions.
The S.A. Trade Union Council (subsequently TUCSA) also 
opposed the proposed legislation but tried to place 
alternatives to the Government. It rejected the organisational 
separation of the registered unions but was prepared to agree 
to the holding of separate Coloured and White meetings of 
a union. This was suggested on condition that job reservation 
legislation be treated as separate legislation in order to
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to see whether it really could protect the interests of 
the White workers - a principle which TUCSA rejected . But 
the Government was not prepared to deviate from its course 
and obviously felt it could ignore any influence TUCSA 
might be able to command.
For the remaining two decades, TUCSA tried to reconcile 
its identification with international trade union principles 
against the impact of racialism amongst the affiliated union 
leaders and their meetings. The dependence on the job 
colour bar was entrenched and the fear of Black advancement 
could not be dislodged by logical arguments.
In 1958, reinforced by a visit from the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU - the international 
body of national union centres i-n the free world) , TUCSA 
resolved to organise all workers irrespective of race. The 
fact that a number of its industrial trade unions (tobacco, 
garment, leather, chemical, baking) had contact with or 
assisted Black trade unions facilitated this decision. But 
the following - events provided an important background 
understanding to the strong mistrust held by the independent 
unions which emerged in the 1970 decade towards TUCSA.
In 1959, five Black unions working with registered 
unions affiliate to TUCSA established together with four 
unaffiliated Black unions the Federation of Free African 
Trade Unions of South Africa (FOFATUSA ). This co-ordinating 
body affiliated to the ICFTU which discouraged it from 
engaging in political activities. The FOFATUSA unions 
received help from the registered unions and TUCSA officials. 
By 1962, 20 unions were affiliated to it, with a membership 
strength equivalent to that of SACTU, namely 36 000. However, 
TUCSA decided at its annual conference that year by majority 
vote to amend its constitution in order to permit any bona 
fide union, ie. Black unions, to affiliate. Horrel points out 
that the TUCSA unions were perturbed about the increasing 
number of unorganised workers who were not formally part of
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industrial conciliation machinery. 1 Without channels for
negotiation and agreement on terms of employment, it was 
suggested, discontent could brew amongst Black workers 
until it might errupt. In the absence of responsible leader 
ship, Black unions who felt frustrated might be 
exploited by 'subversive elements'" (Horrel, M., 1969, p.29) 
This assessment of the motives behind TUGSA's decision, plus 
the fact that craft unions voted against the resolution, 
explains, with hindsight, that TUGSA's efforts would not 
gain the necessary support from its affiliated members.
TUCSA and its affiliated unions not only failed to 
effectively organise Black workers into unions, but also did 
little to counter the backlash from registered union member­
ship against their perceived loss in standard of living, if 
Blacks could exercise union rights. The socio-economic 
circumstances of Black and White workers differed too much 
to facilitate class solidarity.
TUGSA's decision to open to Black unions became a 
challenge to the unions affiliated to FOFATUSA to choose 
belr-'een the two and could be interpreted as a threat to 
the letters' existence because of the inexperience of some 
of the unions and independence on the registered unions who 
were part of the system. FOFATUSA tried to retain its 
identity by suggesting it should affiliate as a body to 
TUCSA. TUGSA's constitution did not allow for this and 
over the next three years the largest (garment and leather) 
of the unions decided to affiliate to TUCSA. Other unions 
went out of existence, the President left the country and 
the organisers decided in 1965 to disband FOFATUSA (Ibid.,
p.82) .
TUCSA continued to pass resolutions calling upon the 
Government to change the definition of employee in the 
Industrial Conciliation Act whereby Black workers were 
denied membership of registered unions and kept out of the 
industrial council machinery. However, the Government not
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only ignored these representations and refused to see 
delegations, but the Minister of Labour, at two political 
party meetings in 1967, deliberately attacked TUCSA as being 
1 un-South African'. This was a well-time attack on TUCSA's 
policy of wanting to organise Black workers and assisting 
the Black unions. Certain artisan unions in TUCSA namely 
the motor mechanics and the engineers had disaffiliated on 
that issue, and the leaders of the remaining artisan unions 
were concerned to retain their protectionist function for 
the White members rather than promote unionism fur Black 
workers. Although TUCSA's forward looking leadership tried 
to keep the affiliation open, 14 unions had disaffiliated 
by 1969 on the issue of Black union membership. At the 
Annual Conference of that year TUCSA constitution was 
amended to exclude unregistered unions. This decision saved 
TUCSA but left it without a role to play in the emerging 
Black union movement of the 1970 decade. Its decision 
in 1974 to again re-open the doors of affiliation to un­
registered, and hence Black unions brought none of the 
independent Black unions to it. Instead those Black unions 
who joined it were labelled paternal because of the 
control exercised over it by the registered union.
TUCSA was also criticised for its alternative policy 
to job reservation. The TUCSA unions argued that the 
'rate for the job' principle was not racialistic in that 
it should ensure that irrespective of race of the incumbent 
the same wage rate applied. However, Lever comments that 
the rate for the job slogan is deceptive because it masks the 
exclusionist_ effect. 1 White trade unions from Cape to 
Copperbelt have found that by insisting on a relatively high 
minimum wage rate for jobs done by union members, Blacks 
could be excluded from the work without any recourse to 
insidioys propaganda' . (Lever,. J. , 1 976) As also pointed 
out by the SACOLA, the rate for the job is the published 
or gazetted rate for the job. This is the minimum rate 
negotiated between the White trade union and the employer
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organisation on Industrial Council level. 'Invariably, 
it is found that this rate is such that, by todays economic 
standards no White worker can exist thereon'. Hence 
the actual wage the White worker can command because he 
only has access to training, is higher than the laid down 
rate.
The three craft unions which disaffiliated from TUCSA 
did not return to that body earily in 1970, but neither 
did they join SACOLA. Instead they became part of the 
significant large number of unions who did not align themselves 
to any co-ordinating body. In fact the number of workers 
affiliated to these 81 unions numbered 192 000 in 1973; 
of these union members 80% were White.
SACOLA was formed primarily to protect its White members 
through job reservation and denial of trade union rights for 
Blacks. In 1969, 27 trade unions with a combined membership 
of 183 781 were affiliated. However, because of divergent 
views, particularly regarding job advancement of Blacks, 
problems were experienced. In 1975 the Federal Consultation 
Council of S.A.R. & H. Association withdrew its group 
membership. This move suggested that the leaders felt 
reform within the organisation was not. possible.
The comments by C. Grobler, the one time General 
Secretary of this body, are significant. He observed that 
the principles of that body forced it to fight a rearguard 
action. 'Work allocation committees and artisan assistant 
schemes on the railways, artisan aids in the mining industry 
straightforward handovers by other trade unions, again under 
the guise of productivity bargaining, are all part of it'. 
Furthermore, the ostensible reason given for the opposition 
to Black unions was because they had not reached standards 
of responsibility and should exercise union rights in their 
Homelands. But 'germane to the issue is that Whites are not 
ready for Black trade unions' (Grobler, C., 1976).
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3.2 Registered Trade Unions
The Industrial Conciliation Act only allowed unions with 
White, Coloured and Indians to be registered. As noted 
in the historical overview, the primarily craft-orientated 
White trade unions were forced to rely on the job colour bar 
to protect and promote the interests of their members in the 
early stages of trade union development. The job colour bar 
became entrenched in legislation and hence these early 
historical beginnings led to a reliance and subsequently respect 
for and then dependence by the craft-orientated trade unions on 
legislation. For example the S.A. Typographical Onion was 
already willing in 1939 to open its ranks to Black workers. 
However, because it was advised that this was going to cause 
considerable conflict with the Government at the time, it 
was prepared to submit to the requirement that it organise only 
White, Coloured and Indian workers. It was only subsequent 
to the Government's accmetance of the Wlehahn recommendation 
and the legislative amendments of 1979 that this union 
decided to organise Black workers.
It appears that the development of industrial unionism, 
started during the 1930 decade, would have over time broken 
down the racialism which became entrenched in the labour 
movement in its early days. Thus the Garment Workers Union 
of S.A. during World War II was able to enrol Black women as 
members as they were not pass bearers and hence did not fall 
under the then definition of employee in the Industrial 
Conciliation Act. The Sweet Workers Union also enrolled Black 
workers as members, until in terms of the Supreme Court order 
in 1945, it was forced to choose between de-registration or 
expulsion of the Black union members. The latter alternative 
was adopted, trade unions are first and foremost, pragmatic 
organisations.
Industrial unionslm was not allowed to develop its own 
direction and any attempts to organise Black workers were
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severely hampered by legislative measures as noted above.
The 1927 Native Administration Act contained a 'hostility 
clause' which was later incorporated into the Riotous 
Assemblies Act. The clause stated that it was an offence 
for any person to say or do anything that was considered 
likely to promote any feeling of hostility between Black and 
White persons. This provision was used by the authorities 
against trade union leaders whom the Government considered 
were arousing opposition amongst Blacks to certain Government 
measures or were causing animosity in any other way (Horrel,
M., 1961). As has also been noted industrial unionism was 
further severely hampered by the campaign launched by 
Afrikaner nationalist against, in particular, the Mine 
Workers Union, the Garment Workers Union and the Building 
Workers Union. Dr. Malan stated in 1943 that the system of 
collective bargaining was out of date and would have no place 
in the economic policy of the Nationalist Party. These 
campaigns were not immediately successful and hence the 
Nationalist Party resorted to legislative control to further 
weaken the trade union movement after it had come into power.
The amendments to the Industrial Conciliation Act 
in 1956 entrenched racialism in the legislation. Mixed trade 
unions had to split upyin the future only uniracial unions 
could be registered. Mixed unions could apply for exemption 
but the executive committee had to be all White. Some unions 
split in order to give Coloureds their own organisational base 
(distributive trade) while others retained their mixed 
character, but formed informal liaison committees between the White 
and Coloured branches (garment industry). In a number of 
cases exemptions were granted.
The weak and fragmented nature of the trade union movement 
is reflected in the statistics below.
Only 17 trade unions had a membership of 10 000 and more 
in 1973. The largest were the S.A. Municipal Employees
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(36 000 Whites) and the Garment Workers' Union of 
Western Province (35 000 Coloureds' - (Horner, D ., 1 974 .
One third of the registered trade unions covered 92% 
of unionised labour, ie. 112 unions had insignificant 
membership. Yet some of these small and totally unrepresentative 
unions were and are party to industrial councils and have 
influence on wages and working conditions of significant 
numbers of Black workers. It is evident from these statistics 
and the output of the industrial council as reflected in 
the agreements that in many instances the relationship pattern 
between registered trade unions and employers association 
could be described as collusion.
TABLE 12
REGISTERED TRADE UNIONS - 1973
Membership (0001s)
No. White Coloured/Asian Total
White 85 367 - 367
Coloured/Asian 48 - 76 76
Mixed 41 45 130 176
TOTAL 174 412 206 619
The degree of unionisation of workers eligible to join 
registered unions varies considerably according to the 
different sectors. The total number is 30% which is low 
considering the provision of closed shop facilities.
Statistics are not available for an accurate statement because 
of the overlaps caused by craft unions whose members are 
employed in various sectors. Table 13 gives some idea of the 
degree of unionisation by sector where the aggregate
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percentage for the various race groups in a sector differs 
for Whites to that of the Coloureds/Asians, this has been 
shown by including the figure in brackets. Craft union 
membership can also not be accurately distributed amongst the 
various sectors.
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TABLE 13
UNIONISATION OF WHITE, COLOURED AND ASIAN WORKERS PER SECTOR
1973
Sector No. W.C Members
.A. Union % of eligible 
total W.C.A.
Number
Blacks
of
Building 47 000 42% (C.32%) 277 000
Commerce 15 000 5% 1 94 000
Finance 33 000 52% (C.8%) 7 000
Government (Prov.) 6 000 (W. only) 6% 82 000
Government(Loc.) 60 000 83% (C.59%) 120 000
Manufacturing:
Beverages 256 2% 14 000
Chemicals 2 900 10% 38 000
Clothing 71 000 77% (C.84%) 36 000
Electricity 3 000 (W. only)30% 18 000
Food 12 000 26% (C.35%) 89 000
Footwear 22 000 62% (W. 9%) 7 000
Furniture 9 000 53% (W.13%) 20 000
Iron, Steel, Eng, 92 000 49% (C.32%) 235 000
Misc. 1 000 4% 22 000
Motor 52 000 46% (C.28%) 119 000
Non-metallie 
mineral 1 000 5% 77 000
Printing 21 000 76% 8 500
Textiles 5 000 25% 64 000
Tobacco 573 25% 1 900
Mining 42 000 (w. only)50% 593 000
Catering & liquor 13 000 63% (C.74%) 32 000
Telecommunication 3 800 7% (C.18%) 15 000
Transport-SAR 81 000 65% (C.13%) 99 000
Note: W-Whites ? C-Coloureds; A-Asians.
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White union membership increased from 319 000 in 1961 
to only 412 000 in 1973, Coloured and Asian membership 
increased from 98 000 in 1961 to 174 000 in 1973, But 
Coloured leadership did not emerge in relation to this 
growth in Union membership. One explanation is that 
130 000 Coloureds (or 74% of total) are 'locked in' mixed 
trade unions, where union decisions and affairs are handled 
by a White general secretary and controlled by a White 
executive.
A document prepared for the TUCSA 1967 Special 
Conference to discuss Black union expulsion (agreed to in 
1969) highlighted how organised labour was unrepresentative 
of the total labour force in manufacturing industry as reflected 
in the above table (Kraft, R. , 1 967),, Analysis of union 
membership over the period 1960 to 1965, showed that:
The proportion of White union members was dropping 
by 1% per year.
In 14 of the 22 sectors, the proportion of Coloured 
union members increased; in one case up to 14,4%.
60% of Coloureds, Asians and Whites were not 
organised. However, one third of these were in 
white collar positions, ie. excluded from union 
constitutions.
In 6 sectors, Coloureds and Indians increased their 
proportion of the labour force by 5% or more for
period 1958/9 - 1967, namely:
Leather 40,9% to 62,2%
Transport 5,8% to 20,4%
Beverages 20,6% to 26,2%
Footwear 57,6% to 72,5%
Motor 16% to 21 ,8%
Clothing 56,6% to 63,5%
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Considering the growth trends in unionisation amongst 
Coloured workers, the question arises why the ideology 
expressed by Coloured leaders in other organisation and 
societal activities has not expressed itself in the union 
movement. A prominent section of Coloured sporting bodies 
have adopted the slogan 1 there cannot be normal sport in 
an abnormal society1 and have demanded multiracial sports; 
integrated clubs, also in schools, and elimination of 
apartheid. Coloured leadership with such objectives have 
not emerged amongst registered unions, except in the 
motor assembly industry, probably for two reasons. Firstly, 
the category Coloured includes in the labour legislation 
also the Asian group, and the majority have entered the 
union movement automatically because of the closed shop 
provision of many industrial council agreements. Secondly, 
besides lack of awareness amongst the members, the nature 
of the leadership has been influenced by the White leaders.
Certain characteristics of the registered trade 
union movement have been discussed in the previous chapter 
describing the racial divisions reflected in the co-ordinating 
bodies. Considering the onslaught on unionism subsequent 
to 1948, it is remarkable that principles were retained 
and the movement was not totally forced to go underground 
or into exile.
However, the movement suffered from a negative image 
and this affected the emergence of leadership. As one of 
TUCSA's leaders observed, 'the future of the trade union 
movement lies in the hands of the Coloured and Black workers ' 
who constitute the real working class, 'White leadership 
in the South African trade union movement is an ageing 
leadership, faced with a serious problem of succession'.
If White trade unions are to survive, they will be mainly 
white-collar associations of supervisors, technicians and 
foremen (Altman, R., 1976).
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The registered trade unions did nove into the third 
phase of union development subsequent to World War II, 
although TUCSA was severely criticised by the Minister of 
Labour and ignored by his Department. The two co-ordinating 
bodies of registered unions serve on 11 State bodies ranging 
from unemployment insurance, inflation, training of Blacks, 
productivity to the Economic Advisory Council of the Prime 
Minister.
But the significance or effect of this representation 
was probably small. One consequence of the weakness of the 
registered, in particular the industrial, unions was their 
in/ability to ensure that wage rates remained in line with 
inflation. In 1976 the White leadership of the largest 
Coloured union (the Garment Workers Union of the Western 
Cape) faced problems of rank and file dissatisfaction typical 
of phase three of union development. In support of 
allegations made, the Action Committee campaigning to oust 
the General Secretary, stated that:
real wages had declined since 1948 by 25%, ie. 
earnings in 1976 were R20-50 p.w. and should 
have been R25.60 p.w. to make up for cost of 
living increases; and
sick pay had only increased from R4 per week 
in 194 8 to R8 per week in 1976, whereas, in 
proportion to inflation, it should have been 
R12.80 per week.
(Maree, J., 1976)
This trend occurred with little previous protest because 
of changes in the racial composition of the labour market.
The Coloureds who replaced the Whites were used to a 
lower standard of living and hence saw relative improvement. 
But the rate for the job was not maintained.
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3.3 Employers Organisations
In 1973, 240 employers organisations for specific trades 
representing 38 757 employers were registered in terms of 
the Industrial Conciliation Act.
These trade associations form the base of the 
organisational network of employer interest. This 
organisational network is extended and reinforced by the 
other types of employer initiated and controlled bodies 
which are involved with labour matters.
Trade associations, eg. Steel and Engineering 
Industry Federation of S.A. (SEIFSA); Transvaal 
Clothing Manufacturers Association, etc.;
Co-ordinating bodies such as the Chamber of 
Commerce and Chamber of Industries, operating 
on city, provincial and/or national level - 
Transvaal Chamber of Industries, Johannesburg 
Chamber of Commerce, Federated Chambers of 
Industries, Associated Chamber of Industries.
Professional organisations (at least 10) such as 
the Institute of Personnel Management, Institute 
of Directors, etc.;
Promotion and pressure group organisations such as 
S.A. Foundation, Free Market Foundation and Urban 
Foundation;
Service organisations such as National Development 
and Management Foundation; National Occupational 
and Safety Associations;
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Specialised bodies such as the South African 
Employer Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs; 
Institute for Industrial Relations - jointly 
controlled with organised labour; etc.
It might be a corrollary of the effective penetration 
into the Government's administrative system that so little 
is known of the influence exercised and power wielded by 
these organisations. The lack of information regarding 
the objectives and activities of the S.A. Employers 
Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs is a case in point. 
This organisation representing 90% of all employers in 
South Africa adopted a committed stand on the international 
platform of the International Labour Organisation in 
1973 and 1977 regarding freedom of association. Yet 
it shuns publicity in South Africa.
One of the reasons for the low profile position adopted
is sensitivity towards Government reactions to the 
objectives of organised commerce and industry, particularly 
the necessity to challenge aspects of the separate development 
policy. It was only during the 1960's that organised
business became involved in pressures group activities with
Government Departments.
An article on 'Persuasion Business: the power of 
organised business' points out that business lobbyists 
emerged in Pretoria during the late 1960's to promote private 
enterprise interests. The move of the Federated Chamber 
of Industries headquarters to Pretoria facilitated this 
development. Why have such pressure groups been able to 
make an impact?
Economic imperatives forced a deviation from hard-line 
apartheid ideology, and a vacuum developed in economic 
thinking which the Government itself, still publicly wedded 
to out-dated policies, found hard to fill. Hence a
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willingness emerged amongst Government Departments to tap 
resources outside its own ranks (Management, 1 974) . The 
erosion of two areas of separate development policy is 
discussed in the next chapter.
Organised business and its spokesmen increasingly 
expressed concern during the 1970 decade about what was 
termed a tendency towards 'creeping socialism' by the 
Government. Initially attention was drawn to the fact that 
nearly half the White male population was employed in the 
civil service and that there was an increase in government 
departments. It said that since 1 97 8 the number of
employees in Central Government departments had increased 
by 400 per cent. A book published by the chief executive 
of a large Afrikaner controlled insurance company referred 
to the assault on private enterprise. The criticisms then 
changed to action. In 1976 the Free Market Foundation was 
established subsequent to a number of conferences on entre­
preneurship and the free enterprise, system.
In order to counter perceived influence of socialism 
amongst Black workers, many employers (Anglovaal, Afrox, 
Anglo Alpha Cement, Tongaat, etc.) included in the training 
programme for plant-based committee representatives, items 
on the function of business in the free enterprise system on 
the basis that 1 for free enterprise to effectively counter 
socialism, we must show the advantages of the system1 
(Management, June, 1977).
Yet this emphasis on the ideology of free enterprise 
did not automatically lead to acceptance of the operation 
of trade unions. Subsequent to the 1976 uprising in Soweto 
against Bantu education, the Transvaal Chamber of Industries 
drew up a memorandum for the attention of the Prime Minister 
which identified a number of issues as requiring urgent 
attention. Freedom of association was not amongst them.
The issues were*.
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because township Blacks see themselves as 
permanent urban dwel1ers and industry needs them 
on a permanent basis, the township where they 
reside should be granted municipal status with 
effective governmental powers;
ownership of land should be granted to urban 
Slacks;
adequate finance should be provided for housing;
basic township services should be provided - 
electrical reticulatio" of all premises; 
tarred roads, storm water drainage, telephones, 
shopping facilities, etc.;
influx control should be streamlined to eliminate 
requirements that Black workers unemployed for more 
than 30 days be ejected from their house; the curfew 
regulations, etc. should be cancelled, etc.;
discriminatory tax laws should be eliminated?
barriers in the occupational skill ladder should 
be removed.
(Financial Mail, August 5, 1976).
When the Urban Foundation was established by leading 
business leaders in November 1976, in response to the June 
1976 uprising in Soweto, a deliberate decision was taken 
not to refer to Black unions as this was perceived to be 
a sensitive issue with the Government.
Thus, although employers were prepared to fight for 
their interests as reflected in the analysis, they 
resisted strongly the re-emergence of Black unionism from 
1973 onwards. During 1975 employer organisations
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and employers responded in various ways to the remarkable 
increase in the number of Black unions. Admittedly 
employers faced an awkward dilemma in that the Department 
of Labour officials openly spoke against recognising 
Black unions, but they did not counter this pressure as 
had been done with other aspects of government policy 
(Dcuwes-Dekker, L., 1977).
The Federated Chamber of Industries accepted that 
'Black workers are manifesting an increasing interest in 
organising themselves into trade unions. It was felt that 
neither premature recognition should be. given, nor obstacles 
placed in the way of their development1. Stress was laic 
on the 'ability' of Black workers to organise themselves 
within a framework of responsibilities inherent in such 
representation in the negotiating process. When asked by 
the Sweet Food and Allied Workers1 Union to elaborate 
on this statement, no positive response was given.
The Steel and Engineering Federation of S.A. (SEIFSA) 
took a firm stand against Black trade unions in 1973 and urged 
companies to establish liaison committees - thereby
removing the initiative taken by union members in 
establishing works committees. However, a more flexible 
attitude emerged and SEIFSA did accept a seat on the Board 
of Trustees of the Institute for Industrial Relations in 
1976 indicating a willingness to acknowledge the existence 
of Black unions.
The Afrikaanse Handelsjnstituut adopted a more 
reactionary approach, particularly regarding the 1977 pro­
posed amendments to the Black Labour Relations Regulations 
Act (not. placed before Parliament) providing for industry­
wide committees. The industry-wide committees were regarded 
as potential for Communist infiltration. By making mistaken 
assumptions about trends in bargaining overseas, the 
Institute argued that decentralised company negotiation should 
be provided for. Centralised bargaining was dangerous
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because the strike potential is increased, left-wing 
control of leadership in Black trade unions becoming 
possible and centrally co-ordinated controlled trade unions 
would fall in irresponsible hands.
It is perhaps wry comment that two of the organisational 
structures identified by Bozzoli as forming part of the 
response to the 1946 Mine Workers' strike, were again called 
into action after the 197 3 Natal strikes. In fact, NDMF 
absorbed the Bantu Wages and Productivity Association and 
created a specialised department called 1 Operation Progress',
- since dissolved. In three years NDMF convened 4 
Conferences (approximately 200 delegates each form all over 
the country) to debate the question of Black labour relations. 
In order to ensure the co-operation of the Department of 
Labour, and participation of its Minister, there was a tacit 
agreement not to discuss Black trade unions, and 'industrial 
relations models' were designed in terms of the assumption 
that Black trade unions would not gain legal recognition.
The Conference and subsequent publications certainly 
focussed attention on the need for systems of representation 
for Black workers - something not considered prior to 1973. 
However, the anti-Black union ’ j.r*'.- was either explicitly 
stated or implied in these deliberations.
Amongst individual employers three broad positions 
emerged:
Certain companies faced requests from registered 
trade unions to give facilities to, but not 
recognise fully the parallel existed Black trade 
unions those unions they controlled. This 
situation in the Transvaal Clothing Industry where 
the 22 000 strong Black National Union of Clothing 
Workers had organising and stop-order facilities 
and participated in informal negotiations. Similar
but less developed positions prevailed, in the 
Tobacco Industry; Banking sector (Barclays/Standard); 
Footwear and related sectors, and the Transport 
sector (goods transportation).
This, union parallelism, if not paternalism had its 
roots in the policy of the registered trade union 
movement just after World War II - and reflected an 
understandable objective in terms of the unquestionable 
requirement of a united labour movement. However, 
whether it is a viable policy for future decades can 
be questioned. It ignores the dynamics of Black 
consciousness with its requirement of independent 
organisational platform from which, through equal 
representation, a move to form umbrella organisations 
can be considered.
Certain companies showed willingness to consider 
some form of relationship with Black trade unions, 
but were hesitant to formalise. Some of these 
companies supported the Institute for Industrial 
Relations as a positive step towards closer contact 
with Black trade unions. Others faced with specific 
requests to sign a recognition agreement with Black 
trade unions, refused as such but kept contact but 
in the meantime promoted the committee system.
Certain companies adopted a deliberate anti-trade 
union position and actively p/emote the human 
relations approach. Arguments used included that: 
the organised Black labour movement is not 
sophisticated enough and that the essence of labour 
relations is joint problem solving, and not conflict 
reconciliation through collective bargaining (S.A. 
Breweries); decentralised plant-based bargaining is
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the pattern for the future (General Mining); Black 
trade unions will be used by far left socialists as 
a political tool and collective bargaining must be kept in 
the family (the unions are no longer necessary 
approach of the Tongaat/Huletts Group).
The system of representation being proposed and 
actively introduced in terms of this latter approach 
and analysed in a subsequent chapter, is the vertical 
system of representation for the privileged few 
through the committee system,
A survey conducted in 1972 by Schlemmer and Boulanger 
contains some explanation for the anti-union approach,
Employers perceived the disadvantages of Black unions 
in the following order:
cause unnecessary trouble; 
vulnerable to outside infiltration; 
agitators;
malpractice elsewhere spill over; 
waste of time;
authoritarian/dictorial leadership; 
first step towards communism;
speak for themselves, not workers. (Schlemmer, 1972).
These reasonings suggest that management was 
reacting to negative images of unionism and were
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ignorant about the process of the institutionalisation 
of industrial conflict through recognition of the union.
3.4 Wage Regulating Instruments
The above description and analysis suggests that the 
process of collective bargaining as analysed in chapter one 
did not remain, if it ever was comphrensively, a basic 
feature of the interaction between registered trade unions 
and employers association. The registered unions were 
pre-occupied with the issue of race. Certainly individual 
employers were not challenged to reform their coercive 
employment practices and were satisfied that the question 
of regulating minimum wage rates and working conditions 
was handled by the employers association. In fact the 
relationship pattern between leaders of registered trade unions 
and employers associations tended towards collusion as the 
unions became less representative of the total labour force. 
Certainly, the registered unions could not command recourse to 
effective strike action as a last resort weapon and hence 
had to depend on other strategies to ensure continuation 
of their relation with employers. These strategies ranged 
from unstated right of management to introduce technologies 
as it saw necessary and accepting a decline in real 
earnings of Black workers.
The following part of this chapter deals with the 
type of wage regulating instrument which developed in 
primarily manufacturing industry. The information and 
statistics support the assumption that collusion was becoming 
an increasingly dominant component of the relationship.
In terms of the two labour laws minimum wage rates 
for workers in manufacturing industry, transport, commerce 
and related secondary sectors, are either arrived at through 
collective bargaining between trade unions and employers
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associations using the industrial councils (Industrial 
Conciliation Act) or determined by the State appointed wage 
board (Wage Act). Few private or house agreements exist 
and where they do they are based on the industrial council 
agreement for that relevant sector. The 1924 Industrial 
Conciliation Act established the principle that wages and 
working conditions should be determined at the industry 
level for a particular sector and not, as is the case for 
instance in the United States, at company level. This 
principle of centralised collective bargaining has never 
been challenged by employers or their associations. The 
determination of minimum wages and working conditions at the 
centralised level for a particular sector is advantageous 
as it still allows the individual company to pay workers 
above the minimum laid down and working conditions to be 
improved, but ensures that unfair competition at least in 
the area of labour costs is eliminated. The fact that the 
•! ndustrial council agreements were extended to cover non- 
parties with sanction of criminal proceedings for non­
adherence, reinforced this principle.
Industrial councils established for a particular 
sector by the employer association and trade union (only 
White, Coloured and Indian workers can register their 
trade unions), operate on the principle of self-government 
between those two parties. Industrial councils have been 
established primarily in manufacturing industry. The growth 
and development of industrial councils is reflected in 
Table 14 (Douwes Dekker, L., 1977).
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TABLE 14
INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS AGREEMENTS (OOO's)
Year No. Whites Coloureds" Asiatics Blacks Total Employers
1 930 25 45 3
1944 51 1 70 9
1955 108 370 1 9
1 965 92 610 25
1 968 98 194 146 49 444 833 29
1971 100 219 193 61 539 1 012 -
1974 104 194 223 68 580 1 065 39
The two parties to the industrial council participate 
jointly and equally in committees formed as forums for 
collective bargaining and other decision-making processes.
The joint agreements reflecting the institutionalisation 
of conflict of interests, deal with wages, working 
conditions, as well as social security benefit funds. The 
Industrial Conciliation Act provides for an extensive and 
flexible list of items which can be negotiated by these 
parties, emphasising the self-government principle. The 
industrial council system has developed two levels of 
activities, namely decision-making structure of the 
jointly controlled committees and the administrative 
machinery necessary to carry out any of the decisions taken 
and to operate funds which have been established. The 
administrative level is responsible for the policing of 
agreements to ensure that both parties adhere to the terms 
and conditions. Agents are employed to carry out inspections 
and to deal with any conflict of rights issues which might 
occur. As industrial councils are centralised bodies for a 
sector, problems are not, if there is a dispute, resolved 
at the place of work, but have to be referred to one of the
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committees. This is not conducive to the speedy and 
equitable resolution of grievances.
The agreement arrived at by the two parties can be 
extended, and normally is, by the Minister of Labour to 
non-parties, that is employers and workers not members of 
the registered bodies, and also in terms of a separate clause 
of the Act to the Black workers. In 1974 over half of the 
workers covered were Blacks.
As an instrument for the institutionalisation of 
industrial conflict, the industrial council system has the 
potential of being an effective body provided both parties 
are of equal or near equal strength. This requirement is 
essential because the industrial council is a joint body 
and hence if any party exerts due influence on it, it can 
control the nature of the services rendered and maintain 
the influence over its various activities. The secretariat 
employed to run the administrative level is accountable to 
both parties, but it is natural for the more dominating or 
powerful party to exert influence on those activities.
The investigating activities of the agents can in particular 
be curtailed and directed by employers when the workers are 
in a state of passivity due to repressive measures. The 
stronger party will also be able to exert influence on the 
content of any agreement entered into and the definitions 
used.
The registered trade unions being concerned with race 
instead of worker representative strength allowed the 
industrial councils to increasingly be controlled by 
employers associations. In cert,,in instances in fact the 
local Chamber of Industries acts as secretaries to the 
industrial council and control the administrative level 
of activities.
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As more than half the workers covered by industrial 
council agreements are excluded because Black workers are 
not defined as employees, the process whereby agreements 
are reached between registered trade unions and employers 
associations does not correspond to the requirements of 
collective bargaining. The registered trade union could 
not exert enough bargaining power and if necessary declare 
disputes because they were not representing the total labour 
force. The Botha Commission of Inquiry in fact noted in 1951 
1 the evidence available to the Commission on the point is 
sufficient to satisfy it that the interest of native workers 
have suffered in the process of collective bargaining between 
employers and employees. In some cases it would seem that 
their interests are deliberately sacrificed by the European 
employees in order to gain benefit for themselves1.
(The Industrial Legislation‘Commission, 1951).
The statistics contained in Table 8 and 10 of Chapter 2 
illustrate this point as well as evidence of poverty wages 
being paid by manufacturing industry. In 197 3 subsequent to 
the shock effect of the demonstration strikes, the National 
Development Foundation conducted a survey to determine wages 
paid to Black workers. Taking a conservative estimate of 
the poverty datum, line of R18-16 per week, the returns from 
1780 employers revealed that one third of the 206 187 male 
Black workers employed earned less than that poverty wage. Even 
more disconcerting 13,5% of those workers earned less than 
R10-50 per week which excluded them from contributing and 
hence benefitting from the unemployment insurance fund.
(Horrel, M., 1974, p.203)
The statistics in Table 15 summarise the extent to which 
Black workers have been excluded from social security 
benefit schemes operated by registered unions and employers 
on industrial councils. The number of Black workers 
covered by a pension scheme is high because of their inclusion 
in 1968 by the large iron and steel industrial council into 
their fund. Doubt has been expressed however whether all
142
As more than half the workers covered by Industrial 
council agreements are excluded because Black workers are 
not defined as employees, the process whereby agreements 
are reached between registered trade unions and employers 
associations does not correspond to the requirements of 
collective bargaining. The registered trade union could 
not exert enough bargaining power and if necessary declare 
disputes because they were not representing the total labour 
force. The Botha Commission of Inquiry in fact noted in 1951 
1 the evidence available to the Commission on the point is 
sufficient to satisfy it that the interest of native workers 
have suffered in the process of collective bargaining between 
employers and employees. In some cases it would seem that 
their interests are deliberately sacrificed by the European 
employees in order to gain benefit for themselves1.
(The Industrial Legislation‘Commission, 1951).
The statistics contained in Table 8 and 10 of Chapter 2 
illustrate this point as well as evidence of poverty wages 
being paid by manufacturing industry. In 1973 subsequent to 
the shock effect of the demonstration strikes, the National 
Development Foundation conducted a survey to determine wages 
paid to Black workers. Taking a conservative estimate of 
the poverty datum line of HI 8-16 per week, the returns from 
1780 employers revealed that one third of the 206 187 male 
Black workers employed earned less than that poverty wage. Even 
more disconcerting 13,5% of those workers earned less than 
R10-50 per week which excluded them from contributing and 
hence benefitting from the unemployment insurance fund.
(Horrel, M., 1974, p.203)
The statistics in Table 15 summarise the extent to which 
Black workers have been excluded from social security 
benefit schemes operated by registered unions and employers 
on industrial councils. The number of Black workers 
covered by a pension scheme is high because of their inclusion 
in 1968 by the large iron and steel industrial council into 
their fund. Doubt has been expressed however whether all
143
workers covered by this scheme '"31, because of administrative 
ineffectiveness, receive their .„ benefits. (Douwes Dekker,
L., 1974).
TABLE 15
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS ADMINISTERED BY INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS
1971 (COO's)
BENEFIT WHITES COLOUREDS ASIANS BLACKS
Medical aid 146 41 7 1
Medical benefit 11 76 31 40
Sick pay 140 115 40 53
Provident/
pension 188 152 51 391
As against 
possible 21 9 1 93 61 539
The industrial council system did not become for the 
Black worker an organisation to facilitate the 
institutionalisation of conflict of rights or conflict of 
interests. On the contrary the industrial council perpetuates 
the racially discriminatory practices of the wider society.
The following points reinforce this conclusion:
- Black workers and their leaders are excluded from 
the decision-making process of industrial councils.
Not only from the regular so-called collective 
bargaining process for a new agreement, but also 
from the other committees responsible for managing 
the funds of benefits established, and in particular 
the complaints committee responsible for handling 
disputes arising from different interpretations 
of the clauses of agreements and deciding on cases 
of alleged infringements brough forward by the agents
as a result of inspections.
- Black workers with few exceptions are excluded from 
social security funds.
Black workers cannot influence the service 
rendered by the administrative machineiy of the 
industrial council and hence have not been able to 
take up problems such as: underpayments, enforced 
overtime, wrongfull classification, wrongfull 
deductions, etc. in an effective manner.
Black workers have to contribute towards the 
upkeep of the administrative machinery of the 
industrial council through weekly deductions from 
wages.
Two further observations have to be made in regard to the 
above generalised analysis. Although the Coloured and 
Indian workers have legally protected union rights, their 
position in the registered union movement and hence bodies 
such as industrial councils is marginal. Secondly, the 
Black worker not covered by an industrial council is worse 
off,. However, the relatively advantageous position of the 
Black employed by companies covered by industrial councils 
is not because of the operation of any principle of 
industrial justice. Industrial Council agrements were 
extended in 1929 to cover Black workers because employers 
feared unfair competition if minimum wage rates were not 
laid down. It cannot be concluded however that the interests 
of the White workers were or are satisfactorily protected 
Certain y in terms of conflict of interest matters the 
White workers did experience improvements in their standard 
of living, but in terms of conflict of rights issues, it can 
be argued that many situations occurred where White workers 
were not ensured adequate redress for injustices experienced.
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This was partly due to the centralised level of operation 
of industrial councils and partly due to the fact that the 
registered trade unions did not develop effective shop 
stewards committees or union branches in the place of work.
The other wage regulating instrument is the Wage Board 
established in terms of the 1925 Wage Act. The Government 
appointed members of the Wage Board are responsible for 
inT astigating a particular sector which is not covered by 
an industrial council agreemen .vid on the basis of evidence 
submitted at public hearings, ■ c-'ll as by taking into
account the criteria of profitability of the industry, 
determine the minimum ' ges and working' conditions for that 
industry. Minimum wat rates established by the Wage Board 
are approximately 20% lower than rates for jobs negotiated 
through industrial council machinery, except the commercial 
trade where the registered trade union makes thorough 
representations. The policing of Wage Board Determinations 
is ineffective, furthermore, no social security funds are 
established.
It was envisaged because this wage regulating instrument 
is inferior to what can be achieved through the industrial 
council system, that as registered unions were established, 
they would ask employers associations to set up such as joint 
organisation. This development would have occurred if it 
had not been for the fact that Black workers could not 
belong to trade unions. Hence the pressure to establish 
industrial councils did not take place. The statistics in 
Table 16 show that in particular the number of Black workers 
covered by Wage Board determinations increased over 
the decades. As the statistics are not collected annually 
they reflect a trend rather than the actual position.
(Douwes Dukker, L ., 1 977) .
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TABLE 16
WAGE BOARD DETERMINATION (OOO"s)
Period Whites
-.............V
Coloureds ■^Asiatics Blacks
1937 - 1947 86 38 ^17 1 91
1937 - 1 959 109 45 237
1 947 - 1969 110 58 '17 291
1974 1 30 55 18 370
Investigations carried out subsequent to the 1 973
strikes not only demonstrated that the Wage Board lagged in 
regular review of wage rates, but did not cover important 
sectors. An inventory of determinations current at the end 
of 1973, by Horner, indicated that of the 74 determination,
37 were three or more years old and 6 were actually 10 years 
old. The year before the strikes 8 determinations were made, 
but in 1973 22 determinations were revised. (Horrel, et al., 
1975).
The 1973 amendments to the Black Labour Relations 
Regulations Act made provision for employers to put forward 
minimum wage rates which were published as wage orders. It 
is indicative of the lag in effective wage regulation ; at 
within months 111 000 Black workers were covered - previously 
there was no control over wage minima. Yet even so, the 
three wage regulating instruments cover only approximately 
1 million of the 2/4 million (excluding the mining and 
agricultural sectors) Black wage earners.
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3.5 Development of the Personnel Management Function
Personnel management as a specific function emerged in the 
19501s in response to, according to Bozzoli, the emergence 
of working class action particular the 1946 mine workers 
strike. The aims of personnel management activities 
were to ensure the 1 well being1 of employees, to improve 
employer-employee relations, and to build up a spirit of 
loyalty and team work in the company. The development of 
personnel management was facilitated by the establishment 
not only of its own Institute but the National Development 
and Management Foundation (NDMF), the Institute for Personnel 
Research, and the Bantu Wages and Productivity Association. 
The output of the organisations was very much in the human 
relations mode of looking after the welfare of the worker 
in order to obtained his loyalty and acceptance of 
managerial power. It was felt that Black workers were not 
ready for trade unionism in the sense that they would not 
accept the constraints of institutional control and 
leadership moderation (Bozzoli, B ., 1976).
The professionalisation of the personnel management 
function took place in the late 1960's and received 
considerable impetus in the early 1970 decade. In 1969 
the Institute of Personnel Management S.A. had a modest 
annual turnover of R8 000 and a membership of 890 spread 
around 5 branches and produced a roneod newsletter, By 
1976 membership had grown to 4 000 in 14 branches and the 
annual turnover had increased to R600 000. The full time 
staff of 20 persons were responsible for running a successful 
monthly publication which popularised new developments in 
personnel management and carried case studies of successful 
programmes; running on average 12 seminars or functions on 
related topics per month throughout the country; instituting 
a 2 year learner controls correspondence diploma in personnel 
management for which 1 000 persons employed in personnel 
fields had already been enrolled; holding annual conventions 
which brought together personnel practitioners throughout
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the country and also international experts in the field, 
in particular from America (Campbell, R., 1976).
The personnel management function in other words, 
developed during a period when the trade union movement was 
not only increasingly divided, but also powerless and without 
clear-cut objectives. Hence, it is not surprising that 
personnel managers did not believe that trade unions can 
play an essential role in regulating management labour 
relations and followed what has been referred to as the 
human relations approach. In a symposium discussion subsequent 
to the 1973 strikes the Director of the Institute of 
Personnel Management stated that in the past conflict of 
interest between management was perceived to be inherent, 
but he argued that a way could be found where 'management is 
beginning to define a common problem - at the point where 
the workers should see themselves jointly involved in a 
common enterprise'. (People and Profits, Panel Discussion,
1 973) .
The Institute of Personnel Management was hesitant 
in following the example of other employer organisations who 
did express support in policy statements for Black trade 
unions. The policy statement issued in 1976 by the IPM 
said that the legally established plant-based committee 
system in terms of the Bantu Labour Regulations Act, 'provided 
a worthwhile vehicle for the development of healthy industrial 
relations and a logical and valid approach to complex 
problems of improving communication between Black workers 
and management1. (Douwes Dekker, L . , 1 977) .
The personnel practices followed by the S,A. Breweries 
Group of companies as defined in 1970 are illustrative of 
the objectives major companies were setting for themselves 
in developing this function. The purpose was to obtain good 
communication and optimum job satisfaction from Black workers, 
concentrating on selections, job classifications, performance
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appraisal, fair remuneration through job evaluation, 
motivation, welfare, and pension fund coverage all in 
order to ensure a sense of security. Black graduates were 
employed as labour officers and formed the ’king pins' 
of these activities. Training manuals were developed by the 
Group in collaboration with the subsidiaries. Profit 
bonuses would be introduced by linking them into the 
performance appraisal. Plant-based committees had been 
established to ’air grievances', but it was hoped that they 
would become, 'more positive channels for communications 
both ways and would strengthen the identification of rhe 
individual with the enterprise, and vice versa'.
(Biesheuvel, S., 1970).
These objectives typify the human relations approach in 
particular the emphasis placed on the individual and 
implication that justice can be accorded to him. It is 
significant that the consultant to this Group of companies 
made the following observation in 1977. 'We personnel 
specialists would do well to ask ourselves whether we have 
been worthy of our wardship in relation to our Black workers, 
who, because they have no political power depend so much 
more upon use'. (Douwes-Dekker, L., 1976) This observation 
with the specific preference to 'wardship' was complete of 
the mark. Black consciousness which was emerging in particular 
denies the assumption of dependence. Furthermore, the 
issue of worker rights is overlooked. The company in 1976 
in fact refused to consider recognising a Black union.
Hence whatever the nature of the sentiments of concern 
about lack of political power, the policies adopted by the 
company prevented the emergence of the labour relations 
component of the industrial relationship and aimed to deny 
the power dimension of industrial relations.
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The philosophy underlying this sole stress on personnel 
management is paternalism. Blunter identified three 
characteristics of paternalism in relation to management 
practices:
a sense cf proprietorship over workers;
the possession of conclusive authority and 
control in matters affecting workers ;■
a sense of obligation and responsibility over
the welfare of the workers. (Douwes Dekker, L., 1977)
It is evident that those companies which had moved from 
the system of coercive employment practices and had adopted 
an approach similar to that described above displayed these 
characteristics. The relevance of Blumer's formulation is the 
third characteristic. That is the first two are justified 
because the personnel manager is able through the welfare 
function see to the needs of the worker. However, welfare 
activities are subservient to profitability, there are limits 
to what can be done and how much can be given. These 
limitations are even more restraint because the personnel 
management was subservient to other functions, such as 
marketing and finance. Very few personnel managers had 
attained the position of director and in general their 
salary scales were 85% that of the other activities, and 
in fact were not increasing as much (People and Profits,
1973, p.28). Thus there is no guarantee that welfare 
activities and benefits could command a fair allocation of 
wealth and would not be curtailed at times of economic 
decline. Hence a responsibility was being taken on in 
accepting the logical base of paternalism which in fact 
would not be fulfilled.
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One area which reflects the limitation of the human 
relations approach and its expression in paternalism is the 
application of job evaluation. Job evaluation as a 
procedural mechanism to establish wage rates on an objective 
basis by determing a standardised rational for wage 
differentials between jobs or tasks is important.
One such job evaluation system adopted in South 
Africa is the Paterson grading system which classifies 
the work and task of a job in terms of decisions made by 
the employee and skills required to perform the tasks.
The actual pay levels for the job grades would be decided 
upon by the pay curve in operation of a particular company. 
Whereas in first-world countries the rate of increase from 
grade to grade tended to be between 25% to 30%, in third 
world countries the increases tended to be much steeper ; 
increases of up to 50% appeared acceptable.
Because of the job colour bar wage, differentials in 
South Africa are based on the race of the incumbent rather 
than the job content, As van Coller points out two racial 
wage gaps can be detected. The restrictive practices gap 
which prevents Blacks from being employed in a job done by 
Whites. In such a case the custom developed for the 
Blacks in semi-skilled and unskilled jobs being paid in 
terms of a lower wage curve than that of the Whites in that 
there was no uniform pay curve to bring in the 
rates together. In situations where Black and Whites 
performed the same or equivalent work, the Whites earned 
more, ie. the equivalent work wage gap. These wage gaps 
are the practical consequence of the civilised labour 
policy which you developed in the period 1920 to 1930 to 
reinforce the job colour bar. The application of the 
Paterson system to South Africa has revealed that a mixture 
of first and third world pay scales and hence wage curves 
are ir operation. That is two wage curves can be drawn with
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a break in the pay scales between rates for Black and White 
groups causing if depicted graphically a dog's leg phenomenon. 
This evidence supports the statement that the industrial 
council system institutionalised discriminatory pay scales 
according to race and that individual companies follow that 
practice (van Coller, S., 1979, p.118). Hence the
problem facing personnel managers in companies who want to 
do justice to all employers: How can the wage curves be
unified ? Is the Personnel Management function influential 
enough for a company to agree to place all workers on a 
uniform pay curve which will have considerable cost 
implications in that Black wages must be upgraded?
Only one company has publically committed itself to 
eliminating the 'dog's leg' in the pay curve through upgrading 
the Black wages onto the lower extension of the White wage 
curve. The cost involved was R1.2 million.
The problems involved in achieving a uniform pay curve 
in terms of the first world pattern of smaller percentage 
differentials between unskilled and skilled workers cannot 
be solved by individual companies alone, let alone the 
personnel managers. It is a matter of concern that the 
development of the personnel management function in South 
Africa, although recognising racially discriminatory 
employment practices has not accepted that the most effective 
manner to seek reconiliation of the complex issues arising 
from decades of application of the job colour bar and the 
exploitation colour bar, is through institutionalisation of 
industrial conflict.
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3.6 The Emergence of Black Trade Unions
The fact that no legal recognition was afforded to Black 
trade unions in terms of the 1 92 4 Industrial Conciliation 
Act placed them in a serious vacuum or state of suspension. 
These unions when they wanted to become organisatally 
effective were not banned but neither given an opportunity 
to render a service to members through being party to wage 
and other agreements. They were denied the possibility of 
organisational development because the recognition phase of 
union development could not be entered. In the 1920 decade 
Black workers joined unions in large numbers, one estimate 
suggests over 100 000 workers belonged to the Industrial 
and Commercial Union. But this large general union had 
primarily identified political objectives and could not gain 
recognition for members from specific employers. During 
World War II the Black unions again came into prominence 
in that nearly 150 000 members belonged to unions affiliated 
to the Council of Non-European Trade Unions. These Black 
unions could have become viable in that certain employers 
were prepared to deal with them and officials from the 
Department of Labour assisted them in their representation 
at Wage Board hearings. In fact, the Smuts Government,after 
consultation with the Trades and Labour Council, was prepared 
in a proposed Bill to extend legal registration to Black 
unions. The analysis that the Black trade unions during 
World War II were becoming viable is borne out by the 
conclusion reached by the 1949 Botha Commission in terms of 
evidence submitted before it. The Commission stated that:
The 1951 Botha Commission ascertained that 1 it was 
satisfied that there are a number of African (Black) 
unions wnich are well organised and are conducted on 
correct lines. The leaders of some of these unions 
have in the past rendered considerable assistanc by 
adivisng against and restraining their members from 
taking direct action. They are able to place the 
case for the workers before wage-fixing bodies and 
some of them have shown indications of a measure of 
ability to negotiate with employers'.
(Industrial Legislation Commission, 1951),
154
However, instead of legislative support, a White 
backlash developed. This was generated by the following 
events ;- the Government's training scheme for
Black bricklayers; the 1946 Mine Workers strike involving 
70 000 Black miners and the return of ex-servicemen whose 
very absence had brought in Blacks into skilled positions 
during World War II. As is described in the earlier part 
of this chapter, these events led to the creating of the 
break-away right wing Sacola body. The racially dis­
criminatory legislation of the early 19501s brought into 
being SACTU which body,because of the circumstances^ perceived 
a political struggle instead of the need for issues such 
as union recognition to build up viable organisations.
Selznick observes that even if workers experience an 
injustice or a hurt this does not automatically lead to 
expectation of rights (Selznick, P., 1 969) . It appears 
that the nature of the coercive social order in the 1960 
decade imposed restraints which prevented the felt hurt 
or sense of injustice from evolving into legitimate 
expectations. The re-emergence of Black trade unions in 
the 1970's has been successful because of both the development 
of Black consciousness and certain relaxations in the socio­
economic order. A further facilitating factor was the 
activities of workers' educational organisations. What 
was the extent of Black worker discontent?
A study amongst Black workers in Durban conducted 
during 1972 revealed considerable extent of resentment 
(Schlemmer, L., 1 975) . The awareness was a focussed 
discontent, irrespective of education.
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Less than Std. 8 Std. 8 and above
Discontent about 
economic conditions 62% 62%
Discontent about 
general race 
discrimination 54% 56%
Discontent directed 
at Whites 44% 34%
The Black workers were not only discontent but aware 
of the extent of their deprived position relative to the 
White group. Schlemmer suggests that a sense of relative 
deprivation operates when there is a 'perception of rightful 
entitlement to rewards which are withheld or granted 
less freely than people consider to be justified1 .
The research showed that 6 out of 10 urban Blacks were 
aware of unjustified treatment or discrimination; perceived 
unfair restrictions; explained inequality in terms of lack 
of opportunity; access to capital, as well as the hostility 
of Whites; and stated that the problems of Blacks were due 
to White policies and the laws. It is pertinent to remember 
this research was conducted just prior to the 1973 strikes.
Research conducted in Durban in 1974 revealed that 
49% of the workers did believe that only collective action 
could bring improvement in their situation. Yet only 8%
belonged to a trade union.
As the authors state, :Here is the central feature 
of the Black worker situation - the gap between a relatively 
high consciousness expressed through a belief in collective 
action side by side with a lack of activity of a permanent
organisational kind'. (Webster, E., 1976).
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What was the nature of Black consciousness movement 
which developed in the early 1970 decade and become an 
ingredient of the propensity amongst Black './orkers to take 
out union membership? Webster points out that Black 
consciousness involves two basic propositions:
1 That Blacks have a certain common cultural 
and historical experience arising out of 
colonialism which they need to become aware 
of, ie. conscious;
That Blacks need to mobilise themselves as 
a group - show solidarity - in order to realise 
this new consciousness and translate it into 
power necessary to overcome White racism'.
(Webster, E., 1974)
Hence the issue was not only trade union rights for Blacks, 
but Black trade unionism.
For the actual and potential membership of the unions, 
the memory, of failure of SACTU leadership because of the 
direct political objectives, was still real. Hence the 
determination to establish sound relationships with employers 
(bread and butter politics) rather than direct political 
involvement.
The Black unions, did not, as organisations, directly 
associate themselves with the uprising in Soweto in June 
1976, although there was sympathy for the earlier stay-aways.
But as Armour Plate's legal strike in September 1976, showed, 
full support was given to tl' Glass Workers Union in their 
struggle for industrial justice and recognition of the union. 
This is also demonstrated by the specific objective of 
demanding recognition from employers where majority membership 
in a company was reached. The content of recognition agreements 
were formulated by the Johannesburg based Consultative 
Committee Unions in 1976.
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The re-emergence of unionism amongst Black workers after 
197 3 spread at a remarkable pace. Whereas in 1972 one large 
Black union operated, the National Union of Clothing 
Workers and small operations in the engineering and tobacco 
sectors^by 1976, 26 Black trade unions operated with a signed- 
up membership of 120 000 for most of the manufacturing 
sectors as well as commerce and banking.
Lewsen identified in 1976 three main groupings, namely:
The 5 Durban based unions affiliated to TUAC (Trade 
Union Advisory Committee), utilising the educational 
services of the Institute for Industrial Education.
The Johannesburg based Industrial Aid Society was 
linked to TUAC.
ina 9 unions based in Johannesburg loosely constituted 
under the Ad-Hoc Consultative Committee, utilising 
the educational services of the Urban Training 
Project.
The 10 unions established by parallel registered 
trade unions of whom 6 are affiliated to TUCSA 
(Lewsen, J., 1 976) .
Lewsen records the following differences between the 
three groupings.
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The above brief sketch of trade union development amongst 
White and hence Coloured and Indian workers, as well as the 
Black workers, can be related to the phases of trade union 
organisational developments. Certain of the White craft 
trade unions gained recognition at the turn of the century 
but the other craft trade unions moved from the stage of 
hostility and unstructured conflict to recognition only when 
the Industrial Conciliation Act gave them a legislative 
existence which employers could not ignore. The industrial 
White unions only gained recognition, in spite of the legal 
support as the experience of the Garment Workers Union bears 
out, in the 1930 decade. Employers initially did not perceive 
neither the union nor the industrial council as an effective 
mechanism to institutionalise industrial conflict. These 
trends again support how essential it is for the legal frame­
work to support the expression of freedom of association in 
order to break the power of the employer. The White 
registered trade unions entered the third phase of organisational 
development after World War II. This was facilitated by a 
centralised mode of operation in the industrial council 
system as well as the involvement of the registered craft 
trade unions on the apprenticeship board and apprenticeship 
committees set up in terms of the Apprenticeship Act of 1942.
When social security legislation in terms of the Unemployment 
Insurance Act and Workmens Compensation Act were enacted, the 
registered trade union leaders were also given a seat on the 
local as well as national bodies set up to attend to any 
problems or functioning arising out of the services rendered 
by those Acts. The registered trade union movement was so 
embroiled in the whole concept of race as a criterion for its 
existence, that it never developed as a movement any specific 
ideology. Thus the fourth phase of organisational development 
where unionism becomes involved in some form of work 
participation was never identified as a goal by the White 
controlled registered trade unions.
As indicated above the Black trade union movement 
did not break out of the first phase of unstructured conflict
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up to the 1970. Hostility towards Black trade unions 
enforced by legislation persisted throughout this period 
and O'Meara has drawn the conclusion that in fact after 
World War II the approach towards Black trade unionism 
was marked by institutionalised violence. The Black trade 
union movement which re-emerged in the 197 0 decade 
therefore faced the challenge of breaking into the second 
phase of union recognition in order to become effective 
organisationally. However, because of the emphasis placed 
both by the State and employers for the work place committee 
system as an alternative to unionism, the Black trade unions 
had to include effective recognition in the work place in 
their recognition demands. The Coloured and Indian trade 
unionists did not express awareness of this need and can 
be said to have been incorporated into the existing union 
movement during the 1950 to 1970 period. Whether the concern 
of the re-emerged Black trade union movement during the 
1970 decade with work place or plant-based relations contains 
that basis for some form of demand for workers' 
participation in management decision making processes can 
as yet not be assessed.
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CHAPTER 4
CRACKS WITHIN THE SYSTEM OF CONTROL
The foregoing description and analysis has highlighted 
the increasing entrenchment through legalisation of the two 
systems of control. It was particularly in the 1960 decade 
that the practical implications of separate development 
were imposed. The purpose of the 1968 promulgation of the 
Bantu Labour Act regulations was to prevent further 
urbanisation of Blacks. Other measures such as halt to 
building of houses and secondary schools aimed to reverse 
the belief amongst Blacks that they were permanent members 
of South African society. In that same decade increasing 
attempts were made to ensure through job reservation that 
Blacks remained 1 hewers of wood and carriers of water1.
But any system of control must in the face of economic 
development and changing values adapt to pressure if it is 
to maintain its power. If the need for such flexibility is 
not acknowledged, evidence of serious contradictions and 
anomalies can be expected as well as tensions within those 
groups suppressed by the control instruments.
In the ten year period after 1963 South Africa 
experienced an unprecedented large scale inflow of foreign 
capital which highlighted the artificial shortage of labour 
created by the two colour bars and revealed the nature of the 
duality in the economy. What evidence can be found that the 
lack of flexibility in applying separate development policy 
was creating serious strains and challenges within the two 
instruments of control because of economic development.
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Are there inherent contradictory forces within the system 
which would challenge its foundation?
Is the allegiance between employers and the State irreversible? 
Would the new generation of Black unions in the attempt to 
gain freedom of association again be suppressed by the 
repressive legislationf or would cracks appear in the 
system of control offering opportunity for development.
4.1 Economic Imperatives and Government Policy
The following description of events illustrate how the 
demands of economic development brought about the erosion of 
two important areas of Government policy, namely:
Black advancement into jobs perceived to be the 
preserve of White workers?
Training of Blacks in the so-called White areas.
During the 1970 Parliamentary debate, the Minister of 
Labour said that Whites and 'Non-Whites' (Blacks, Coloureds 
and Indians) should not work together in the same employment 
situation, and no White person should work under a 'Non- 
White ' person. 1 It is and remains Government policy that our
metropolitan areas, our White cities, will in future become 
Whiter and not Blacker... The Government deems the survival 
of Whites to be far more valuable than any temporary economic 
benefit'. The Minister of Bantu Administration said that 
Blacks must not be allowed to enter into top strata of labour, 
skilled jobs and managerial positions, in order to meet 
shortages, for this would lead to labour equality and to 
integration in residential areas, social matters and political 
authority in Parliament. The Prime Minister said that through
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gain freedom of association again be suppressed by the 
repressive legislation, or would cracks appear in the 
system of control offering opportunity for development.
4.1 Economic Imperatives and Government Policy
The following description of events illustrate how the 
demands of economic development brought about the erosion of 
two important areas of Government policy, namely:
Black advancement into jobs perceived to be the 
preserve of White workers;
Training of Blacks in the so-called White areas.
During the 1970 Parliamentary debate, the Minister of 
Labour said that Whites and 1 Non-Whites1 (Blacks, Coloureds 
and Indians) should not work together in the same employment 
situation, and no White person should work under a 'Non- 
White' person. 1 It is and remains Government policy that our
metropolitan areas, our White cities, will in future become 
Whiter and not Blacker... The Government deems the survival 
of Whites to be far more valuable than any temporary economic 
benefit1. The Minister of Bantu Administration said that 
Blacks muot not be allowed to enter into top strata of labour, 
skilled jobs and managerial positions, in order to meet 
shortages, for this would lead to labour equality and to 
integration in residential areas, social matters and political 
authority in Parliament. The Prime Minister said that through
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decentralisation incentives, the labour-intensive industries - 
(and the clothing industry was so identified as he said 
it should not have been allowed to be developed in those 
areas in the first place) - should provide work to the 
Blacks in the homelands (Horrel, M., 1972).
These political objectives run counter to the manpower 
requirements of the economy. In three specific attempts, 
discussed below, the Government had to give up its initial 
stated objectives.
The Government introduced a Bantu Law Amendment 
Bill in 196 9 which would grant the Minister concerned dic­
tatorial powers to implement job reservation in 
offices and shops. That is, the Minister could 
prohibit the employment of Blacks as:
counter assistants or salemen in shops or cafes; 
receptionists;
telephonists or switchboard operators in 
offices, shops, factories or hotels;
clerks, cashiers or typists in shops, offices 
or factories.
The South African Federated Chambers of Industries 
said it would be difficult to enforce such 
restrictions on the use of Blacks, and applied 
for total exclusion of the manufacturing 
industry from this job colour bar on the employment 
of Blacks. The Government modified its stand, but
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even the revised version of the Bill was described 
as 'completely unacceptable'. Nothing was done by the 
Government to implement this job reservation. In 1979 
the provisions were repealed from the legislation.
This was a definite reversal of a political goal 
because of economic imperatives.
In 1969 the Government appointed an Inter-Departmental 
Committee on the Decentralisation of Industries for 
the purpose of making recommendations for the more 
effective implementation of the policy of industrial 
decentralisation. If the Verwoerdian dream of return 
3f urban Blacks to the homelands was to be realised 
by 1978, industry would have to be relocated to the 
border areas, between South Africa and the homelands, 
and in the homelands. The Government in its White 
Paper stressed that every effort should be made to 
provide employment opportunities in or near the 
homelands for the Blacks. To achieve expansion of 
industry to those areas, the ratio of Black to 
White was fixed to 2:1 in the urban Pretoria- 
Witwatersrard and-Vcreeniging area. The Physical 
Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act was used 
to enforce these requirements. When the initial 
negative sar.cf.1 rifi failed concessions and financial 
incentives were granted so that manufacturers could 
recover the cost of moving to a border area.
The industry which most seriously felt the attempts 
to control expansion in the urban areas was the 
clothing industry in the Transvaal. But instead of 
the expansion taking place in decentralised areas 
(border-industries and the homelands) the clothing 
factories moved to the other existing areas, namely 
Cape Town and Durban. When serious legislative 
attempts were made by the authorities in the second
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part of the 1970 decader concerted protests were 
lodged by organised industry. Towards the end of 
the 1970's, concessions were made to the clothing 
industry regarding the employment of Blacks in 
the so-called White area. The attempts to decentralise 
industry in terms of the ideology of separate 
development failed.
The Minister's statement that the survival of the 
Whites was more important than the economic 
development, was a denial of the process that had 
started in the early part of the 1960 decade whereby 
Blacks increasingly occupied jobs previously held 
by Whites. The following events describe how 
this Black advancement was achieved.
A standing committee of management and White union 
representatives was established on the Railways in 1961 
to investigate the need or otherwise, of allocating work 
done by White graded staff to semi-skilled or unskilled 
labour. As a result, by 1970, one thousand four hundred 
and eighteen Blacks, Coloureds and Indians were 
'temporarily' employed on work normally performed by White 
graded staff - mainly as flagmen, trade hands, shed 
attendants, and stokers and deckhands on tugs and dredgers. 
In addition, fourteen thousand two hundred and ten Blacks 
(including a small number of Coloureds and Indians) were 
performing work formerly done by White railway workers 
(Horrel, M., 1971). Notwithstanding this progress and 
because the White unions refused to let Blacks do certain 
jobs such as firemen, conductors or station foremen, a 
serious shortage existed. That is, in 1969, of the 212 000 
authorised posts, 28 000 or 13% were vacant.
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But this progression of Blacks into White jobs was not 
accompanied by social justice. The Blacks occupying White 
jobs were neither given commensurate status nor paid the 
same wages which the Whites received. This racial dis­
criminatory practice explains also the large gap in average 
earnings between the race groups. In 1968, the monthly 
wages were: Whites R241, Coloureds R61, Indians R47,
Blacks R45. In the public service in general, Blacks in 
similar posts to Whites (ie. doing the same work) received 
only 50% - 60% of the wage a White worker received.
It is significant that the economic realities of 
labour shortages were first tackled on the Railways, ie. 
part of the Government service. It was also in the 
Government service that in the 1970’s control over White 
wage increases was introduced, ie. higher wage increases 
were given to Blacks and White wages were frozen so that 
Whites experienced a reduction in standard of living.
The Artisan Staff Association calculated that cost of living 
increased by 116,5% from December 1972 to May 1979, while 
wages only went up by 43% - a backlog of 73,5%.
Further evidence that economic pressure demanded Black 
advancement came from the engineering industry during the 
industrial council negotiations for the 1968 agreement. The 
White craft unions gave into demand from employers that 
Blacks be upgraded when it was agreed that the four top jobs 
be reserved. 1 Because of the downgrading of many jobs, a 
large proportion of Blacks gained small increases in wages. 
Some jobs performed mainly by Blacks were downgraded by 
more than one category, the result being that newcomers to 
this work were to receive a lower wage than previously 
payable. In fact, workers employed in lower grades would 
receive wages below poverty datum line1. (Forrel, M., 1 969) 
Basically a considerable job fragmentation exercise was 
achieved. When the agreement had to be renegotiated in 
1970, the employers wanted to downgrade and reschedule about 
300 further tasks in the main job categories. The unions
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resisted this. 'It was decided that a possible revision 
of work schedules would be discussed subsequently by 
technical committees of the industrial councils for each 
manufacturing process. If so decided, exemptions from 
the agreement would then be sought1. (Ibid.) During the 
following years, the trade unions regularly granted 
exemptions to employers to utilise Blacks in the higher 
j0 0 categories.
A further tactic adopted by White craft trade unions 
in ansuer to the pressure exerted by employers for Blacks 
to be employed in higher skilled jobs, was to establish 
a category of artisan aides. The aide would be allowed 
to do artisan work except for some specific functions.
The category of artisan aides was widely used in 
artisan trades from 1968 onwards as a means of formalising 
the practice whereby Blacks did 'White' jobs without 
receiving commensurate increase in pay or status improvement. 
This happened in the printing industry in 1970, in the 
motor industry in 1969, in the mining industry in 1973, 
and on the railways in 1972. In the engineering industry, 
the process of exemption was used from 1970 onwards to allow 
Blacks entry into jobs previously reserved for Whites.
In 1968, the White craft union in the motor repair 
industry announced that it had forbidden its members to 
nelp train Coloured or Indian - let alone Black - apprentices. 
But something had to be done because of the shortage of 
qualified mechanics. The ratio of operating vehicles 
per mechanic in SOuth Africa was 106 in 1969 and increased 
to 146 by 1975, whereas in Europe it was 95 vehicles per 
mechanic. How then were cars repaired? Through the 
introduction of repair shop assistants. As Bendix observes:
* The job description of the repair shop assistant 
representing the semi-skilled labour category, 
reflects a job competence approaching that of 
a practicing mechanic rather than mid-point between
1 68
the skills of a labourer and journeyman. In 
essence, the repair shop assistant as defined 
in the main agreement of 1974, can be 
regarded as a mechanic'. (Bendix, D.W., 1977)
Yet the laid down wage of the repair shop assistant in the 
1977 Industrial Council agreement is RO-7 9 per hour or 4 8% 
of that of a journeyman; and this is after 18 months 
experience.
As is evident from the inability to apply job 
reservation and the introduction of this artisan aid 
category, the registered trade unions preferred the short­
term solution of job fragmentation rather than permit of 
the indenturing of Coloured and Indians let alone 
Blacks as apprentices.' When the shortage of skilled artisans 
became acute in the late 1 960' s, the question of the better 
utilisation of manpower was at that time also raised at 
the level of the Prime Minister's Economic Advisory Council.
A committee of this Council was established to make 
recommendations under the Chairmanship of Mr. Geyser, who 
was then the Secretary for Labour. The Commission was 
subsequently incorporated into the Commission on 
Decentralisation of Industry. In 1971 the Government tabled 
its White Paper in response to that Commission but no 
legislative charges were introduced.
The interpretation by the Department of Labour of 
this Government policy during the next decade was as 
follows:
the indenturing of Coloureds and Indians would 
not be permitted unless application for the 
registration of the apprentice was supported 
by the relevant Apprenticeship Committee 
and that meant the White craft trade union,
169
or when there were no Whites available for 
employment;
the indenturing of Blacks as apprentices outside 
the Black homeland areas was not permitted.
(Horrel, M ., 1972)
The Minister of Finance announced in 1973 that an 
Inter-Departmental Committee had been appointed to 
investigate the desirability and . . feasibility
of a system of pre-service training and in-service 
training of Black workers for industrial categories in 
White areas. This step marked a radical change in Government 
policy. Previously it had always been maintained that 
Blacks would not be trained in White areas. The Minister 
of Labour said as late as May 1972: 'The poli i of this 
Government ... is to refrain from training and using them 
(Blacks) in White areas. That is and remains the Government 
policy1. However, even the Ninth Manpower Survey published 
by the Minister's department early in 1973, recorded a 
shortage of 5% or 95 655 White workers. This included a 
shortage of 18 800 artisans and 4 700 apprentices in the 
following trades: metal and engineering, electrical, motor, 
building and ladies hairdressing. (Horrel, M., 197 3)
Obviosuly the ideological stance could not be maintained.
The Inter-Departmental Committee in fact recommended that 
the Department of Bantu Education was to establish eight 
training centres for Blacks in their townships where basic 
training would be offered. Money would also be. available 
to assist in the establishment of private industrial training 
centres in industrial complexes in White areas (Horrel, M., 197 4
Three conclusions can be drawn from the above 
description and course of events. On the one hand economic
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criteria and requirements were successfully challenging 
the specific attempts to make a reality of separate 
development ideals. However, at the same time, as the 
quotations bear out, a cleavage or division was becoming 
apparent in Government policy makers. But although the 
verkramptes were losing out to the verligtes in certain 
instances, this did not imply that the overall policy was 
changing nor that the rdie hards' did not influence policy 
planning and implementation. Thirdly, the breakthrough in 
developments in terms of economic criteria did not mean 
that social considerations in terms of industrial justice 
would be incorporated in the changes brought about.
4.2 The 1973 Strikes
On the 9th January 1973, the entire labour force of 2 000 
workers employed by Coronation Brick and Tile Company in 
Durban went on strike. Within the next 4 months in the 
Durban area over 100 000 workers employed at 146 companies 
had been involved in some form of demonstration action.
The textile industry in particular was hard hit as the 
workers at 26 out of 41 textile companies stopped work 
(Institute of Industrial Education, 1974). The strikes were 
spontaneous demonstration stoppages as no clear cut demands 
were made except for a general request for increases in wages. 
Furthermore, in general, no negotiators were elected although 
management urged workers when the stoppage occured, to 
elect spokesmen. Furthermore, the strikes were of short 
duration. The strikes were broken because although employers 
used the technique of 'negotiation by sacking' to coerce 
workers back to work again, in the majority of cases workers 
were given increases in wages of between R1.50 and R2.50 
per week.
The strike at Coronation Brick and Tile was mainly due 
to the below poverty wages paid and the expectation that a 
new wage determination would soon be published. The Wage
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